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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three papers that separately study product quality in interna-
tional trade, the governance’ effect on FDI and the agency problems in firms’ exporting
decisions.
The first chapter quantifies the contribution of differences in quality preferences to the
differences in gains from trade across countries. The quantification demonstrates that vari-
ations in the strength of quality preferences across countries add to heterogeneities across
countries in market competitiveness. If the quality channel is shut down, countries with
stronger preferences for quality have larger degrees of underestimations in their losses from
the trade barrier. Finally, gains from a universal rise in quality preference are unequal among
countries, with larger economies generally gaining more than smaller economies.
The second chapter proposes a theoretical model to micro-found firms’ optimal choice
of FDI location, and sourcing and production, allowing for many countries, industries, and
heterogeneous firms. We arrive at the main hypothesis that predicts an institutional com-
plementarity pattern across countries in bilateral FDI flows at both the firm and country
levels. We conduct an extensive test of the theory using worldwide bilateral FDI data at the
firm level and at the country level. The results indicate a statistically significant assortative
matching pattern in the institutional qualities of FDI origins and destinations.
The third chapter incorporates financial constraints into agency problems of firms. We
show that under the same conditions, managers of potential exporting firms around the
export threshold exert more efforts in financially under-developed countries to induce their
owners to export. This finding has very positive policy implications, as firms in financially
under-developed countries can compete with their peers in financially developed countries
by exerting more managerial efforts. We find clear empirical evidence for this theoretical
prediction using World Management Survey data for more than ten thousands firms from
around 20 countries during 1999 – 2010.
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1. Heterogeneous Firms in Trade: Quality Matters
1.1. Introduction
Trade economists have paid particular attention to the role played by product quality
in international trade. Under quality sorting, more efficient firms produce higher-quality
goods, enter more competitive markets and charge higher prices,1 which enriches conven-
tional efficiency-based trade theories.2 Additionally, quality differentiations across firms and
markets can explain price variations in exports and imports.3 Finally, the product quality
is related to welfare gains from trade.4
This paper analyzes differences in quality preferences and technologies among countries
and investigates the impact of these differences on gains from trade. Despite the growing
literature linking quality, price and welfare, little has considered the contribution of qual-
ity either to cross-country differences in market competitiveness or to unequal gains from
trade. In addition, this paper is the first to quantify the countries’ heterogeneities in quality
preferences and costs from both demand and supply sides. In this paper, I investigate this
problem using a combination of empirical, theoretical and structural analyses. Two findings
emerge from this analysis: first, differences in quality preferences among countries enlarge
the inequality in gains from trade; second, a universal rise in quality preferences brings higher
gains to larger economies.
To provide micro-foundations, I use a recent Chinese firm-level export transaction dataset
to explore firm-level evidence. Evidence from this dataset shows that firms charging higher
prices sell to larger countries, earn higher revenues and enter more markets. The positive
relationship between price, revenue, and market entry is strengthened in sectors of high
research and development (R&D) intensity. Typically, R&D intensity can be viewed as a
proxy for scope of quality differentiation in Manova and Zhang (2012). Additionally, I choose
two sectors with different levels of R&D intensity - tobacco (R&D intensity approximately
zero) and pharmaceutical (R&D intensity approximately 50%). In the pharmaceutical sector,
the positive relationship between price, revenue and market entry still holds. However, in
tobacco sector, price is negatively correlated to revenue and the destination market size. The
evidence reveals that the price is positively correlated destination market size, firm revenues
1See, for example, Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Baller (2015), Crozet et al. (2012), Demir (2011) and
Eckel et al. (2015).
2Conventional heterogeneous firm trade theories include Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
3See, for example, Mandel (2010).
4See, for example, Fan et al. (2018)
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and market entry in a subset of sectors only. This implies that price reveals quality only in
selected industries and that some sectors are homogeneous with limited quality differentiation
space.
Motivated by these stylized facts, I extend the framework of Antoniades (2015) into the
multi-country and multi-sector setting. The framework introduces quality differentiation
into Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) (MO, thereafter). According to Antoniades (2015), firms
compete along the quality dimension as well as cost dimension so that more productive
firms charge higher prices because they can produce higher-quality products. I also extend
Antoniades (2015) so that a firm can produce multiple products. The extension suggests that
more productive firms produce more products with higher average qualities. On the demand
side, quality preferences are homogeneous within a country and sector. On the supply side,
the cost of improving quality is embedded in both variable and sunk costs that firms have
to pay.
In the multi-country setting in this paper, it is possible to assess spillover effects of the
bilateral trade liberalization and the preference shock. The spillover effect is unique to this
multi-country model. A bilateral trade liberalization between two countries can generate
negative effect on competitiveness of other countries. The effect on the third country is
higher, the larger the trade-liberalizing economies. Apart from that, a positive preference
shock on one country could have positive effect on competitiveness of other countries. This
occurs since quality differentiation scope in selling to that market are widened following pos-
itive preference shock. Firms in all countries respond by rising quality of goods sold to that
market. The responses are higher for more productive firms. Therefore, the productivity
threshold of entering the market with preference shock rises. As for other countries without
shocks, the least productive firms cannot profitably export to the market with the positive
preference shock. This makes this group of firms unable to cover the sunk cost of entry.
Thus, the least productive firms are driven out of the market, in all countries. The pro-
ductivity thresholds of other countries without preference shock could also rise. The larger
the country with preference shock, the higher the effects on productivity of other countries.
Finally, if the trade liberalization negatively affect competitiveness of a third country, higher
quality preference alleviate the negative effect. If the trade liberalization positively affect
competitiveness of a third country, higher quality preference strengthen the positive effect.
This occurs since higher quality preference have positive selection effect.
The multi-country setting of this paper enables computation of equilibrium. I bring the
model to data to estimate the relevant parameters of quality in the model. An extended
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gravity model can be derived from the above theoretical framework. In addition to the
bilateral trade costs and the importer/exporter fixed effects typically included in a gravity
model estimation,5 I include (a non-linear function of) quality preferences and costs into
the the gravity equation. According to this gravity model, bilateral trade flow is positively
affected by the destination country’s quality preferences and negatively affected by the origin
country’s costs of improving quality.6 I parameterize that gravity equation to estimate
quality preferences/costs parameters as well as trade costs. After the estimation, I recover
two measures of the degree of competition for each country-sector pair. The first measure is
endogenous competitiveness. This is the productivity threshold above which firms can make
non-negative profits. Thus, before a firm makes a random draw of productivity, a firm will
be, ex ante, less likely to enter a market where the cutoff productivity is high and competition
is fierce. The second is the exogenous measure of competitiveness. This is the fundamental
productivity level in a market. Firms are more likely to draw a high productivity if the
level of fundamental productivity is higher. I follow Corcos et al. (2011) and estimate the
endogenous competitiveness first and back out the exogenous competitiveness using free-
entry conditions.7
The structural analysis suggests that quality preferences are related to income and that
considering quality enlarges differences in competitiveness across countries. First, the pref-
erence for quality is positively correlated with GDP per capita in more than half of the
sectors studied.8 This indicates that for these industries, the preferences for quality are on
average stronger in richer countries. Second, the distribution of preferences for quality vary
across sectors. The variance of the estimates across countries is particularly large for certain
sectors such as HS 85 (Electrical machinery and equipment), which is 56.19, and small for
certain sectors such as HS 37 (Photographic or cinematographic goods), which is approxi-
mately 9.94.9 These findings are, to some extent, consistent with empirical evidence on the
correlation between price and market size.10 For example, Khandelwal (2010) and Kneller
and Yu (2016) finds that prices are a good proxy for quality in some industries but not in
5The original gravity model starts from Tinbergen (1962) and is augmented by Anderson and Wincoop
(2003).
6The details of this are discussed in the Section 1.3 and Section 1.4.
7This is discussed in detail in Section 1.4.
8For the rest of sectors, GDP per capita has insignificant effect on quality preferences.
9As for the cost of quality, it is found that the mean is smaller than the preference parameters within the
same sector and the variance are also smaller.
10Syverson (2007) among other, reports a negative correlation between market size and output price, while
Verhoogen (2008) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) report positive correlations.
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others. I compare the endogenous competitiveness estimated from this model with that esti-
mated from the MO canonical model. Comparing across countries by sector, it is noticeable
that endogenous competitiveness is more dispersed under this model. This more dispersed
distribution can be explained by the additional heterogeneity introduced by differentials in
both quality preferences and costs of improving quality among countries.
A counterfactual exercise is performed to examine the competitiveness-enhancing effect of
quality. Exogenous competitiveness and quality parameters are kept constant. I experiment
with a 5% universal increase in international trade costs. This exercise is implemented under
both this model and the MO model. In general, the productivity cutoffs, which measure
the endogenous competitiveness, decrease in both models. This implies that the average
productivity is lower and the economy becomes less competitive. Quantitatively, the decline
of the productivity cutoff is 25% to 300% larger in this model with quality than that it is in
the MO setup (depending on the sector). Furthermore, the differences between this model
and the MO model in degrees of the declines of productivity cutoffs rise in the magnitude of
preferences for quality, in most sectors. If consumers value quality more in some countries,
the difference between the rise of productivity cutoffs in this model and in the MO model
will be larger in these countries than the difference in other countries where quality is not
valued. This suggests that gains from trade across countries are more heterogeneous than in
a canonical model, in which quality is considered.
For the second counterfactual exercise, I simulate a universal positive shock in preference
for quality. Although quality preferences are exogenous to this model, they can change
over time by promoting consumers’ awareness of product quality. Most countries experience
gains in productivity of less than 141.2%. Approximately 25 countries experience a loss in
productivity. The total gains in productivity is nearly 5 times the total losses in productivity,
from the global scale. It is noticeable that large economies generally gain more than small
economies. On average, 1% rise in population size leads to 7.876% more gains in productivity.
This finding is consistent with the model implication that larger economies have wider scope
for quality differentiation.
Quality in international trade has been intensively studied, but existing work pays lim-
ited attention to sources of quality variation from both the demand and the supply side and
does not link them to heterogeneity among countries. Hallak (2006) estimates the demand
for quality across countries on the demand side. Other studies focus more on firms’ behavior
in quality improvement (Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015), among others). Nevertheless, An-
toniades (2015) reconciles both the demand and the supply sides into a single theoretical
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framework. This paper uses a more general framework and compares predictive differences
between that quality-extended model and the MO model.
The analysis of this paper provides new insight into the sources of unequal gains from
trade from a quality perspective. That countries do not gain equally has been well doc-
umented. Gains from trade can be divergent among countries of different sizes (Markusen
(1981), among others) or incomes (Trela and Whalley (1990), among others). A recent study
by Anderson and Yotov (2016) suggests that free trade agreement (FTA) can bring -0.3%
to 5% gains to different countries. However, little literature provides explanations for the
unequal gains across countries. The paper points out and quantifies the strengthening effect
on competition brought by higher quality preferences and quantifies it.
The paper relates to three strands of literature: heterogeneous firms’ quality choices,
pricing-to-market and non-homothetic preferences. Trade liberalization induces firms’ quality-
upgrading behavior (Fan et al. (2015), among others). Larger plants have higher output
prices and use more expensive materials (Kugler and Verhoogen 2012).11 This paper em-
braces the above findings by allowing quality choices to be endogenous to firms such that
prices and markups vary with plant size and productivity. The model also includes findings
by Feenstra and Romalis (2014) that export unit values vary to a larger extent than quality-
adjusted prices.12 Finally, the study, by estimating quality preferences and relating to the
country-level income, incorporates non-homothetic preferences proposed by Fajgelbaum et
al. (2011).13
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 uses firm-product level
trade statistics to explore the relationship between price, market features and firm exporting
performances. I use these statistics to show the micro foundations of the model. Section 1.3
lays out the theoretical framework under a multi-country and multi-product setting. Section
1.4 discusses the data and how relevant parameters are estimated. Section 1.5 implements
the counterfactual analysis. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
11Other studies include Manova and Zhang (2012).
12Atkeson and Burstein (2008) finds that price deviate from purchasing power parity.
13Similarly, Fieler (2011) proposes that richer households consume higher-elasticity goods more thus lead-
ing to more trade flows between high income countries than between low-income ones.
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1.2. Stylized Facts
1.2.1. Data
In order to document stylized facts regarding f.o.b. export prices across destinations and
across firms within the same destination, I use a unique micro-level data and two sets of
macro-level data. The specific micro dataset used here is the China Customs Trade Statis-
tics (CCTS) issued in 2013 by The General Administration of Customs. The advantage of
this dataset is that it is highly disaggregated in recording the import/exports of Chinese
firms. Additionally, it records the prices of exports/imports, origins/destinations of im-
ports/exports, the product (HS8) of the transaction, and the mode (ordinary or processing)
of international trade. I use the CEPII-Dist dataset to obtain bilateral characteristics of des-
tination countries and China. The Penn World Table dataset is used to obtain population
of destination countries.
1.2.2. Empirical Findings
In this subsection, I report three stylized facts concerning export prices across destinations
and across firms within destinations. Although the existing literature such as Manova and
Zhang (2012) has documented these findings, it is important to show that they hold in the
more recent years. Moreover, these are the facts to be embraced in the model and that lay
the micro foundation in the model setup.
On export prices across destinations — Based on the entire customs export data in
2013, Table 1 reports the regression results using (log) export prices as the dependent vari-
able and destination country’s population as the main explanatory variable, controlling for
destination’s GDP per capita and distance to China. Columns 1-2 use the prices at the
firm-HS8-country level and Columns 3-4 use HS8-country level. The coefficients on (log)
population in all specifications are significantly positive, suggesting that export prices in-
crease with the destination’s market size, consistent with Manova and Zhang (2012). Thus,
it is summarized as the following fact:
Stylized Fact 1: On average, firms set higher export prices for the same product in larger
markets.
On export prices and revenues - Table 2 presents robust evidence that firms charging
higher export prices earn greater revenues even within very narrowly defined destination-
product markets. In Columns 1-2, I use prices at the firm-HS8-country level and Columns
3-4 I use prices at firm-product level. This relationship is highly statistically significant.
6
Importantly, it is also markedly stronger for goods with greater scope for quality upgrading,
as proxied by sectors’ R&D intensity compiled by Kroszner et al. (2007). The magnitudes
and signs of estimated coefficients are relatively robust to different specifications and differ-
ent level of aggregations. The elasticity of export prices with respect to revenues is 0.15. A
doubling in firm sales in a given market is thus associated with 20% higher bilateral unit
prices for the average product. That number is bigger for sectors with higher R&D intensity.
This yields the following fact:
Stylized Fact 2: On average, firms charge higher prices simultaneously earn greater rev-
enues in each destination. The correlation between price and revenue is higher in R&D
intensive sectors.
On prices and market entry -As reported in Table 3, exporters that supply more countries
systematically charge higher average prices (Columns 1-2). Firms selling to more destinations
also exhibit greater price dispersion across importers (Columns 3-4). In this table, I use prices
(or price dispersions) at firm-HS8 product level. These results are both largely enhanced by
products with substantial potential for quality differentiation. As columns (2) and (4) show,
the patterns are stronger for sectors with larger scope for quality differentiation, which is
proxied by sectoral R&D intensity, defined as before. The finding is consistent with Manova
and Yu (2017) and Manova and Zhang (2012) which use earlier versions of CCTS. This
finding suggests the following fact:
Stylized Fact 3: On average, exporters entering more destinations and offering a wider
range of export prices charge higher prices. The correlation between price and market entry
is higher in R&D intensive sectors.
One caveat is that the above relationships can be sector-dependent. The above relation-
ship exist only in a subset of sectors. In Figure 1 and 2, I plot the above 3 stylized facts
for sector HS 24 (Tobacco) and HS 6, respectively. The findings of the three stylized facts
continue to hold in the sub-sample of HS 6, while they are reversed in HS 24. From Figure
(1a), the average price decreases with destination market size. Firms charging higher prices
earn lower revenues, as in Figure (1b). The relationship between the firm’s price charged
and the number of market it entered (Figure (1c)) is not as significant as in sector HS 6 (2c).
The comparison suggests that competition improves quality in only a subset of sectors. This
is also consistent with the Table (2) -(3) where the relationship between price, revenue and
market entry are "more positive" in R&D intensive sectors. In sector 30 (Pharmaceuticals),
the average R&D intensity is approximately 58% while that ratio of sector 24 is 0.
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1.3. Theory
I lay out theoretical frameworks that incorporate endogenous quality choices in the linear
demand system. The demand side features heterogeneous quality preferences among different
countries; In addition, quality upgrading requires additional variable and fixed costs such
that producers endogenously choose the level of quality in their products. The model is
built on a multi-country basis for the convenience of quantification in subsequent empirical
studies. For simplicity, sector notations are dropped as there are no interactions between
them.
1.3.1. Setup
I follow the framework of Antoniades (2015) and Foster et al. (2008), the preference of a
consumer in country j is represented as (1). This utility function has the advantage that the
price/quantity are linear in quality preference
Uj = q
c
0 +
∑
s
[
αs
∫
ω∈Ωs
qs(ω)
cdω + κjs
∫
ω∈Ωs
zs(ω)qs(ω)
cdω
]
−
∑
s
[
1
2
γs
∫
ω∈Ωs
(qs(ω)
c)2dω +
1
2
ηs
(∫
ω∈Ωs
qs(ω)
c
)2]
(1)
where qc0 and qs(ω) are individual c’s consumption in numeraire and differentiated goods
(in sector s) respectively. The quality of each variety ω is given by zs(ω) and the taste for
quality by consumers in country j in sector s is κjs. In the above utility function, κjszs(ω)
is equivalent to the variety-specific taste shifter in Foster et al. (2008).14 If qualities of all
varieties are zero or if the taste parameters are zero, the model becomes traditional Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) model. Finally, αs and ηs capture the degree of substitution between
each variety and the numeraire. The parameter γ measures the degree of differentiation
between varieties. κjs picks up the degree of preference for variety. Specifically, κjs are
assumed to be positive and differ across countries and sectors.
This generates a linear inverse demand function that depends on both quantity and
quality:
pj(ω) = α− γq(ω)c + κjz(ω)− ηQc (2)
14The difference between this paper and Foster et al. (2008) is that the latter regard the shifter as the
idiosyncratic term.
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where Qc =
∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)
cdω. By re-arranging (2) one can obtain the total demand in country
j of each variety:
qj(ω) = Ljq(ω)
c =
αLj
ηNj + γ
− Lj
γ
pj(ω) +
Ljκj
γ
z(ω) +
ηNjLj
γ (ηNj + γ)
p¯j − ηNjLjκj
γ (ηNj + γ)
z¯j (3)
where p¯j = 1Nj
∫
ω∈Ω pj(ω)dω is the mean price over all varieties in country j, z¯j =
1
Nj
∫
ω∈Ω zj(ω)dω
is the mean quality over all varieties in j. This form of preference over quantity and quality
ensures that demand function is linear in price and quality.
On the supply side, firms have to incur costs in both production and quality improve-
ments. For simplicity, labor is assumed to be the only factor of production. As with most
heterogeneous firm trade models, firms have to pay a sunk cost fe before they draw the pro-
ductivity c (marginal cost of production). If a firm in country i produce and sell to country
j, it should choose both the quantity and the quality of its product, given the total cost
function:
TCij(ω) = qij(ω)(τijc+ µizij(ω)) + δzij(ω)
2 (4)
where τij is the ice-berg trade cost from country i to j and zij is the quality level of goods
sold from i to j. The first term implies that firms have to incur additional marginal cost of
quality upgrading,which depends on both quality level zij and quality improving technology
at origin country µi, when producing in country i; the second term picks up the fixed cost
of improving quality. To generate closed form solutions, I assume that the fixed cost is a
quadratic function of quality level. A more generalized function form in the fixed cost can be
found in Fan et al. (2015) in which CES preference is assumed. In the cost function (4), the
marginal cost of upgrading quality differs across countries/sectors, since labor productivity
are heterogeneous across countries. The multiplier in the fixed cost δ is assumed to be
identical across countries, since the fixed costs of innovation across countries, which include
high-skilled workers, tend to be homogeneous across countries.15
15This assumption is made since the highly skilled labor migrate to regions where wages are high, according
to Parikh and Leuvensteijn (2003). Therefore the wage for high skilled workers tend to converge over time.
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1.3.2. Firms’ Problem
For a firm (of marginal cost c) from country i selling to each (potential) market j ∈ J , it
chooses quantity and quality to maximize profit:
piij(c) = max
qj(ω),zj(ω)
pij(ω)qij(ω)− TCij(ω) (5)
Given the demand structure, the quantity of goods sold from country i to country j satisfies
a linear function with respect to price pij:
qij(c, z) =
Lj
γ
[
cjD − pij(c, z) + κjzij
]
(6)
where cjD is the cost threshold so that firms with marginal cost of production c ≤ cjD/τij can
sell to market j and make non-negative profits. Equation (6) shows that demand is linear
to both price and quality. This makes it convenient for later analysis in optimal pricing.
Given the demand function and the firms’ problem, the optimal price and quantity as a
function of quality z is linear in marginal cost16:
pij(c, z) =
1
2
(cjD + τijc) +
1
2
(κj + µi)zij (7a)
qij(c, z) =
Lj
2γ
(cjD − τijc) +
Lj
2γ
(κj − µi)zij (7b)
where cjD is the cost-cutoff in country j, above which firms cannot profitably sell in market
j. This is also the endogenous competitiveness of country j (lower cutoff, more endogenous
competition), which changes with factors such as ice-berg trade costs, quality parameters
and market size. Thus, that the profit of selling to market j can be re-written as
piij(c, z) =
Lj
4γ
[
(cjD − τijc) + (κj − µi)zij
]2 − δz2ij (8)
Solving for the first-order conditions for profit, the optimal quality choice to sell from i to j
of firm c is written as a decreasing function of marginal cost so that more productive firms
offer higher quality within a market
zij(c) = ρij(c
j
D − τijc) (9)
16Per unit trade cost (τij − 1) c does not depend on quality
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where ρij = Lj(κj−µi)/ (4δγ − Lj(κj − µi)2). As Equation (9) shows, the quality is linearly
related to marginal cost c. Consistent with other international trade in quality literature,17
for the same firm c from country i, it is expected to offer higher quality goods to larger
markets and countries with higher taste for quality. Higher quality is also expected from
countries with higher labor productivity in quality improvement (i.e., lower µi). It is no-
ticeable that at the first glance, a lower cutoff resulting from trade liberalization seems to
have negative impact on quality updates. However, a lower cutoff indicates that the average
marginal cost is also lower, since firms with marginal cost above the new cutoff exit the
market. Since firm-level quality z(c) decreases with c, the average quality of products sold
in the economy rises. That effect is higher the larger quality differentiation scope ρij.
Given optimal quality function in (9) and price/quantity functions, it is evident that
price and quantity can be further expressed as
pij(c, z) =
1
2
(cjD + τijc) +
1
2
(κj + µi)ρij(c
j
D − τijc) (10a)
qij(c, z) =
Lj
2γ
(cjD − τijc) +
Lj
2γ
(κj − µi)ρij(cjD − τijc) (10b)
So the for each firm with marginal cost of production c, the operating revenue of exporting
from country i to j is:
rij(c) =
ρij
(
(cjD)
2 − (τijc)2
)
+ δρ2ij(κj + µi)(c
j
D − τijc)2
κj − µi (11)
Equation (10) and (11) implies that other things equal, more productive firms charge higher
prices and earn greater revenues from each destination, if (κj +µi)ρij > 1. This is consistent
with Stylized 2 in the prior section.
The operating profit can be expressed as18:
piij =
Lj
4γ
[1 + (κj − µi)ρij] (cjD − τijc)2 (12)
Profit function in (12) implies that countries of higher quality preferences offer higher profits,
all else being equal. This is related to the third stylized facts. From (12), more productive
17For example, see Fan et al. (2018) in which more productive firms offer higher quality products with
lower quality-adjusted costs.
18Following Antoniades (2015), the fixed cost of upgrading quality is also regarded as sunk since this model
is not dynamic.
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firms earn higher profits and earn non-zero profits in a larger set of markets.
This profit function is a quality-adjusted form of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), in which
profits are magnified by a term larger than one. This quality-adjusted term is key to the
later empirical analysis.
1.3.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the free entry condition of each country implies that the expected profit
(earned from selling to each market) of a firm is zero. Such that that
∑
j∈J
∫ cJ(c)D /τij
0
piij(c)dGi(c) = f
i
E (13)
where fE is the sunk cost a firm have to pay prior to entry. It is assumed to be positive and
can vary across countries and sectors. Equation (13) implies that operating profit from all
markets are expected to merely compensate for the sunk cost.
Following prior literature, it is assumed here that marginal cost draws follow Pareto
distribution: Gi(c) =
(
c
ciM
)k
so that firms draw the marginal cost c from the range [0, ciM ].
The term ciM is the exogenous competitiveness in market i. Lower values indicates that
a firm in country i is more likely to draw a lower cost. The power k governs the Pareto
distribution dispersion: higher k implies that the distribution of c is more concentrated.
Given profit as in (12), one can re-write the equilibrium condition in (13) for country i
so that the summation of expected profit from each market equals the sunk cost paid.
∑
j∈J
Lj
4γ
[1 + (κj − µi) ρij] τ−kij (cjD)k+2 =
(k + 1)(k + 2)γfe
2
(
ciM
)k (14)
The same equilibrium condition can be written for each country h, in the matrix form. In
the multi-country case, the vector of cost threshold cD for each country j satisfies:
B ∗ L ∗ cDk+2 = 2γ (k + 1) (k + 2) fecMk (15)
where matrix B is the the "quality adjusted" matrix of trade freeness. If there are a total
of J countries, the dimension is J × J . This matrix is represented as the following form:
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B =

[1 + (κ1 − µ1) ρ11] τ−k11 [1 + (κ2 − µ1) ρ12] τ−k12 . . . [1 + (κJ − µ1) ρ1J ] τ−k1J
[1 + (κ1 − µ2) ρ21] τ−k21 [1 + (κ2 − µ2) ρ22] τ−k22 . . . [1 + (κJ − µ2) ρ2J ] τ−k2J
. . .
[1 + (κ1 − µJ) ρJ1] τ−kJ1 [1 + (κ2 − µJ) ρJ2] τ−kJ2 . . . [1 + (κJ − µJ) ρJJ ] τ−kJJ

It is noticeable that whether elements in B are larger or smaller than one depends on the
trade freeness, κ’s and µ’s. If trade cost is small (i.e., τ−kij is larger) and κj is large, i, jth
element can exceed one.
The matrix L is of dimension J ×J and is the diagonal matrix of market size Li for each
country i:
L =

L1 0 . . . 0
0 L2 . . . 0
. . .
0 0 . . . LJ

The last term on the right-hand-side of (15) cDk+2 is the vector of cutoffs (to the power
of k+ 2), with the ith element being (ciD)k+2. On the right hand side of Equation (15), ckM is
the vector of exogenous competitiveness (to the power k), with ith element being ci,kM . Both
ckD and ckM are of dimension J × 1.
By inverting matrix B, cost threshold cjD for each country j can be computed as follows:
(
cjD
)k+2
=
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)fe
| B |
∑
i | Cij | (ciM)k
Lj
(16)
where | B | is the determinant of matrix B and Cij is the cofactor of Bij. A closer examina-
tion of the matrices and Equation (16) implies that higher market size Lj leads to a lower
calculated cutoff, all else being equal.19 If ice-berg trade cost is symmetric, i.e. τij = τji,
bilateral trade liberalization can have heterogeneous effects on cost cutoffs of different coun-
tries. Following this argument, bilateral trade liberalization can have negative externalities
on countries without trade liberalization.
Proposition 1. If ice-berg trade cost is symmetric, i.e. τij = τji, the effect of a bilateral
trade liberalization between i and j on cutoffs is not universal i.e. ∃ k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., J} such
19This also holds under multi-product setting in Appendix A.1.
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that ∂c
k
D
∂τij
> 0 and ∂c
k′
D
∂τij
< 0. Additionally, ∃ B such that ∂ciD
∂τij
, ∂c
j
D
∂τij
> 0 and ∂c
k
D
∂τij
< 0, ∀k 6= i, j.
The larger the trade liberalizing economies, the higher the effects on the cutoff of country
k ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 QED
The intuition for the negative externalities is comparable to the special case of two-
country world. It is driven by the long-term entry.In the long run, the market entries in
trade-liberalizing economies rise. This drives up the competitiveness, i.e. the cost cutoff
decrease as a result. For other countries without trade liberalization, the profit from selling
to these markets are higher, relative to countries with trade liberalization. This results in
decreased entries and higher cost threshold.
Another implication from (16) is on the effect of a preference shock, i.e. a change in κj,
on cutoffs of countries.
Proposition 2. The effects of a shock in preference for quality κj of any country j on cutoffs
are universal, i.e. ∃ B such that ∂ckD
∂κk
< 0, ∀ k. The larger the country with preference shock,
the higher the effects on the cutoff of country k ∈ {1, ..., J}
Proof. See Appendix A.2 QED
The intuition for this lies in the selection effect. Quality differentiation scope in selling to
that market are widened following positive preference shock. Firms in all countries respond
by rising quality of goods sold to that market. The responses are higher for more productive
firms. Therefore, the productivity threshold of entering the market with preference shock
rises. As for other countries without shocks, the least productive firms cannot profitably
export to the market with the positive preference shock. This makes this group of firms
unable to cover the sunk cost of entry. Thus, the least productive firms are driven out of
the market, in all countries. The productivity thresholds of other countries without any
preference shock also rise.
Additionally, the average bilateral f.o.b price p¯ij and trade value rij can be computed by
aggregating over c ∈ [0, ciD]20
p¯ij =
1
2
[
2k + 1
k + 1
+
1
k + 1
(κj + µi) ρij
]
cjD
τij
(17)
20Trade value is computed based on f.o.b price.
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This is related to the first stylized fact, which links price with market size. From (17), one can
observe that market size affect price both by decreasing the cost cutoff cjD and by increasing
the scope for quality differentiation. If the latter dominates, the relationship between price
and market size is similar to Figure (2a), otherwise, it is closer to (1a).
The total trade value from i to j
rij =
kNEi (c
i
m)
−k
2γ
Lj(τij)
−(k+1) (cjD)k+2 [1 + (κj − µi)ρij]( 1k(k + 2) + (κj + µi)ρijk(k + 1)(k + 2)
)
(18)
where NEi denotes the expected number of entrants in country i. From Equation (17) and
(18), the quality components have two effects: higher µi raises prices and reduces the trade
values because of the additional (variable) costs incurred in manufacturing higher-quality
goods in the origin country. Higher quality preferences in the destination country raise the
willingness to pay and thus average price and trade value rise. Another countervailing effect
is that, higher quality preferences drive down the cost cutoffs in the importing country thus
to some extent lowering prices and values.
Finally, one can compute other aggregate variables, which are the number of varieties,
entries, price indexes and welfare. The expected number of varieties in a country j (i.e., the
number of producers from domestic and abroad servicing market j) is similar to the M.O
model multiplied by a quality-adjustment term that is negatively related to κ (of the market
j) and positively affected by µ (of each sourcing country). That can be characterized as:
Nj =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− cjD
cjD
1
1 + (κj − µ)ρ
(19)
where [1 + (κj − µ)ρ] = {[1 + (κj − µ1)ρ1j]N1j+[1 + (κj − µ2)ρ2j]N2j+...}/Nj. Nkj denotes
the number of varieties sold from country k to country j. Equation (19) indicates that a
higher preference for quality can be countervailing: κ can directly lower the number of
varieties because it imposes higher requirements for the quality firms offer to market j such
that fewer firms can meet the high-quality requirement. On the other hand, higher quality
preferences lower the cutoffs as is previously argued, which then encourages entry by raising
average profits.
One can solve for the number of entrants by noting that the number of producers from
origin to destinations depends on the exogenous competitiveness of the origin country and
the cutoff in the destination country. Equation (19) can be used to solve for the number
of entrants in each country. Notice that the number of bilateral varieties Nij satisfies the
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following condition
Nij = N
E
i ∗G(cijD) = NEi τ−kij ckj (ciM)−k
For each country j, the total number of varieties from each sourcing country should equal
Equation (19), which can be represented in the following condition
∑
i∈J
NEi [1 + (κj − µi)ρij] (τijciM)−k =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− cjD
cj,k+1D
(20)
Under the multi-country set-up, refer to M.O model, re-arranging (19) leads to the fol-
lowing condition:
D ∗ ckM ∗NE = F (21)
If there are J countries, D has the dimension of J × J and is the transpose of matrix B:
D =

[1 + (κ1 − µ1) ρ11] τ−k11 [1 + (κ1 − µ2) ρ21] τ−k21 . . . [1 + (κ1 − µJ) ρJ1] τ−kJ1
[1 + (κ2 − µ1) ρ12] τ−k12 [1 + (κ2 − µ2) ρ22] τ−k22 . . . [1 + (κ2 − µJ) ρJ2] τ−kJ2
. . .
[1 + (κJ − µ1) ρ1J ] τ−kJ1 [1 + (κJ − µ2) ρ2J ] τ−k2J . . . [1 + (κJ − µJ) ρJJ ] τ−kJJ

The second term on the left hand side c−kM is the diagonal matrix of c
i,−k
M and is also
dimension of J × J written as
ckM =

c1,−kM 0 . . . 0
0 c2,−kM . . . 0
. . .
0 0 . . . cJ,−kM

and the third term NE denotes the vector of entrants with dimension J ∗ 1. The i− th
element is NEi .
On the right-hand-side, matrix F is of dimension J ∗ 1 and the i− th element is
2γ(k+1)(α−ciD)
ηci,k+1D
The average price in a market is obtained by aggregating over the average delivered price
over destinations. Using the bilateral price in (17), it is implied that the (weighted) expected
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price levels in country i are as follows:
pi =
2k + 1 + (κi + µ)ρ
2(k + 1)
ciD (22)
where (κi + µ)ρ = [(κi + µ1)ρ1iN1i + (κi + µ2)ρ2iN2i + ...] /Ni. From (22), similar argument
can be applied: higher κ can lower the cutoff thus lowering the price index. However, this
raises prices, since the consumers could have a higher willingness to pay for high quality.
Finally, the welfare in country i is as follows:
Ui = 1 +
∑
s
[
1
2
Ni(αs − p¯i + βz¯i)2
γs + ηsN
+
Ni
γs
(
1
2
σ2p +
1
2
β2σ2z − βCov(p, z)
)]
= 1 +
∑
s
1
2ηs
(αs − ciD)
[
αs − k + 1
k + 2
ciD +
(κis − µs)ρjis
k + 2
ciD
]
(23)
where the quality component (κis−µ)ρjis
k+2
is defined in the similar manner as previous. Other
things equal, higher valuation on quality always raises welfare: it directly raises welfare
by raising the utility obtained from consuming higher quality goods; it indirectly increases
welfare by reducing the cost cutoff so that more productive firms enters and provide higher
quality goods.21
The above derivations indicate that the existence of quality can be double-sides. The sub-
sequent proposition argues that if the quality scope is high, the quality preference amplifies
the effect of the trade cost change.
Proposition 3. The larger the scope for quality differentiation 1 + (κj − µi)ρij (i, j ∈
{1, ..., J}), the more likely the selection effect of quality preference κj, i.e. ∂
2(chD)
k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
smaller.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. QED
1.3.4. Discussion
The theory sketched above is based on linear demand, and it addresses the point of pricing-to-
market. Specifically, it relates market toughness to the behavior of firms, and consequently,
21The third term in the square bracket has the opposite effect compared with the first two terms. I
attempted to compute the last term (multiplied by 12η (α − ciD)) and found that its proportion to the total
welfare is less than 5%.
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to the economic aggregates such as price index and welfare. In such a setting, market tough-
ness operates through two channels: an increase in competition and an increase in the scope
for quality differentiation. The theory identifies the second channel through which market
toughness affects firms’ outcomes. An increase in market toughness (e.g., an increase in
market size or a decrease in trade costs) raises the scope of quality differentiation because it
makes it easier for firms to recover the fixed cost of innovation. Under such circumstances,
each firm responds by raising quality, mark-ups, and prices. The (endogenous) relation be-
tween the scope of quality differentiation and market toughness is a key element of the model
and constitutes an important deviation from past work.22 For the most productive firms,
quality, prices and profit rise as the innovation effect dominates the competition. These firms
can earn positive profit from exporting to more competitive market. This features the advan-
tages of exporters. The theory provides clarity on the relation between prices, productivity,
market shares, and quality. In heterogeneous firms’ trade models, if no quality is present,
these models predict a negative correlation between prices and productivity. However, if
quality is present, and if higher quality indicates higher prices, then the correlation between
prices and productivity, and (possibly) between prices and firm size becomes positive. Fur-
thermore, since these models produce a quality sorting along the productivity axis, then the
correlation between prices and quality is also positive.
The model is also connected to prior theoretical frameworks. For example, Fan et al.
(2018) modified CES utility by allowing positive baseline utility. The derived price is then
positively related to the destination market’s income. Variable markup is implied by this
modification. The slight difference from this model is that quality does not depend on market
size. The implications of the model are also consistent with other forms of extensions of
Melitz-Ottaviano under quality framework. For example, using slightly different extensions
of the MO framework with quality, Bellone et al. (2016) confirms the dominance of the
quality-enhancing effect of competition using French firm-level data.
Furthermore, the setting can be extended to multi-product case. For instance, Eckel
et al. (2015) discovers that core products have lower costs so that firms have more incentives
to invest in upgrading quality in these groups of products. I follow Mayer et al. (2014) and
extend the current framework by allowing firms to sell more than one product to a market.23
The implications are isomorphic to this extension. Under this setup, it is concluded that
22These include works using CES framework, for example Gervais (2016), Mandel (2010) and Fan et al.
(2015), etc.
23Details of setup and derivations are in Appendix A.1.
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higher product customization costs lead to a more competitive market. For individual firms,
rising market competitiveness exerts a larger effect on quality improvements of products
closer to the core.
1.4. Quantification
This section discusses the dataset used in the study and the methodologies to compute
relevant parameters. I focus on sectors that are for final consumption, since producers and
consumers can have different attitudes towards quality.24 As there is no sectoral interaction
here, I carry out estimations sector by sector. According to the theoretical model, the
parameters to be estimated are as follows: 1) preference κi,s and cost µi,s for each country
i and sector s; 2) cutoffs (endogenous competitiveness) ci,sD for each country/sector; and 3)
cost upper-bound (exogenous competitiveness) ci,sM . Finally, sector s refers to HS 2 product
level. As one step in the counterfactual analysis, I perform the quantification under quality
model and M.O model.
These are the steps to estimate the model:
Step 1. Given the bilateral trade flow in the data, the bilateral trade cost τij can be
estimated using aggregate bilateral trade flow in (18).
Step 2. Obtain the residuals from the first step estimation and compute preference for
quality κi and cost of improving quality µi for each country i, using Generalized Method of
Moments.
Step 3. With the above set of parameters, the cost cutoff (endogenous competitiveness,
ciD) of each country is projected using bilateral price in (17).
Step 4. With parameters from the above three steps,the exogenous competitiveness
(multiplied by fixed cost fe) ciMfe can be computed from free entry condition in (15).
1.4.1. Data
The main dataset used here is the BACI world trade database provided by CEPII. The origin
of the dataset is COMTRADE of the United Nations Statistical Division. The advantage
of BACI data is that it reconciles records of both exporter and importer when there are
inconsistencies in the transaction records from both sides (Gaulier and Zignago 2010). Thus,
the dataset is more accurate since the reliability of the reported data of both exporter and
24Sectors for intermediate use, capital investment and final consumption are recognized by Broad Economic
Classification (BEC) conversion.
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importer are evaluated and cross-proofed. Another advantage is that the dataset is highly
disaggregated: it reports the bilateral trade value and quantity at the HS6 level for more
than 5,000 HS6 sectors.
To complement the dataset, I collect bilateral remoteness data to proxy for ice-berg
trade cost. The major statistics is from GeoDist data compiled by CEPII. This dataset
records bilateral information on distance, and other variables used in gravity equations to
identify particular links between two countries. These variables include colonial relation,
common languages, the contiguity (Mayer and Zignago 2011). Further, data on bilateral
regional trade agreement and bilateral common currency relations are collected from de
Sousa. These variables are used to proxy bilateral ice-berg trade cost. Finally, I proxy
market size by population and this dataset is from Penn World Table.
I obtain Pareto distribution parameter from a global firm-level database. Here I use
Orbis dataset for this purpose. The ORBIS database (compiled by the Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing, BvD) is a commercial dataset, which contains administrative data on
130 million firms worldwide. ORBIS is an umbrella product that provides firm-level data
covering approximately 100+ countries, both developed and emerging, since 2008. This
dataset covers both public and private firms. I access the financial module to obtain firm-
level variables. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), I use total asset, employment and
material cost (either recorded in the original dataset or imputed by subtracting the total
cost of employees from the cost of goods sold) to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) at
the firm level. To get k, I regress firm ranking (in TFP) on (computed) firm productivity.25
This gives k = 3.38.
Prior to the empirical studies, some summary statistics for the feature of the data are
displayed first. Table 4 reports the number of observations for each HS 2 sector. A small
number of observations in one sector indicates that zero trade occur very frequently. It is
implied that sectors are heterogeneous in international trade transactions: HS 61 and HS
62 (clothing) has the most observations, followed by HS 85 (machinery/equipment). Table
5 and Table 6 report the number of HS 6 products a country imports (Table 5) or exports
(Table 6). From Table 5, the USA imports the highest number of products, followed by
Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom. From Table 6, China and the USA export the
highest number of products, followed by Netherlands and Italy and United Kingdom. To
some extent, a large exporter can also be a large importer. Finally, it is evident in Table
25I use Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to compute TFP. In the sample of firms, the majority consists of
manufacturing.
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5 and Table 6 that the distribution of the number of HS 6 products exported/imported is
uneven across countries. Some countries import/export fewer than 100 products.
Another stylized fact lies in the f.o.b price. Figure (3a) displays the relation between (log
of average) f.o.b price and (log of) GDP per capita in the destination country for the sector
of 020422 (meat sheep or goats; fresh, chilled or frozen). The price to a destination market
is the average f.o.b price across all source countries exporting to that destination. Figure
(3b) presents for the sector of 940169 (Seats). These two sectors are chosen since they have
many importing countries. From the graph, it is implied that sectors can be heterogeneous
in relation between price and destination market income. Therefore, the ’quality sorting’
channel can exist only in a subset of sectors. The finding is to some extent consistent with
Manova and Zhang (2012), which reveals that firms charge higher prices in richer destinations
within a firm-product category, using Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. It is also consistent
with with Kneller and Yu (2016), which uses the same dataset as Manova and Zhang (2012)
and finds that quality sorting (competition raise quality and price) exists in a subset of HS
2 industries while some other industries have efficiency sorting (competition lowers price).
1.4.2. Quality Preference and Cost Parameters
I recover quality preference and cost parameters based on the estimation of the gravity
equation. According to (18), the bilateral trade flow can be decomposed into origin fixed
effects, destination fixed effects, bilateral trade costs and a non-linear function of κj and µi.
Specifically, I estimate the following gravity equation for each HS2 sector s (I suppress sector
notation here):
ln rij = δi+ δj− (k+1) ln τij +ln [1 + (κj − µi)ρij]+ ln
(
1
k(k + 2)
+
(κj + µi)ρij
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
)
(24)
where origin fixed effects δi = ln(NEi (ciM)
−k
) and destination fixed effects δj = ln
(
Lj
(
cjD
)k+2)
.
This form is the original Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) gravity equation with additional qual-
ity terms. Equation (24) has the advantage of explaining residuals in the original MO model.
The ice-berg trade cost is proxied by several bilateral variables, so that the specification of
24 can be re-written as
ln rij = δi + δj + β1Contig + β2Comlang + β3Colony + β4Comcol + β5Curcol +
β6Smctry + β7LnDist+ β8RTA+ β9Comcur + ij
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In the above specification, Contig = 1 if the exporter (i) and the importer (j) are contiguous,
and Contig = 0 otherwise. Comlang = 1 if i and j share common official language, Colony =
1 if i and j have ever in colonial relationship, Comcol = 1 if i and j have a common colonizer
after 1945, Curcol = 1 if i and j are currently in colonial relation, Smctry = 1 if i and j
were the same country. LnDist is the (log) distance between i and j. 26 The data of those
variables are from CEPII GeoDist. Additionally, RTA = 1 if i and j have reached any trade
agreements and Comcur = 1 if i and j are in the same currency union. This is from Sousa
(2012).
An issue with the ordinary least squares (OLS) is the presence of zero trade as is discussed
before. The above gravity equation can be subject to bias due to the existence of zero bilateral
trade, which to some extent suggested by Table 4. As is argued by Helpman et al. (2008),
disregarding country pairs that do not trade with each other can cause biased estimates on
the data. Additionally, it is documented in their empirical study that half of countries do
not trade with each other. To address such issue, I use Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) by including zero trade flows. The same
estimation strategy is also used in Corcos et al. (2011).
Table 7 reports results from PPML estimates for selected sectors. At the first glance,
the coefficients are within expectations. Specifically, distance has negative effects on trade
flows. Regional trade agreements, common language and colonial relations can have positive
effects on bilateral trade. Common currency can have both positive and negative effects.
It is noticeable that most other sectors not reported here have similar patterns in terms of
trade cost proxies.
Given the estimated equation, I am able to back parameters of quality preferences and
costs from the residuals. These parameters are recovered using residuals in specification (24).
Although BACI covers more than 200 countries, only 168 of them have data on population in
the Penn World Table. Thus, for each HS2 sector, I have at most 336 parameters to recover.
There are much more residuals than parameters. Therefore, the system is over-identified
and hence I employed a least square procedure to hunt for the optimal solution. 27
I estimate those parameters for each sector and discovered stylized patterns from them.
Table 8 reports the summary statistics of estimates of κ’s for each sector; Table 9 reports the
summary statistics of µ’s. First, a comparison of Table 8 and Table 9 indicates that κ is on
26This is the simple distance, which is the distance between the most populated cities of the two countries.
27Specifically, the optimal κ and µ satisfy: [κ, µ] = 1N argmin
∑
ij
[
ln [1 + (κj − µi)ρij ] + ln
(
1
k(k+2) +
(κj+µi)ρij
k(k+1)(k+2)
)
− ij
]2
,
where N is the number of observations of trade flows in each sector.
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average larger than µ and tends to be more dispersed than µ. This to some extent implies
that (dis) tastes for quality are more heterogeneous among countries than the technology
of quality-improving. Second, a closer examination of Table 8 indicates that sectors differ
in the dispersion of κ’s across countries. For instance, HS 50 (textiles) has relatively small
dispersion in κ, while HS 85 (electric motors and generators) has a very high dispersion.
Thus, in some sectors countries tend to be homogeneous in preferences, while in other sectors
countries can be divergent.
Table 10 attempts to explore the relation between the parameters and GDP per capita.
Illustrations of the positive relation for 40 sectors are in the two panels of Figure 4. 28. Table
10 presents coefficients in regressing estimated κ on GDP per capita for 63 HS 2 sectors. It
is evident that the positive correlation between κ and GDP per capita exists in a subset of
industries, while in other sectors insignificant effects exist. Comparing with Table 8, it is
implied that sectors with medium level of dispersion tend to have κ correlated with GDP per
capita. One caveat is that the formation of quality preferences κ is exogenous to the model.
This differentiate with Feenstra and Romalis (2014) where quality preferences are modeled
as endogenous to income. According non-homothetic preferences setup in Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2016), quality preference of a country can also depend on income inequality
inside the country. In sum, consumer preferences result from multiple socio-economic con-
ditions and it is out of the scope of the this paper.
In addition, I also examine the correlation between cost of quality and country income.
Table 11 reports coefficients on GDP per capita in regressing µ on GDP per capita. Compared
with Table 10, significant effects appear in fewer sectors. In addition, 3 of these sectors exhibit
negative and significant results. The correlation between the marginal cost and income is
less explicit compared with preferences. The explanation for this has two sides: the positive
association can be accommodated by the fact that richer countries have higher labor cost
while the negative association can be explained by that richer countries have a comparative
advantage in producing higher quality goods since the demand for higher-quality is larger.
1.4.3. Endogenous and Exogenous Competitiveness
After parameters of preferences and cost of quality are estimated in the last subsection, the
cost cutoff for each country is computed using the parameters estimated in the last step.
Specifically, I use average bilateral f.o.b price in (17), the calculated trade cost and κj (and
28Consistent with Table 10, I illustrate those sectors where GDP per capita has positive and significant
effect on κ
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µi) to back out the cost threshold for each country. However, it is worth noting that price
calculated using value divided by quantity is noisy even though units are converted to tons.
This potentially results in multiple cost cutoffs for one country in one sector. Thus, I modify
(17) by allowing noisy terms. To account for this, I regress price on trade costs, nonlinear
terms of κ /µ and destination country fixed effects, as in the following specification:
ln pij = cons+ ln
[
2k + 1
k + 1
+
1
k + 1
(κj + µi) ρij
]
− β1 ln τij + ψj + ij (25)
In (25), the exponential of the coefficients on each of the destination fixed effects are the cost
cutoffs. 29 This corresponds to the endogenous competitiveness in Corcos et al. (2011).30
With the cutoffs obtained from the empirical implementations, I back out cost upper
bounds (exogenous competitiveness) ciM (multiplied by fe) for each country i in each sector
s. For this set of parameters, I use Equation (16) to back out exogenous competitiveness for
each country/sector ((ciM)kfe) by the following relation:
fe ∗ ckM = B∗L∗c
k+2
D
2γ(k+1)(k+2)
where ckM is the vector of (ciM)k and c
k+2
D is the vector of (c
i
D)
k+2, which is estimated as in
Equation (25). Matrix B is defined in the prior subsection. I also implement above two steps
under M.O by eliminating all quality components in the relevant equations. Table 12a and
Table 12b report results as summaries in estimations of exogenous competitiveness across
sectors.
Exogenous competitiveness displays several characteristics. First, the levels of these
statistics vary to a large extent across sectors. For example, for HS 50, the figures are
in 1012, while in other sectors the mean is below one. The cause in the large variation
across sectors can be attributed to the different degrees of variations in the multiplication
[1 + (κj − µi)ρij] for different sectors.31 The different degrees of variation results from the
dispersion differences in κ and µ across sectors, which are analyzed in the prior subsection.
Comparing with preference for quality, sectors having a large variation in κ can also have
large variations in ckM . Another explanation could be that the sunk cost fe vary across
industries.
29This follows from Allen and Atkin (2016), where preference parameters in that paper is recovered from
good-level fixed effects.
30In Corcos et al. (2011), the cost cutoffs are computed using price index of countries in each sector. The
practice is infeasible here due to data coverage issues.
31I perform the similar estimation of ckM following multi-country version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
typically, the means and standard deviations are smaller for almost all sectors.
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The similar estimation strategy is also implemented without quality considerations. This
follows from multi-country Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Corcos et al. (2011). Sub-
sequently, I compute ck+2D implied by the two models. The purpose of this practice is to
compare the predicted endogenous competitiveness of the two models. Table 13 and Table
14 summarize cutoffs computed from the two different models across sectors. Illustrations
of the distribution of cutoffs implied by both models for all sectors are displayed in the two
panels of Figure 5. In comparison with the two models, several implications arise. Firstly,
for most sectors, the levels of cutoffs are on the same scale: the means in cutoffs do not
significant differ from each other. Second, for most sectors, the distribution of cutoffs are
more dispersed under quality model than under the MO model: the variances in Table 13 is
larger and for most sectors, cutoffs under quality sorting have higher maximum values and
smaller minimum values. Those comparisons suggest that adding quality sorting enlarges
the inequality among countries in competitiveness.
To further compare the two models, I summarize the differences in the predictions in
cutoffs across countries for each sector. Figure 6 displays the kernel density of prediction
differences across countries of various sectors. For most industries, the majority of differences
lie around zero. The distribution in differences vary across sectors, which is observed from
the skewness. For sectors such as HS 2 and HS 3, the difference distributions are nearly
normal so the probability of overestimation and underestimation are nearly equal. Right
skewness occurs in sectors such as HS 74 and HS 82, indicating that quality model over-
predicts more than it under-predicts. Left skewness happens in sectors such as HS 4 and HS
10 so that more under-estimates of quality model exist in these sectors. In general, within
most sectors, predictive differences between the two models do not deviate to a large extent
from zero.
1.5. Counterfactual Scenario
Having estimated the model, one can use it to simulate the effects of trade frictions/liberalizations.
This is achieved by recomputing for each sector the (quality-adjusted) trade freeness matrix
B while keeping the exogenous competitiveness, shape parameters and preference/costs for
quality parameters constant. The resulting matrix is then used to compute new endogenous
competitiveness. Specifically, the following statistic is to be computed:
cˆjD =
c
′j
D
cjD
− 1
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where c
′j
D is the cutoff after trade liberalization. I estimated the above statistics under
both this model and the M.O model and compare the differences between the two models to
discover the underlying regularities leading to the differences.
Furthermore, I also experiment with preference and technological shocks. The purpose
of the counterfactual is to explore the effect of preferences or technological progress (in
improving quality) on endogenous competitiveness across countries and sectors. This practice
is infeasible under the framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or other efficiency-based
settings to the best of my knowledge. Thus, it is a significant contribution of this model.
1.5.1. International Trade Costs
The first exercise is to examine the effect of bilateral trade cost changes. I would like to
examine the change in cutoffs across countries and sectors. I simulate a 5% increase in in-
ternational trade cost while keeping intra-national trade costs constant. This counterfactual
analysis is to examine the effect of protectionism on the endogenous competitiveness. This
counterfactual analysis is relevant since the temptation of protectionism in the past decade
has been large and increasing for a large number of policy makers. Thus there is possibility
of introducing new external tariffs or other types of trade barriers.
As is noted above, I focus on two aspects: the changes in cutoffs and the differences in
predictions implied by the two models. Table 15 summarizes the mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum in the changes of cutoffs. Table 16 reports those statistics implied
by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). It is worth noting that in almost all sectors here, an increase
in international trade cost (while keeping intra-national trade cost constant) can lead to a
decrease in cost cutoff for some countries, regardless of the models. This decline in cutoff
(or rise in the endogenous competitiveness) is justified by the rising entry of local producers
since the relative cost of intra-national trade is cheaper than international costs. In the
two-country case, consider that in MO with two countries, the cutoff is computed as
ci,k+2D =
γφ
Li
1−ωj
1−ωiωj
where ωi = τ−kji and indicates the freeness of trade. If the both ωj and ωi increase, the
change in cutoff is then
∆ci,k+2D =
γφ
Li
(
1− ωiωj)−2 [(1− ωj)ωj∆ωi − (1− ωi)∆ωj]] (26)
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so that the direction of change in cutoff depends on the magnitudes of ωi, ωj and the degrees
in the changes of both. Under the current model, ωi and ωj can be higher than 1, since
in this model it is replaced with [1 + (κj − µi) ρij] τ−kij and thus the sign of ∆ck+2D can be
negative when ∆ωj and ∆ωi are negative.
Nonetheless, the aggregate cutoffs increase, for both models. A closer examination of
the two sets of results implies the following regularities. First, the mean changes are all
positive for both models, with the changes implied by the quality models higher than the
MO model for most sectors. This difference can be partially driven by the higher maximum
value in Table 15 (for most sectors). Second, and related to the prior section, the variance of
changes is larger under this model. This is connected with the prior section in that variance
under this model is higher than under Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with additional quality
components. Finally, under both models, the maximum of the change is larger than 1 for
all sectors. Thus, the magnitude of effect on endogenous competitiveness is larger than the
degree of trade cost rise.
Finally, it is worth exploring the underlying forces driving these changes. The focal
points lie in whether such difference is systematic across countries in some (or all) sectors.
If such regularities exist, then one can argue that these changes are not randomly driven.
For all sectors, I attempt to correlate with quality preference of each country.32 In the two
panels of Figure 7, I tried to plot the (log) quality preferences with the prediction differences
(changes predicted by this model minus changes predicted by MO).33 All else being equal, the
higher the quality preference of the country, the larger the predicted difference between the
current model and MO model. This result indicates that in models with quality preference
differentials across countries, the disparity in terms of loss from higher trade barriers is larger
than in models without quality considerations. This implication is to some extent consistent
with simulations on the market size by Antoniades (2015), in which it is shown that larger
market size results in larger cutoff decrease in countries with higher quality preferences.
1.5.2. Preference/Cost Changes
The second counterfactual exercise is to examine the effect of a universal preference or
technology shocks on endogenous competitiveness. This analysis is infeasible under models
32I also attempt to link them with cost of quality of each country. However, no systematic regularities are
found.
33I find similar patterns in the following sectors: HS2, HS4, HS7, HS8, HS9, HS11, HS15, HS16, HS17,
HS18, HS19, HS35, HS36, HS38, HS39, HS52, HS58, HS63, HS64, HS65, HS69, HS73, HS76, HS81, HS86,
HS95 and HS96.
27
of MO or other models based on the efficiency sorting of heterogeneous firms in international
trade. It is perceived to be relevant since consumers’ preferences are changing over time.
Although quality preferences are exogenous to this model, they can be altered in several
ways. An increase in quality preference can result from higher expectations of consumers for
the products they purchase. For instance, in food industry, food safety issues motivate more
consumers to pursue organic food, which is perceived to be high-quality, thus raising the
willingness-to-pay (Grunert 2005). The pervasiveness of advertisements and other multi-
media can also shape consumers’ preference for high quality products. Apart from that
technology progress drives down the cost of quality updates.
Essentially, the two changes are consistent. As is shown in the model, higher preference
and lower marginal cost in quality raise the scope for quality differentiation. Therefore, I
combine the two exercises by adding/ subtracting 0.1 units in either κj/ µi in computing
ρij. All else being equal, individual producers entering each market raise product quality
and charge higher prices. If other conditions remain unchanged, resulting cost cutoffs are
lowered. In the long run, a trade diversion effect can occur in that a subset of countries can
experience a rise in their cost cutoffs. This arises since the cutoff of each country depends on
both its own κ (and µ) and others’ κ (µ). This can be explained in detail in Equation (26)
if one replaces ωi with [1 + (κi − µj) ρji] τ−kji . Therefore, the direction of change in cutoffs
depends on the magnitudes of κ and µ across countries.
As is expected, trade diversion occurs in a few countries. Table 17a and 17b summarize
the percentage changes in cost cutoffs across countries. Figure 8 visualizes the changes us-
ing the world map. I compute the weighted cutoff changes for each country. The weight
is calculated as an industry’s share of total value of imports of a country. Although the
majority experience rising market competitiveness revealed in declining cost cutoffs, 25 of
them have the opposite change. Overall, the magnitude of increase in cost cutoffs is lower
than decrease: the decrease in cost cutoffs ranges from around 500% to around 0.6%. Thus
positive preference or technology shocks brings more positive effects on productivity improv-
ing globally. A further plot in Figure 8 reveals that the more than half of the countries have
their declines in cutoffs falling less than 141.2%. The change in endogenous competitiveness
falling in the range of [−141.2, 0.58] occupies the most area.
Large countries generally gain more than small economies. This can be supported from
the optimal quality choice in (9). Loss in utility which is revealed from rise in cost cutoff
occur mostly in small economies. The justification of this observation can be that small
economies have smaller scopes for quality differentiation, thus firms have less incentive to
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sell high-quality goods. Faced with the same degree of preference rise, firms are diverted to
sell higher-quality goods to larger markets. I prove that by regressing gains from trade on
their (log) population and other country level controls in Table (18). They reveal negative
relationship between the change in cost cutoffs and population size. This exercise implies
that market size is negative associated with changes in cost cutoff, i.e., positively related
to changes in productivity and welfare gains. On average, 1% rise in population size leads
to 7.876% more gains in productivity. However, one caveat is that the aggregate gain in
productivity is affected by other factors such as compositions of imports of a country.
1.6. Conclusion
This paper extends a theory on quality with endogenous markups. Theoretical framework
is of multi-country type, which is a generalization of two-country model commonly used in
Melitz and Ottaviano framework. Different from competition on cost, the theory identifies
that in some sectors and countries, firms can also compete on quality. Tough competition
featured by larger market, lower trade cost and higher preference for quality are more likely
to induce firms to improve quality. The selection effect is larger when quality differentiation
scope is wide.
Empirical study is undertaken to compare this theory with efficiency framework. Struc-
tural estimation is used to identify relevant parameters. These parameters are later used to
compute cutoffs and average prices under quality competition. The same steps are used to
compute counterparts under efficiency competition. The structural estimation implies that
considering quality differentials among countries enlarges heterogeneities in competitiveness.
The counterfactual study points out that in most sectors, the higher the quality preference of
a country, the larger the loss from rising trade barrier, compared with Melitz and Ottaviano.
Finally, positive universal preference shocks generally bring more gains to larger countries.
Though the paper addresses the importance of considering quality preference differentials
across countries, it still has insufficiencies in investigating this issue. This study can be
extended to examine the spatial distribution in quality preferences and technologies, using
more disaggregated data, such as China Customs Trade Statistics and China Inter-Provincial
Input-Output Statistics. Furthermore, one can compare the impacts of international and
intra-national trade costs on competitiveness of different regions in China, under both the
current model and Melitz-Ottaviano model.
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2. Informal Institutions and Comparative Advantage of
South-Based MNEs: Theory and Evidence
2.1. Introduction
The accumulated knowledge of the FDI literature (see for example the survey by Helpman,
2006) has provided us a good understanding of the incentives and constraints of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) in their choices (of organizational forms and production locations)
in response to their own firm characteristics, the nature of the industry, and the country
where they operate from. In these existing theoretical frameworks, MNEs are often theo-
rized to be based in the North. This supposition, although understandable given the North
MNEs’ leading edge in R&D and technology, is increasingly incongruent with the facts. In
2006–2010, 17% of the world FDI outflows originate from the South (Dixit 2012). At the
same time, the share of FDI inflows from the developing country received by their peer South
is disproportionately large at 36% in 2000 (Dilek and Dilip 2004). By 2013, FDI from the
developing country (including transition economies) has accounted for 39% of global FDI
outflows (UNCTAD 2014). It is thus important that theoretical framework be developed
to formalize the comparative advantage of South-based MNEs. This paper makes one such
contribution.34
It has been suggested by a lecture of Dixit (2012) that similarly poor governance endow-
ments may be a source of comparative advantage for South-based MNEs when investing in
developing countries. Several empirical studies such as Darby et al. (2009), Cuervo-Cazurra
(2008), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Habib and Zurawicki (2002) have found patterns
consistent with this hypothesis.35 In these studies, ‘experiences’, ‘skills’ and ‘abilities’ of
34In the general framework of Arkolakis et al. (2018), it is possible to have MNEs originating from all
countries. However, because the pattern of multinational production (MP) is determined in large part by
the efficiency parameters Til characterizing the productivity of firms originating from i conducting MP pro-
duction in country l, the framework implies a dominance of MNEs based in the North given their technology
superiority.
35Darby et al. (2009) found that South MNEs are less (or not at all) deterred by bad institutional quality
in the host country than North MNE, based on bilateral FDI count data (on the number of MNEs from
a country of origin present in a destination country). Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) measured the proportion of
developing-country MNEs among the largest foreign firms in each of 50 LDCs and found that developing-
country MNEs are more prevalent in LDCs with poorer regulatory quality and lower control of corruption
(although this negative relationship does not apply to all aspects of institutional quality, e.g., rule of law).
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007), using a gravity model for bilateral FDI from OECD countries to the other
countries, found that good institutions in the home country have no or even negative impact on outward
FDI, and institutional distance has often a negative impact on bilateral FDI. Last but not least, Habib and
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firms based in the South ‘to manage under difficult conditions’ and their ‘familiarity’ with
the norms in the host country are often cited as the potential explanations. Exactly how
these comparative advantages arise endogenously is, however, less than fully understood,
because often the relative cost advantages of the North and the South MNEs have been
assumed rather than derived.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model to micro-found the cost structure of firms,
given their endogenous response to the state institutions of the country in which they are
based and where their production facilities might be. Firms’ optimal choice of FDI location,
sourcing decision (FDI or domestic production), and production decision (produce or not)
are fully characterized, in a vertical-FDI model with many countries, industries, and het-
erogeneous firms. The main hypothesis predicts an institutional assortative matching in the
state institutional qualities of FDI origins and destinations, all else being equal.
The theory is built on the fundamental assumption that the fixed operating cost of
firms increases with poorer state institutions, but decreases with firms’ own investment
in informal in- stitutions, and the investment in informal institutions is more effective in
reducing overhead cost in environments of poorer formal institutions. As an endogenous
outcome, when and where the formal institutions are weaker, the private sector tends to build
more informal institutions to sub- stitute the former. Evidence abounds in the literature
that documents the endogenous response of the private sector to the formal institutions
the state provides. For the purpose of exposition, we may categorize them as economic,
legal, or political informal institutions. First, where the market- supporting institutions
such as contract enforcement and bank credit are lacking, firms tend to fill in the void
with relational contracting and trade credit. These patterns are documented for example
by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) for Russia, China, Poland and Vietnam. John McMillan
and Christopher Woodruff (1999) provide detailed accounts of how these informal economic
institutions work in Vietnam under reputation incentives and threat of community sanction.
A similar argument is suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) that reputation-based
mechanisms can, at least in part, alleviate the problems originating from weak contracting
institutions.
Second, where the state legal institution is weak, the private sector tends to turn to
informal legal institutions such as private patrols, private protection agencies or informal
courts to substitute for police protection and judicial systems (Hay and Shleifer 1998). For
Zurawicki (2002) focused on corruption and observed that the distance in the corruption level between the
home and host countries reduce bilateral FDI flows.
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example, Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) find that higher levels of regulation and weak legal
institutions are associated with a higher probability of contact with a private protection
organization in Russia.
Finally (and perhaps the most controversial of the three given its many faceted impli-
cations), where the state’s bureaucratic system is inefficient and regulatory quality poor,
firms tend to build political connection, for example, Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006), with
politicians and government officials, or directly participate in politics. Political connection
may help firms reduce regulatory burden (e.g., fewer days to obtain business permit, fewer
agencies to register or fewer on-site inspections) but also secure property rights (e.g., lower
expropriation via tax or fines) and enforce contracts. For example,Li et al. (2006) found
that in China, the probability of entrepreneurs entering politics decreases by 8–20% when
the institutional index in a region improves by one standard deviation. J.P.Chen et al. (2011)
similarly show that firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which
the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. Song (2014) provide a
vivid account of how in the aluminum and auto industries, Chinese local governments may
have a large leverage in providing public goods (such as land and capital) to their cronies
and alter the terms of competition in the market. In general, firms may engage in all three
types of informal institutional building (economic, legal or political). For example, Cai et al.
(2011) infer that the entertainment and travel costs expenditures of Chinese firms consist
of grease money to obtain better government services, protection money to lower tax rates,
and also business expenditures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients.
The term informal institution has been used in the literature to refer to many things
ranging from customs, traditions, norms, religion (Williamson 2000), social capital, trust
(Chan et al., 2015) to culture. Here, we adopt the definition of Helmke and Levitsky (2004)
that distinguishes informal institution from informal behavioral regularities, shared values
and the broader concept of culture. Specifically, informal institutions are defined as socially
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of
officially sanctioned channels.
This paper proceeds to show that in spite of the endogenous choice of heavier investment
in informal institutions that combat the fixed operating cost, firms based in the South still
have an absolute disadvantage than their peer in the North because the state institution’s
first-order effect dominates. Nonetheless, they have a comparative advantage in conducting
FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, because their heavier investment in informal
institution plays a more important role in FDI destinations of poorer state institutions. Thus,
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a MNE from a country of poorer state institutions than another MNE will tend more likely to
invest in a destination of poorer state institutions than the other MNE’s choice of destination,
all else being equal.
The paper also derives the implications on the volume of bilateral FDI flows at the country
level, given the firm-level choice of FDI destination, by aggregating the FDI activities across
sectors (of different market sizes) and across firms (of heterogeneous productivity levels). The
model generates the endogenous presence of zero FDI for some country pairs. Conditional on
positive bilateral FDI flows, complementarity in institutions (of FDI origins and destinations)
continues to hold at the intensive margin: multinational firms tend to generate more net
profits in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional environment
at home. At the extensive margin, subject to qualifying conditions, more multinational firms
tend to conduct FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional
environment at home.
The empirical studies cited earlier have presented evidence (at least in part) supporting
the above hypothesis. They are however limited in the following ways. First, institutional
distance is often used as a control variable in this empirical literature (except Darby et al.
(2009)). In contrast, the current theory suggests that it is the sorting in institutional qualities
that matters, and hence, a more appropriate control is the interaction of the institutional
qualities of the FDI origin and destination. Second, the countries included in these studies
are often restricted to the least developed countries as the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra
2008) or developed countries as the home country (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007). Third, when
the country coverage is comprehensive, it is often at the cost of using the FDI count data
(ie, the number or percentage of firms; Darby et al. (2009)) instead of the FDI flows/stocks
(that incorporate the intensive margin in addition to the extensive margin). To provide
a direct and comprehensive test of the proposed hypothesis, this paper assembles a panel
dataset of bilateral FDI stocks (and flows) for 219 economies in years 2001–2010 based on the
UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics. This extends the country coverage to include almost all
economies in the world, which allows us to examine the behavior of FDI flows from (to) the
whole spectrum of countries in terms of institutional qualities. The state institutional quality
is measured by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators commonly used in the
literature. To test the theory’s main prediction of a positive assortative matching pattern
in institutions, bilateral FDI activities are regressed on the level and the interaction of the
institutional quality indicators of the home and host countries. An extensive set of gravity
variables (to proxy for communication and transaction costs of FDI) are also included, in
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addition to home and host country characteristics (such as GDPs, GDPs per capita, and
general production cost levels) and variables suggested by competing hypotheses of FDI.
In particular, since income levels and institutional qualities are correlated, the difference in
GDPs per capita between the home and host countries is included to control for the Linder
effect on FDI as proposed by Fajgelbaum et al. (2014). Overall, the paper finds support for
the theory’s prediction. The coefficient on the institutional interaction term is positive and
significant, and the conclusion is robust to the FDI series used (inward or outward, stocks or
flows), the measures of institutional quality, the estimation specifications, and the inclusion
of zero FDI observations.
We provide further evidence on the theory’s prediction at the firm level using the fDi
Markets dataset on worldwide firm-level greenfield FDI during 2009–2016, which was merged
with the Orbis financial dataset on private companies to obtain parent firms’ key performance
measures (and to estimate their productivity levels). For the period 2009–2016, there are
35,039 unique firms from 168 origin countries that conduct greenfield FDI in 200 destination
countries. Each observation refers to an incident of greenfield foreign capital investment in
a sector and year by a firm reported by fDi Markets, and the corresponding characteristics
of the investing firm, origin and destination countries. We regress capital investment on the
interaction of the institutional quality indicators of the home and host countries, on firm
productivity and its interaction with destination institutional quality, on firm R&D intensity
and its interaction with destination institutional quality, and the same set of gravity variables
as the country-level analysis. An extensive set of fixed effects (origin- year, destination-year,
destination-sector) are also controlled for.
We continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term of the
origin and destination institutional qualities. This provides the firm-level evidence for the
institutional complementarity effect. In addition, more productive firms tend to invest more
in countries of poorer state institutions, which is consistent with the theory’s prediction (as
these firms with larger market shares have stronger incentives to locate production in coun-
tries of lower wages, and they are able to afford the higher fixed cost associated with larger
investment in informal institution in such countries). On the other hand, firms of higher
R&D intensity (and technology sophisticatedness) makes less FDI, but such negative effects
are moderated by better destination institutions. This is consistent with the quality-control
theory of Chang and Lu (2012), where the risk of quality-control failure in cross-border
production arrangement discourages high-technology firms from locating their production in
countries of weaker technology capacity or institutional support.
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Singapore often ranks among the top in terms of good governance. For example, in 2012,
it clinched the 1st in terms of GE and RQ, the 4th in CC, and the 5th in RL. Thus, when
its government undertook to jointly develop the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
(SIP) with the Chinese government in 1994, by transplanting its Singapore-style institutions
overseas in the Chinese land of cheap labor, it was greeted by the investor community with
great enthusiasm. Take a few examples from Pereira (2002):
We are a Western multinational company. We operate entirely above board. We don’t
like hidden costs and personal benefits in business. We came on the basis that there would be
a Singaporean system here. We can justify every single entry honestly in our account books.
(Manager, European company, male, Germany citizen, aged 40-50)
Things here [at the SIP] are very straightforward. All the rules are clear, all the person-
nel are very professional, and the estate is very modern. So this has allowed our company
to focus on doing business rather than worry about all the other aspects. (Manager, US
company, male, Singapore citizen, aged 30-40)
Few expected that the joint venture would soon ‘sour’ in 2001. There are no typical
barriers in terms of language, ethnicity, or cultural origins. As the Singaporean leaders
later reflected, the Singapore government misjudged the importance of relationship with
local authorities. In particular, it underestimated the extent of latitude that the Chinese
local officials had versus Beijing in altering the terms of competition (Pereira 2002). The
quotations cited above and the overall incident bring home the point that institutional
endowments of an investor (what it is endowed with in formal institutions and what it
develops in informal institutions) play a non-negligible role in the operation and the outcome
of FDI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model
and predictions. Sections 3 and 4 present the country-level and firm-level evidence, and
Section 5 concludes.
2.2. Model
This model is designed to highlight the mechanism of institution on FDI activities, and to
keep the model tractable, we intentionally drop many other mechanisms that the previous
literature has shown to be important. Thus, it is not a quantitative FDI model suitable for
calibration. Rather, the theoretical prediction in this section will be tested as a ‘partial’ effect
of institution on FDI in the empirical section (after controlling for other relevant determinants
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of FDI). We discuss possible extensions of the current framework to incorporate these other
elements of interest in Section 2.5. For recent developments in quantitative FDI models, see
for example, Garetto (2013), Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), Irarrazabal et al. (2013)
and Arkolakis et al. (2018).
Suppose there are a continuum of countries indexed by r ∈ R, where r is an inverse
measure of the quality of formal institutions. The larger r is, the poorer the institution of
the country. There are a continuum of sectors indexed by j producing differentiated goods,
and one sector producing homogeneous good (used as the numeraire). The only factor
of production is labor, and the homogeneous good is produced with constant unit labor
requirement. We abstract away from any kind of trade frictions (and thus the incentives of
horizontal FDI driven by market access). This implies that there is a single world market
for goods. Labor endowment is assumed to be large enough in each country such that the
homogeneous good is always produced. As a result, a country’s labor productivity in the
numeraire good determines its wage rate w. Countries with better formal institutions are
assumed to have higher labor productivity in the numeraire good and hence a higher wage:
w = ω(r) and ω′(r) ≡ dω(r)/dr < 0.
Each variety of the differentiated goods requires a headquarter service component and a
manu- factured component using a Cobb-Doublas production function (Antràs and Helpman
2004), where each component has a unit labor requirement equal to one. This implies a unit
cost of production equal to = wηhw
1−η
d /ϕ, where ϕ indexes the productivity of the firm
producing the variety, η denotes the headquarter intensity in the production, and wh and wd
corresponds to the wage rate of the country where the headquarter and the manufacturing
facility of the firm are located, respectively.
The world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with identical preferences: U =
x0 +
1
µ
∫
Xµj dj, 0 < µ < 1, where x0 indicates the consumption of the numeraire good, and Xj
a CES function over all available varieties xj(i) in sector j with an elasticity of substitution
σ. We drop the sector index j for the time being to simplify the notation until Section
2.4. Given monopolistic competition, the CES preferences imply the standard pricing and
profit function. Each firm charges a constant markup over its marginal cost of production
p(c) = σ
σ−1c, sells a quantity of x(p(c)) = X
σ(µ−1)+1
j p(c)− σ and earns a variable profit:
pi = (p(c)− c)x(p(c)) = Bφ˜ (wηhw1−ηd )1−σ (27)
where B ≡ 1
σ
X
σ(µ−1)+1
j
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ can be taken as an index of the world market size for the
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sector (exogenous from the point of view of the individual firm) and φ˜ ≡ ϕσ−1a transformed
index of the firm productivity level.
2.2.1. Choice of Informal Institution
A firm given its productivity level chooses whether to produce or not. If it chooses to
produce both components at home, it incurs a fixed overhead cost f(rh, I), which depends
on: i) the quality of the formal institution where the firm is headquartered and, ii) the
informal institution I that the firm invests in. If it chooses to produce the manufactured
component in a country different from where it is headquartered, it incurs an additional
overhead cost f(rd, I), which depends on the quality of the formal institution in the country
where the production facility is located, and similarly, its choice of informal institutional
investment.
The fixed overhead cost is assumed to depend on the formal and informal institutions as
follows. First, it is assumed that f(r, I) strictly increases in r: fr ≡ ∂f(r, I)/∂r > 0. That
is, worse formal institution increases the fixed overhead cost. Next, f(r, I) strictly decreases
in I: fI(r, I) ≡ ∂f(r, I)/∂I < 0, i.e., firm-specific informal institution helps reduce the fixed
overhead cost. Finally, it is assumed that
∂
∂r
(
∂f(r, I)
∂I
)
< 0 (28)
that is, informal institution is more effective in reducing the fixed overhead cost in environ-
ments of poorer formal institutions.
The investment in informal institution is assumed to be a common good within the
boundary of the firm: it can be used at home or in the country where its production facility
is located. Investing in informal institution, however, costs the firm k(I), which is assumed
to be increasing and convex in I.
A firm chooses I∗ that minimizes F (rh, I) ≡ f(rh, I)+k(I) if it chooses local production.
Alternatively, the firm chooses IFDI,∗ that minimizes F FDI(rh, rd, I) ≡ f(rh, I) + f(rd, I) +
k(I) if it chooses to undertake FDI. Define F ∗ (rh) ≡ f(rh, I ∗ (rh)) + k(I ∗ (rh)) and
F FDI,∗(rh, rd) ≡ f(rh, IFDI,∗(rh, rd)) + f(rd, IFDI,∗(rh, rd)) + k(IFDI,∗(rh, rd)); i.e., they are
the respective minimal fixed cost of local production and FDI. We could characterize the
choice and impacts of informal institutions as follows:
Proposition 4. (i) The investment in informal institution will be higher for firms engaging
in multinational production than for firms engaging only in local production: IFDI,∗(rh, rd) >
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I ∗ (rh); (ii) The total fixed cost of production will be higher for multinational production
than for local production: F FDI,∗(rh, rd) > F ∗ (rh); (iii) The total fixed cost of multinational
production will be higher in FDI destination of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗(rh, rd)/drd > 0;
(iv) For a given FDI destination, the total fixed cost of multinational production will be higher
for MNEs based in countries of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drh > 0.
Proof. (i) ∂FFDI
∂I
|I=I∗= ∂f(rh,I∗)∂I + f(rd,I∗)∂I + k′(I) = ∂f(rd,I∗)∂I < 0, where the second equality
follows by the FOC condition for I∗: ∂f(rh,I∗)
∂I
+ k′(I∗) = 0 and the last inequality follows by
the assumption that f(r, I) strictly decreases in I. This implies that IFDI,∗ > I∗. (ii) We can
write F FDI,∗−F∗ = {F FDI,∗−F (rh, IFDI,∗)}+{F (rh, IFDI,∗)−F∗} > 0. The inequality holds
since F FDI,∗ − F (rh, IFDI,∗) = f(rd, IFDI,∗) > 0 by the setup, and F (rh, IFDI,∗) − F∗ > 0
by the definition of F∗ and the fact that IFDI,∗ 6= I∗. (iii) By the evelope theorem, we have
dF FDI,∗
drd
=
∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂I
∂IFDI,∗
∂rd
> 0 (29)
where the sign follows by the assumption that f(r, I) strictly increases in r and by the FOC
for IFDI,∗ such that ∂F
FDI(rh,rd,I
FDI,∗)
∂I
= 0. (iv) The proof is similar to (iii), by replacing rd
with rh. QED
The predictions in Proposition 4 are derived under the endogenous choice of I by firms
and yet they are consistent with many typical assumptions (observations) often made in the
FDI literature. First, note that firms will have a stronger incentive to invest in informal
institutions when they engage in multinational production than if they produce only locally,
because in the former case, the informal institution can be used to help lower the overhead
cost of both the headquarter operation at home and the production abroad. This prediction
is in line with the fact that larger firms tend to be more politically connected or politically
active (Hellman et al. (2003); Faccio (2006); Li et al. (2006); J.P.Chen et al. (2011)), because
MNEs also tend to be larger in size than domestic firms. Second, multinational production
sets a higher threshold than local production in terms of fixed costs. This helps explain
the typical sorting of MNEs and local firms in terms of productivity. Third, poor state
institutions discourage inward FDI by raising the total fixed cost of multinational production
(dF FDI,∗/drd > 0). This is in spite of the fact that firms endogenously undertake heavier
investment in informal institutions should they choose such locations. Thus, the direct effect
of weak state institutions still dominates the countervailing effect of self-remedy. Finally,
poor state institutions also impose an absolute disadvantage on firms based in the South;
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they incur a higher total fixed cost of multinational production than firms based in the North
given the same choice of FDI destination (dF FDI,∗/drh > 0). This helps explain in part the
dominance of MNEs from the North.
Proposition 5. Multinational firms headquartered in countries of poorer institutions will
invest more in informal institution: ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0. As a corollary, multinational firms
headquartered in countries of poorer institutions will be more effective at reducing its overhead
fixed cost at a given FDI destination: df(rd,I
FDI,∗)
drh
< 0.
Proof. Let fII(r, I) ≡ α2f(r,I)∂I2 . The FOC for IFDI,∗ requires that at IFDI,∗,
fI(rh, I) + fI(rd, I) + k
′(I) = 0 (30)
Take total differentiation of (30) with respect to rh and IFDI,∗, we have
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
= −
∂fI (rh,I)
∂rh
fII(rh,I)+fII(rd,I)+k′′(I)
> 0
at IFDI,∗, by the SOC for the IFDI,∗, and the assumption in (28).36 As a corollary,
df(rd,I
FDI,∗)
drh
= fI(rd, I
FDI,∗)∂I
FDI,∗
∂rh
< 0 by the assumption fI(r, I) < 0 and the previous
result ∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
> 0 QED
To interpret this result, note that the marginal benefit to invest in informal institution
is higher for firms based in a country of poorer state institution, because the firm-specific
informal institution reduces the fixed overhead cost of headquarter operation by more in such
environment. The heavier investment in informal institution in turn enables these firms to
reduce the overhead cost of production at the FDI destination. Propositions 4 and 5 together
imply that for each given FDI destination rd, although South-based MNEs have a higher
total fixed cost of multinational operation due to their home institutional disadvantage and
the higher cost incurred to build I, they actually incur a lower fixed cost of production at
the FDI destination, f(rd, I). As an implication, the comparative advantage of South-based
MNEs will be stronger in destinations of poorer state institutions, as the following analysis
formally shows.
36We impose the necessary condition on fII(r, I) to ensure that the SOC, fII(rh, I)+fII(rd, I)+k
′′
(I) > 0,
is satisfied. Given the convexity of k(I), a sufficient condition is fII(r, I) > 0.
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2.2.2. Optimal FDI Destination
If a firm chooses to produce locally, its net profit is
ΠD ≡ piD − F ∗ (rh) = Bφ˜(wh)1−σ − F ∗ (rh) (31)
which increases in ˜phi linearly. Note that F ∗ (rh) has taken into account the optimal choice
I∗ given the home institutional environment rh. If a firm chooses to undertake FDI, its net
profit is instead
ΠFDI = piFDI − F FDI,∗(rh, rd) = Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − F FDI,∗(rh, rd) (32)
where again F FDI,∗(rh, rd) has taken into account the optimal choice IFDI,∗ given the des-
tination rd ad the MNE’s home institution rh. Given Proposition 4 (ii) that the fixed cost
of production of FDI is higher than local production, if firms choose FDI, they necessarily
choose a destination with lower wages than at home (wd < wh, i.e. rd > rh) such that the
higher variable profit of FDI helps offset the higher fixed cost of FDI. This is in line with most
vertical-FDI models in the literature, where FDI is driven by differences in the production
cost across countries. Of course, in the data, reverse FDI (rd < rh) can take place for reasons
not modeled in the paper (such as market access or technology acquisition motives). Thus,
if we do find empirical pattern in support of our hypotheses, it suggests that the mechanism
proposed in the paper is strong enough to dominate potential countervailing forces.
Among possible destinations of FDI, firms trade off lower wages with higher fixed costs
associated with poorer institutions, and choose rd that maximizes (32). The FOC for the
optimal choice rd∗ requires that at rd∗:
∂piFDI
∂wd
w′(rd)− ∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
= 0 (33)
where ∂F FDI,∗(rh, rd)/∂rd = ∂f(rd, IFDI,∗)/∂rd by the evelope theorem. Equation (33)
defines the optimal choice of the FDI destination r∗d as an implicit function of the firm,
industry and home country characteristics: rd∗ ≡ H(rh, φ˜, η). In particular, these include
the institution rh, the productivity level ˜phi, the world demand for the sector B, and the
headquarter intensity of the industry η.
Proposition 6. (i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities at Firm-level FDI)
ll else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional
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qualities, the poorer the institutional quality at home: ∂rd∗
∂rh
> 0; (ii) All else being equal,
a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the more
productive the firm is: ∂rd∗
∂φ˜
> 0; (iii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake
FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the larger the world demand for the sector
is: ∂rd∗
∂B
> 0; (iv) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of
poorer institutional qualities, the less headquarter-intensive the sector is: ∂rd∗
∂η
< 0
Proof. (i) Totally differentiate (33) with respect to rd∗ and rh, we obtain
∂rd∗
∂rh
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
w′(rd)w′(rh)− ∂2f∂I∂rd
∂fFDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0 (34)
The inequality holds because ∂2ΠFD
∂r2d
< 0 by the SOC for rd∗,37 and the numerator is positive
by the fact that: (a) ∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
= η(1 − η)(1 − σ)2piFDI/(whwd) > 0 and w′(r) < 0, and (b)
∂2f
∂I∂rd
< 0 by the assumption in (28) and ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0 by Proposition 5.
(ii) Similarly, taking total differentiation of (33) with respect to rd∗ and φ˜, we have
∂rd∗
∂φ˜
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂φ˜
w′(rd)
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0, (35)
because ∂2piFDI
∂wd∂φ˜
= (1− η)(1− σ)piFDI/(wdφ˜) < 0 and w′(r) < 0
(iii) It is straightforward to see that B has an analogous (positive) effect as φ˜ on rd∗,
because B and φ˜ enter piFDI multiplicatively.
(iv) Finally, by similar derivations, we have
∂rd∗
∂η
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂η
w′(rd)
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2
d
< 0
where ∂2piFDI
∂wd∂η
= (1 − σ)
[
(1− η)(1− σ) ln(wh
wd
)− 1
]
piFDI
wd
> 0, since wh > wd(rd > rh) holds
at the optimal choice of FDI destination. QED
To understand Proposition 6(i), note that institutional complementarity at the firm level
in bilateral FDI flows arises for two reasons. First, firms based in countries of poorer insti-
tutional qualities tend to be more heavily endowed with firm-specific informal institutions,
37We make the necessary assumptions on ω
′′
(r) and ∂
2f(r,I)
∂r2 to ensure that the SOC,
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
< 0, for r∗d
is satisfied.
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which gives them a comparative advantage in conducting FDI in destinations of poorer in-
stitutional qualities (as the adverse effect of weak institutions at the destination on fixed
cost is reduced by the firm- specific institutional investment, and more so in destinations of
poorer institutions). This is the key mechanism proposed by the paper. In addition, given
the supermodularity between the headquarter and the intermediate component implied by
the Cobb-Douglas production function, a lower wage at home (a lower-cost headquarter in-
put) also increases the marginal benefit (increments in variable profits) of securing a lower-
cost manufactured component. This second mechanism reinforces the main mechanism and
strengthens the institutional complementarity effect.
Next, note that a larger φ˜ (or B) increases the marginal benefit of producing the man-
ufactured component at a location with lower wages wd, since the market share of the firm
at stake (or the size of the aggregate demand for the industry) is larger. This encourages
the firm to take on higher fixed costs associated with FDI in countries of poorer institutions
so as to access the cheaper labor pool in these destinations. In contrast, when a sector is
more headquarter intensive, the cost of the manufactured component becomes less impor-
tant a concern, which weakens the incentive of firms to locate FDI in countries with weaker
institutional support.
The prediction that a more productive firm will choose to engage FDI in countries of
poorer institutions may come across as a surprising result. But it is no different from the
traditional vertical-FDI models where the more productive firms in the North are more likely
than the less productive firms to engage FDI in the South: the more productive firms with
larger market shares stand to gain more from the lower variable production cost in the
South, and at the same time, they can afford the higher fixed cost of FDI. Naturally, there
are factors outside the model that may moderate this stark prediction.
2.2.3. Sorting of Firms
Proposition 6(ii) (that the more productive firms choose FDI in countries of poorer institu-
tions) implies that the net profit function of FDI will be an increasing and convex function
of firm productivity level φ˜ for a given sector and home country. To see this, define
ΠFDI,∗∗ ≡ maxrd{piFDI(rh, rd, φ˜, B, η)− F FDI,∗(rh, rd)}
and piFDI,∗∗ and F FDI,∗∗ the corresponding variable profit and fixed cost given the optimal
choice of destination rd∗. Applying the envelope theorem, we have
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dΠFDI,∗∗
dφ˜
= ∂pi
FDI,∗∗
∂φ˜
= B(wηhw
1−η
d )
1−σ > 0
d2ΠFDI,∗∗
dφ˜2
= (1− η)(1− σ)w−1d B(wηhw1−ηd )1−σw′(rd∗)∂rd∗∂φ˜
where the sign for the second derivative follows by Proposition 6 (ii). In addition, by Propo-
sition 4 and 6 (ii) again, we have
dFFDI,∗∗
dφ˜
= dF
FDI,∗∗
drd∗
drd∗
dφ˜
Thus, as the more productive firms choose FDI in countries of higher rd, they earn a
higher variable profit margin but also incur a higher fixed cost. This is illustrated in Figure
1 by firms of three representative productivity levels φ˜1 < φ˜2 < φ˜3. Their respective choice
of rd (with rd,1 < rd,2 < rd,3) implies increasingly steeper variable profit margins and higher
fixed costs. The net profit function ΠFDI,∗∗ corresponds to the upper contour of the net
profit functions across the continuum of FDI destinations.
The profit function of producing locally and that of FDI are juxtaposed in Figure (10).
Given a convex profit function ΠFDI,∗∗ for FDI but a linear one for local production, and a
higher fixed cost for FDI than local production (Proposition 4(ii)), there exists a productivity
level φ˜FDI at which firms are indifferent between FDI and local production (ΠFDI,∗∗ = ΠD).
Let φ˜D denote the productivity cutoff level for local firms to break even. Further, assume
ΠFDI,∗∗(φ˜D) < 0 such that not all firms undertake FDI. It follows that firms with φ˜ ∈[
φ˜min, φ˜
D
]
will choose not to produce and exit the industry, firms with φ˜ ∈
[
φ˜D, φ˜FDI
]
will
produce locally, and firms with φ˜ ∈
[
φ˜FDI , φ˜max
]
will undertake FDI. The cutoffs are defined
implicitly by:
Bφ˜Dw(rh)
1−σ = F ∗(rh) (36)
Bφ˜FDI
[
w(rh)
ηw(rd(φ˜
FDI))1−η)
]1−σ
−Bφ˜FDIw(rh)1−σ = F FDI,∗(rh, rd(φ˜FDI))−F ∗(rh) (37)
The sorting condition ΠFDI,∗∗(φ˜D) < 0 can be rewritten as
(
w(rh)
w(rd(φ˜D))
)(1−η)(σ−1)
< F
FDI,∗(rh,rd(φ˜D))
F ∗(rh)
,
that is, the extra fixed cost of FDI dominates the wage advantage FDI offers for the least
productive surviving firms (given its endogenous choice of rd if it were to undertake FDI). We
assume that this condition holds since sorting of firms by productivity levels into domestic
and multinational firms is a well-documented stylized fact.
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2.2.4. Aggregate Bilateral FDI
As suggested by Figure (9), in the limiting scenario with a continuum of destinations rd,
for each destination rod, there is one unique productivity level φ˜o of firms in each sector that
consider rdo as the optimal FDI destination. To arrive at an expression for the aggregate bi-
lateral FDI at the country level, we impose some structures on the sectoral-level parameters.
In general, sectors may differ in terms of its global market size B, headquarter intensity
η and firm productivity distribution. For simplicity, we suppress the latter two sectoral
heterogeneity and work with only the sectoral demand heterogeneity because of its simple
multiplicative relationship with firm productivity. We discuss the possibility of generalizing
the framework in Section 2.2.5.
Suppose that the global market size has a uniform distribution across sectors such that
B ∼ U(0, 1). In addition, assume that firm productivity in each sector follow the same
cumulative density function G(φ˜) with support φ˜ ∈ [1,∞).
For illustrative purposes, focus on a particular destination rod. For a given home country
rh and sector B, this pins down the firm productivity level φ˜o that will choose rod as a preferred
FDI destination. Specifically, the FOC for r∗d in (33) requires that φ˜o = C(rh, rod)/B, where
C(rh, rd) = {wη(1−σ)h w(1−η)(1−σ)−1d (1 − η)(1 − σ)ω
′
(rd)}−1 ∂f(rd,IFDI,∗)∂rd is a constant given rh
and rd. Thus, a lower sectoral demand B raises the corresponding productivity level of firms
that would prefer rod. More formally, we have
dφ˜o
dB
= − φ˜o
B
.
Whether the firm indeed undertakes FDI in rod, however, depends on whether the firm
productivity level φ˜o exceeds the threshold φ˜FDI . If this is not the case, the FDI profit ΠFDI,∗∗
falls short of domestic profit ΠD and FDI will not realize. Using the cutoff condition (37) for
FDI, we can similarly derive the effect of the sectoral demand B on the cutoff productivity
φ˜FDI . In particular, take total differentiation of (37) with respect to B and φ˜FDI , applying
the FOC (7), we have dφ˜FDI/dB = −φ˜FDI/B. Thus, a lower sectoral demand also raises
the productivity cutoff for FDI.
Given the response of φ˜o and φ˜FDI to the sectoral demand B, we can characterize the
bilateral FDI flows across sectors and country pairs. Starting with the highest sectoral
demand level B = 1, label the corresponding productivity level in this sector that would
prefer rod as a potential FDI location as φ˜o(1), and the FDI cutoff level in this sector as
φ˜FDI(1). It turns out that there are only two possible scenarios.
In the first scenario, supposeφ˜o(1) < φ˜FDI holds. This implies zero FDI in rod from rh in
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the sector with the largest demand. As we look across sectors with lower B, since
| dφ˜o/dB |=| −φ˜o/B |<| −φ˜FDI/B |=| dφ˜FDI/dB | (38)
φ˜o rises by less than φ˜FDI . As a result, the firm who might prefer rod as a possible FDI
destination in a sector always finds domestic production preferable to FDI. Thus, there
would be no FDI in rod from rh for all B ∈ [0, 1], and hence zero bilateral FDI at the
aggregate.
On the other hand, suppose φ˜o(1) >φ˜FDI(1) holds, which implies positive FDI from rh
in rod in the sector with the highest demand. Since in this case,
| φ˜o/dB |=| −φ˜o/B |>| −φ˜FDI/B |=| dφ˜FDI/dB | (39)
φ˜o increases faster than φ˜FDI as B decreases. Hence, firms who might choose rod as a
potential FDI destination also find FDI more profitable relative to domestic production for
all B ∈ [0, 1].
Aggregating across all sectors and firms, we have the bilateral FDI activity from country
rh to rod (when measured in net profit) as:
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(40)
where δ is a Dirac delta function and g ≡ dG/dφ˜ is the density function of firm productiv-
ity. Recall that φ˜o(B) = C(rh, rod)/B by the FOC in (30). In the above derivations, the first
equality holds because B has a uniform distribution and only firms with productivity φ˜o(B)
ill choose to engage FDI in destination rod given sectoral demand level B. The second equality
substitutes in the expression of the FDI profit, and the third equality follows by integrating
over the combinations of (B, φ˜) that satisfy the FOC (30) such that Bφ˜o = C(rh, rod). The
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lower bound φ˜o(1) = C(rd, rod) corresponds to the productivity level of firms that choose rod
in the sector with the highest demand (B = 1). As B decreases toward zero across sectors,
the corresponding productivity level of firms that choose rod increases toward infinity.
We may interpret the first term in (40) as reflecting the ‘intensive margin’ and the second
term the ‘extensive margin’ of FDI activity. They correspond, respectively, to the average
net FDI profit per firm and the mass of firms from country rh engaging FDI in country rod.38
At the extensive margin, poorer institutions, as shown in Proposition 4(iv), raises the
total fixed cost of production for MNEs based in these countries, which reduces the outward
FDI from the South relative to the North. However, so long as this higher total fixed cost
of FDI does not kill the outward FDI from rh toward a destination rod, home countries
with poorer institutions have a larger mass of firms investing in the given destination rod.
Intuitively, the higher informal institutional investment made by firms in the South allows
less productive firms than their peers from the North to survive in a given FDI destination.
Whether this advantage of the South at the extensive margin is stronger in destinations
with poorer institutions depends on two components. First, it depends on whether a higher
rh lowers the productivity cutoff φ˜o(1) by a larger margin in destinations of higher rod. The
answer is positive on second-order approximations. Next, it also depends on g′(φ˜o(1)), the
curvature of the productivity distribution at the cutoff. Intuitively, as rod increases and the
corresponding productivity threshold φ˜o(1) increases, the advantage of the South is stronger
if g′(φ˜o(1)) > 0, as we move up to a productivity level where the density of firms is higher;
the reverse is true if g′(φ˜o(1)) < 0. Overall, the institutional complementarity effect will hold
at the aggregate FDI level if the intensive margin dominates this potential countervailing
force at the extensive margin.
2.2.5. Discussions of the Model
We discuss several possible extensions of the model. First, in the model, we have implicitly
assumed that labor productivity is the same across countries in the production of intermedi-
ate (headquarter or manufactured) components for differentiated goods. We can relax this
assumption without affecting the result, if the wage rate adjusted for labor productivity
remains lower in countries of poorer institutional qualities.
38The intensive and extensive margins are defined here conditional on positive bilateral FDI flows. This
is not exactly the same as how these two margins are sometimes used in the literature. For example, some
studies in the trade literature define the extensive margin by the proportion of active trade status among
the universe of country-pairs, sectors, or product groups.
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Second, for modeling simplicity, we have also assumed that informal institutional en-
dowment is a common good within the firm boundary and fully transnational (i.e., equally
effective in combatting weak formal institutions in foreign countries as at home). Admit-
tedly, the informal institution built likely cannot be fully transferred across countries. In
alternative setups, we may allow firms to build local informal institutions at home and in
the host country separately. The main result will continue to hold, so long as the level of
informal institution that a firm can build in the host country is constrained by its home
institutional environment.
Third, in the literature, several studies have suggested that larger firms tend to be more
politically connected or politically active (Hellman et al. (2003); Faccio (2006); Li et al.
(2006); J.P.Chen et al. (2011)). In the current setup, domestic firms do not differ in their
choices of I. However, as shown by Proposition 3(ii), conditional on firms making the cutoff
for FDI, the more productive firms will choose FDI destinations of higher rd. Since the
more productive firms are also larger and the informal institution a firm develops increases
with rd in the current model, this establishes a positive correlation between firm size and
firm-specific investment in informal institutions.
Fourth, the prediction of Proposition 6(ii) is derived from pure vertical-FDI incentives.
We can think of some potential factors outside the model that may moderate this stark
prediction. For example, in alternative setups with trade frictions, firms may conduct FDI
in several destinations (of good or bad institutions) for market-access motives. Nonetheless,
it is still likely that the lower bound of institutional qualities of the destinations where a
firm engages FDI will be lower, the higher the firm productivity level (all else being equal);
intuitively, the higher fixed cost at a destination of poorer institutional qualities raises the bar
on firm entry. Yet another possible mod- erating factor is quality-control risk. If higher firm
productivity is partly due to more sophisticated production technologies a firm uses, higher
risk of quality-control failure may create disincentives for more productive firms to locate
production in countries with lower wages but poorer institutions (Chang and Lu 2012). As a
result, there may arise a non-monotonic relationship between the firm productivity level and
the institutional quality of a firm’s chosen FDI destination. In firm-level empirical analysis
below, we will control for both firm productivity and firm technology intensity to distinguish
their different interactions with the destination institutional quality.
Fifth, in deriving the aggregate bilateral FDI, we have assumed the firm productivity
support to be unbounded. We may instead impose some upper bound on the productivity
support Helpman et al. (2008). This will not affect the zero FDI conclusion in the first
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scenario but will introduce additional incidence of zero FDI in the second scenario. Zero
FDI in this case will occur not only at the bilateral country level but also at the sectoral
level. In particular, let φ˜ be the upper bound of the firm productivity support. Define
b ≡ C(rh, rod)/φ˜; i.e., b is the cutoff on the sectoral demand where the most productive firm
would undertake FDI in rod from rh. For B < b, the required productivity level for a firm to
choose rdo exceeds the upper bound of the productivity support. Thus, FDI will occur only
in sectors of sufficiently large demand with B ∈ [b, 1] for given rh and rod. We have zero FDI
from rh in rod inallsectors if b > 1.
Seventh, in deriving the aggregate FDI flows, we have also suppressed possible heterogene-
ity in headquarter intensity across sectors. In principle, it is possible to introduce another
layer of sub-sectors characterized by η ∈ [0, 1] within each sector B ∈ [0, 1]. For given (B, η),
we can identify the unique productivity level φ˜o(B, η) of firms that would prefer rod as a FDI
destination. Assume η ∼ U(0, 1), the aggregate bilateral FDI can in principle be derived in
a similar way as in (40). The difficulty is to identify the boundary between zero and positive
bilateral FDI in terms of both parameters (B, η) and as a result, a closed-form solution for
the aggregate bilateral FDI.
Without doubts, the current model has missed some relevant features of multinational
production, such as outsourcing and horizontal FDI. It is possible to introduce the sorting
structure of outsourcing and FDI in Antràs and Helpman (2004) such that the fixed cost
of FDI is greater than outsourcing in the South taking into account the endogenous choice
of firm-specific informal institution, and at the same time, the FDI variable profit margin
is steeper than outsourcing in a given destination. Similar to how the FDI profit function
is derived in Figure 9, the outsourcing profit function taking into account firm’s optimal
choice of destination will likely be an increasing convex function and cut the domestic and
FDI profit functions in the middle spectrum of firm productivity, creating a lower cutoff for
outsourcing and an upper cutoff for FDI. Institutional complementarity effect at the firm
level is likely to follow for outsourcing as for FDI by a similar mechanism.
In models of horizontal FDI, firms may engage FDI in multiple destinations for market-
access motives. However, the same institutional complementarity effect identified in this
paper at the firm level is likely to apply to this alternative setting. Assume away differences
in wage costs (and thus vertical-FDI incentives). MNEs based in poorer institutions still have
a comparative advantage at reducing the overhead cost of FDI at a destination given their
heavier informal institutional investment at home, and thus will be more likely to choose
FDI over exporting to serve the market with poorer institutions, all else being equal.
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2.3. Empirical Evidence: FDI activities at the firm level
We now provide further analysis based on firm-level data to test the predictions of Proposition
6, and estimate the following specification:
ln(FDIfshdt) = β1(Gh,t−11 ∗Gd,t−1) + β2 ln(prodf,t−1) + β3(ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1)
+β4RDf,t−1 + β5RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1
+β6 | ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | +γ′Xhd,t−1
+χht + ζdt + κds + hdsft (41)
where FDIhdsft measures FDI activity in sector s by firm f of origin h in destination d
in year t, Gc,t1 country c’s institutional quality in year t − 1, prodf,t1 firm f ’s productivity
in year t− 1, and RDf,t1 firm f ’s R&D intensity in year t− 1.
By Proposition 6(i), we expect to find β1 > 0 such that firms from countries of better
institutions tend to engage more FDI in destinations of better institutions (relative to another
firm of similar characteristics except countries of origin) and vice versa. The next two terms
test the prediction of Proposition 6(ii), which suggests β3 < 0 because more productive firms
with larger market shares have stronger incentives to locate production in cheaper locations
(poorer institutions in the current framework). To distinguish this effect of productivity
on FDI from that of quality control risk as suggested by Chang and Lu (2012), we also
include R&D intensity to proxy for a parent firm’s technology sophisticatedness. The theory
of Chang and Lu (2012) suggests that firms with more complicated production technology
have weaker incentives to engage in vertical FDI for risk of quality-control failure (β4 < 0),
but such disincentive is less severe in destinations of better institutions (β5 > 0).
The three sets of indicator variables, {χht, ζdt, κds}, control for origin-year, destination-
year, and destination-sector fixed effects. For example, the effects of sectoral demand and
headquarter intensity on the choice of FDI location, as suggested by Proposition 6 (iii)–(iv),
will be absorbed by the destination-sector FEs. The remaining terms - difference in log
GDPs per capita and country relational characteristics - are again included to control for
the Linder effect and other determinants of FDI.
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2.3.1. Data and Measurement
We construct a panel of firm-level FDI data for the period 2009–2016, combining the fDi
Markets database (that tracks the greenfield FDI activities) and the Orbis dataset (that pro-
vides the firm-level financial information). The period of study is dictated by the availability
of the Orbis firm-level data.
The fDi Markets database is a service offered by the Financial Times that tracks cross-
border greenfield investment in all sectors and countries. It provides real-time monitoring
of investment projects, capital investment and job creation. For every project initiated
overseas, this dataset records the date when a project is carried out, the parent firm initiating
it, the location of the parent firm (country-state-city), the industry sector of FDI, the host
country (and city), the capital investment of the project (in million USD), and the number
of jobs created. The advantage of fDi Markets is that each project is cross-referenced against
multiple sources so that the information is relatively accurate.
This dataset is used as the primary source of greenfield FDI information by various
organizations such as UNCTAD and World Bank. It is also increasingly used in FDI studies.
For example, Desbordes and Wei (2017) use this dataset to examine the effect of financial
constraints on FDI activities. M. Chan J. and Zheng (2017) study the effect of networks on
outward FDI;Castellani and Lavoratori (2017) exploit the information on the type of project
to study the co-location and agglomeration of FDI.
We collapse the firm-level capital investment (originally reported by date and at the city
level) into year and destination country basis. Thus, the measure of FDI is at the level
of firm, sector, origin country, destination country, and year. For the period 2009–2016,
there are 35,039 unique firms from 168 origin countries that conduct greenfield FDI in 200
destination countries.
Firm-level financial data (lagged one year) were retrieved from Orbis (compiled by Bu-
reau van Dijk). This dataset provides comprehensive information on private companies
worldwide. In particular, we use the information on operating revenues, number of employ-
ees, total assets, material costs, and research and development (R&D) expenses. Data were
downloaded in US dollars. The Orbis dataset includes over 280 million companies across the
globe, so it is infeasible to download all observations. We download the subset of firms that
satisfy the following criteria during 2008–2016: (i) firms with observations in at least one
year on operating revenues, number of employees, and total assets, and (ii) also with obser-
vations in at least one year on material costs (or alternatively, costs of goods sold and costs
50
of employees), since these variables are required in the estimation of firm productivity.39
We then merge firms from the FDI dataset with the Orbis observations to obtain the
parent firm’s annual financial data for the period 2008–2016. The merge process relies on
match of two key identifiers — firm name and home country — from both datasets, based
on fuzzy matching programs and manual inspection.40 In the end, we have about 25% of
firms in the fDi Markets dataset that are successfully matched to firms from Orbis.
Given the set of parent firms with financial data, we then estimate their productivity
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) method.41 In the estimation process, we allow
the production functions to differ across sectors, where the sector is defined according to the
industry sector of FDI reported for the firm by the fDi Markets dataset (39 sectors in total).
This process provides a panel of productivity estimates for each firm across years according
to its sector of FDI. The R&D intensity is constructed as the ratio of R&D expenses to
operating revenues.
In sum, the sample of observations used in the analysis refer to an incident of greenfield
foreign capital investment in a sector and year by a firm reported by fDi Markets and the
corresponding characteristics of the investing firm, origin and destination countries (lagged
by one year). Thus, effectively, the observations use variations in FDI during 2009–2016 and
those of firm/country characteristics during 2008–2015.
Table (19) provides the summary statistics of the firm-level variables. For the period
2009–2016, the minimum positive FDI value is 8 thousand USD, while the maximum is 18.5
billion USD, with mean at approximately 35.9 million USD. This indicates a large extent of
heterogeneities in FDI capital investment across years and across firms.
Next, we present in Table (20) the institutional quality of home and destination countries
39When the information on material costs is missing, it is proxied by the difference between the costs of
goods sold and the costs of employees.
40Stata provides a fuzzy matching program, reclink2. It is an algorithm for probabilistic record linkage. In
particular, it compares strings to determine whether records are ‘similar’ and provides scores of similarity.
The package also provides an algorithm, stnd compname, to pre-process (standardize) company names. We
standardize each firm’s name in both datasets before applying the matching program. Because reclink2
is a fuzzy matching algorithm, manual check is required to ensure the accuracy. We inspect each record
of matched pairs and verify whether they are indeed the same company. Matched pairs where the (core)
standardized names are different are dropped.
41A possible alternative is the methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996a) (OP). We choose the
LP approach because it uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity; it is common that
firms report positive use of materials, so that we may preserve as many observations as possible. In contrast,
the OP method relies on investment as the proxy, whose level depends on the depreciation rate assumed
and may be non-positive. See Van Beveren (2012) for a review of alternative methodologies to estimate firm
productivity.
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of FDI in terms of the six WGI indicators. First, it is evident that FDI origins on average
have better institutional qualities. This is to some extent consistent with the theory’s setting,
where FDI tends to flow South (wh > wd, i.e., rh < rd) such that the higher variable
profit of FDI helps offset the higher fixed cost of FDI. Second, the table also indicates that
FDI recipient countries are more dispersed than origins in terms of institutional qualities
(standard deviations are larger, while means are lower, for FDI recipient countries).
Unlike the country-level analysis, it is infeasible to conduct analysis incorporating the
extensive margin using Probit or Tobit estimations, because the universe of FDI relations
(nil or active) across all firm-sector-origin-destination-year combinations is too large for typ-
ical computing capacity to handle. Thus, the subsequent analysis focus on firms that were
recorded to have undertaken FDI during 2009–2016. We will use the PPML estimator, be-
cause zero FDI values exist where the firm does not reveal the amount of capital investment.
We measure a country’s institutional quality based on the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI), in six dimensions: voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence
of violence (PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL),
and control of corruption (CC).42 Kaufmann et al. (2011) provide details on the construction
of these indicators. Since these indicators are highly correlated with one another, we include
them one at a time in the estimation of (15). For each governance indicator, a country
receives both a point estimate ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and
a percentile ranking among all countries. The higher the index, the better the institutional
quality. We report the results based on the point estimate, although findings are qualitatively
similar based on the percentile ranking.
The data on GDP per capita (in current US dollars) are based on the World Devel-
opment Indicators.43 We construct the general price level of a country relative to the United
States by the ratio of its GDP (per capita) in current US dollars to its GDP (per capita) in
current PPP dollars. This variable aims to capture the overall cost of production (including,
e.g., rent, wages, intermediate materials and infrastructure) facing the firms operating in the
country.
The transaction and information cost proxies Xhd,t−1 were compiled from several sources.
The CEPII website provides the data on bilateral distance, and whether two countries are
contiguous (contig), share a common language (comlang), have ever had a colonial link
(colony), have had a common colonizer after 1945 (comcol), are currently in a colonial
42http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.
43http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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relationship (curcol) or were/are the same country (smctry).44 The data on whether two
countries are currently in a regional trade agreement (rta), and whether they use a common
currency (comcur) were retrieved from de Sousa’s website.45 Last but not least, the data on
bilateral investment treaties were obtained from UNCTAD. We construct a dummy variable
that equals one if a BIT is currently in force between a country pair and zero otherwise,
according to the date a BIT enters into force (and the date it is terminated if ever).46
All regressors (if time variant) are lagged one period relative to the FDI variable, to reduce
the concern of reverse causality. We also experiment using longer lags of the right-hand-side
variables in unreported exercises; the results are similar.
2.3.2. Results
Table (21) reports the PPML estimation results of equation (41). As shown by the table,
the coefficient on (GhGd) is positive and significant across all the six governance indicators.
This provides support for the paper’s main theoretical prediction of an institutional comple-
mentarity effect on firm-level FDI activities. In addition, the negative sign of the coefficient
on (prodf ∗ Gd) is also consistent with Proposition 6(ii). That is, more productive firms in
fact have stronger incentives to engage more FDI in destinations of lower wages, given their
larger market shares. At the same time, their heavier investment in informal institutions
allow them to operate in such destinations of poorer institutions. Interestingly, the theory
of Chang and Lu (2012) also finds support in this exercise, where the coefficient for RDf
is significantly negative but that for (RDf ∗Gd) is positive. Thus, quality-control risk does
present itself as a critical concern in firms’ FDI decision.
Coefficients on the country-level variables, when precisely estimated, are in general con-
sistent with prior expectations. One notable exception is the positive sign of the coefficient
on the difference in GDPs per capita, contrary to the Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al.
(2014). This result could be due to the pooling of both vertical and horizontal FDI. As ver-
tical FDI is motivated by cost-saving considerations, larger differences in incomes between
origins and destinations can promote FDI flows. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory way
to disentangle the two modes of FDI in this exercise (following methods such as in Alfaro
and Charlton (2009)), because the fDi Markets dataset reports the type of FDI activity in
44http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6. See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for
further de- tails.
45http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. See also Sousa (2012).
46http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. We set the cutoff date to be July 1st of the current year in
defining the year-varying dummy bit.
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only very broad categories.
2.3.3. Robustness Checks
We carry out similar robustness checks as for the country-level FDI. The qualitative results
are very similar if we use the WGI percentile ranking (of institutions across countries) instead
of point estimates. We continue to find a complementarity pattern in institutional qualities,
a negative effect of destination institutional quality on the FDI of more productive firms,
and a positive effect of destination institutional quality on the FDI of firms of higher R&D
intensity.
We then consider dropping countries deemed to be tax havens. The patterns documented
above for the benchmark sample continue to hold in this scenario.
We then add, as extra controls, the similarity of industrial structures of the home and
destination countries, or the similarity of their religion compositions. Similarity in industrial
structures increases FDI by firms. Nonetheless, our key theoretical predictions continue to
hold in the data. In fact, the estimate of the institutional complementarity effect increases in
magnitude across the board. Likewise, similarity in religion compositions has positive effects
on firm-level FDI, but including the extra control does not alter the conclusion for all key
variables of interest discussed above in the benchmark scenario.
Finally, instead of the revenue production function, we also estimate firm productivity
levels based on the value-added production function using the LP method. The institutional
complemen- tarity effect continues to be positive and highly statistically significant. The
coefficient on R&D intensity remains to be negative and that on its interaction with desti-
nation institutional qual- ity positive. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the interaction term
of productivity and destination institutional quality, despite being negative across five of six
governance indicators, is in general statistically insignificant unlike the benchmark case.
In sum, we find robust empirical support for the theory’s main prediction of an institu-
tional complementarity effect at the firm-level FDI (cf. Proposition 6 (i)).
2.4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a theoretical framework to micro-found the hypothesis that
South- based MNEs have a comparative advantage to deal with the inefficiency associated
with weak formal institutions and to maneuver in relationship-based investment environment,
relative to their peers from the North. The theory predicts a complementarity in institutional
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qualities of the home and host countries in bilateral FDI flows. This helps explain the greater
presence of South-based MNEs in countries of relatively poorer institutions.
We have conducted an extensive test of the theory using bilateral FDI for 219 economies
during the period 2001–2010. The results indicate a statistically significant complemen-
tarity effect in institutional qualities. The finding is robust to the FDI series studied, the
institutional indicators used, the inclusion of multilateral country fixed-effects, and the con-
sideration of zero FDI. In addition to predictions on bilateral FDI activity at the country
level, the paper’s theoretical framework also suggests interesting testable predictions at the
firm and sectoral levels. In particular, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of
poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional quality at home and the more pro-
ductive the firm is, all else being equal. Using a worldwide firm-level FDI dataset during the
period 2009-2016 (with 35,039 unique firms from 168 origin countries that conduct greenfield
FDI in 200 destination countries), we find evidence supporting these firm-level predictions.
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3. Financial Constraints, Agency Problem and Interna-
tional Trade
3.1. Introduction
Chen (2014) constructs a model à la Melitz (2003) that captures the agency problem in-
side the firm in order to explain why some agency firms improve productivity after trade
liberalization. This model predicts that small surviving agent non-exporters’ productivity
increases compared with the small surviving neoclassical non-exporters after trade liberal-
ization. The mechanism of this prediction is that agents subject to the agent problem in
the small surviving agent non-exporting firms have the incentives to exert more effort to
induce their owners to produce after trade liberalization. That proposit gets the consistent
empirical supports using Colombia plant-level data.
On the other hand, Manova (2013) incorporates financial frictions into a heterogeneous-
firm model à la Melitz (2003) and applies it to a large panel of bilateral trade for 27 industries
during 1985-1995. She identifies and quantifies the three mechanisms through which credit
constraints affect trade: the selection into production, the selection into exporting, and the
exporters’ foreign sales. She shows that financially developed economies have comparative
advantages in financially vulnerable sectors because better financial institutions lead to more
destination markets (J. M. Chan and Manova 2015), more export product varieties, and more
aggregate trade volumes.
In this study, we would present a heterogeneous-firm model à la Melitz (2003) where
firms suffer from both agency problem inside the firms and financial frictions outside the
firms. In Chen (2018), he argues that the partnership firm is a perfect example of the type
of firm he considers. In real world, most firms are organized as agency firms described in
that paper. Inevitably, the credit constraints are pervasive for almost all firms. Therefore,
firms with these two problems are more relevant to the reality compared to firms with only
either problem.
The firms with two problems we consider in this paper are everywhere. A large corpora-
tion with multiple plants is the perfect example. Consider the case of Ford Motor Company
(Ford for short). Ford has many brands and plants. When deciding whether to set up a new
plant and export or not, the owner needs to raise enough money. A fraction of the initial
investment is usually covered by outside capital, typically from investors. At this step, the
financial frictions emerge naturally. At the same time, the owner of Ford also need to hire a
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manager to run this new plant. And agency problem comes into being as Chen’s paper since
effort exerted by the manager is observable but not verifiable.
In our theoretical model, credit frictions and agency problems are substitutes. Firms with
the highest initial productivities can overcome problems of credit frictions with operating
profits higher than financing costs. In this case, managers exert first-best effort invariably
and these firms export. Firms with not-so-high productivity have their financial constraints
binding and export, since managers have the incentive to exert "second-best" (higher than
the "first-best") efforts. The "second-best" effort level is contingent upon external credit
constraints, since operating profits can only cover the financing cost. Firms with the lowest
productivity exit the exporting market since payoffs to managers are lower than his outside
option.
The work is connected to studies regarding trade and finance. The impacts of financial
constraints have been paid attention to in recent trade literature. Most theoretical/empirical
studies are based on Melitz (2003) (typically, for example, Antràs et al. (2007), and Foley
and Manova (2015)). Generally, lower financial development, such as the lack of loans,
costly financial contracting and weak investor protection raise the cutoff for both domestic
production and exporting. Advantage in access to finance exerts larger influence on trade
in financially more vulnerable sectors (Manova et al. 2015). The mechanism is that weaker
financial contracting and investor protection imposes higher risks for investors (creditors),
which demands high pay-back from debtors (entrepreneurs). Also, insufficient loans in the
economy drives up financing costs for entrepreneurs. In addition, it’s generally recognized
that exporting requires higher costs than selling domestically. In this paper, we identify that
agency problem is another mechanism through which financial constraints hinders trade.
This work is also linked to moral hazard in the open economy. For majority of literature
examining institutional quality and trade, the human capital is mostly fixed exogenously
((Costinot 2004) and (Grossman 2004), for example), however, Vogel (2007) argues that
human capital is endogenous to open to trade under moral hazard. Better Institutional
quality can alleviate problems relating to moral hazard. The theoretical framework in this
paper incorporates the above arguments by allowing managers to choose their optimal efforts
in different firms. Better institutional quality (more advanced financial system here) enables
more managers to have "first-best" efforts.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 3.2 and Section 3.2.8 explain the theoretical
framework in this paper. Section 3.3 presents econometric framework for empirical study
and explains the data. Section 3.4 presents results from empirical study and discussed
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implications from results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. The Model of Credit Constraints and Agency Problem in In-
ternational Trade
3.2.1. Set up
We incorporate credit constraints, agency problem and firm heterogeneity into a static,
partial equilibrium à la Melitz (2003). Manova regards firm as a black box, i.e., the manager
and owner are not distinguished. We follow approach the approach by Chen (2018) and
incorporate agency problem into Manova’s paper. But firm in that model is in the financial
frictionless world, which is unrealistic in fact. We revised the operating profit function by
allowing credit constraints.
There are four types of agents in the economy: investors (bankers), owners (entrepreneurs),
workers, and managers. The managers can choose to be either managers or workers. Their
endowments are I, O, M , and L, respectively, and those endowment amounts are fixed
throughout the firm’s operating process. Workers are homogeneous and their labor is the
only input to production. They receive a uniform wage from employment. We also as-
sume that the measures of bankers and entrepreneurs are large enough such that free-entry
condition holds. Managers are also homogeneous, and some of them are matched with the
entrepreneurs after the entrepreneurs enter the industry.
Differentiated varieties are produced by a continuum of firms in each of J countries and
S sectors. The utility of a representative agent in country i is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
Ui =
∏
s
Cµsis , (42)
where µs is the share of each sector s in total expenditure,
∑
s µs = 1 and Cis is sector-specific
CES consumption:
Cis =
[∫
ω∈Ωis
qis(ω)
σs−1
σs dω
] σs
σs − 1 , (43)
where Ωis is the set of available varieties in country i sector s, and qis(ω) is the consumption
of variety ω in sector s, and σs is the elasticity of substitution of sector s.
From the utility function above, we can get the demand of a consumer in i for a variety
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with price pis(ω) as
qis(ω) =
(
pis(ω)
Pis
)−σs µsYi
Pis
, (44)
where Yi is the total expenditure and Pis is the ideal price index and defined as
Pis ≡
[∫
ω∈Ωis
pis(ω)
1−σsdω
] 1
1− σs . (45)
3.2.2. The Rule
The rule which investors, owners, worker and managers obeys is described as the following
First, an entrepreneur in sector s, country j pays a sunk entry cost cjsfej where cjs is
the cost of a cost-minimizing bundle of inputs specific to each country and sector. According
to Manova’s setting, cjs captures differences in aggregate productivity, factor prices, and
factor intensities across countries and sectors. And the entrepreneur is randomly matched
with a manager. After the match, a firm is set up, the manager and the investor discuss
an implementable idea with initial quality ρ, which is randomly realized drawing from a
cumulative distribution function F (ρ), which does not depend on j and s.
Second, the manager makes his occupational choice. He can quit the firm and become a
worker, in which case the entrepreneur receives zero profit afterwards. Alternatively, he can
choose to work for the entrepreneur and exert effort ψ, to develop the implementable idea
that leads to a blueprint for a product (i.e., variety ω).
Third, if the manager chooses to work for the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur needs to
decide whether or not to pay a fixed production cost cjsfjs to start production and a fixed
cost cjsfji to export to country i, where fji > 0 for i 6= j and fji > fjj = fjs = 0. Firms
need to incur a larger cost to export than just to serve the domestic market. An iceberg
trade cost is incurred so that τji > 1 units of a variety need to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive
from country j to i. We assume that the entrepreneur observes the overall quality of the
implementable idea, which equals ρψ, when deciding whether or not to start production and
export. The overall quality of the implementable idea determines the labor productivity of
the firm in the subsequent production.
At this stage, the problem of financial frictions emerges. The entrepreneur needs to decide
the optimal financial contract with investor. The details will be discussed in next section.
The entrepreneur is willing to produce, if and only if the operating profit can cover the fixed
costs the entrepreneur should pay and the money he should pay back to the lender.
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Fourth, if the production starts, the manager decides the price and quantity in each
market given external credit F chosen by the entrepreneur. At this point, firms compete
with each other in each market, revenue is received, and the variable cost is paid. At this
stage, the financial contract with investor is also enforced. At last, the operating profit is
realized. The labor productivity of the firm is ρψ(ρ). The manager will exert effort level
ψ(ρ) and the payoff is a fraction α of firm’s operating profit minus the dis-utility of exerting
that effort. The manager’s effort depends on the initial firm productivity ρ and is not a
continuous function of it. The detail of this point will be discussed in the following sections.
The manager will choose an optimal effort level accordingly and becomes a worker if her
payoff is lower than the outside option cjs. In the latter case, the entrepreneur will not
produce and exit the market.
Finally, the entrepreneur and the manager bargain over the operating profit to receive
income. They play a generalized Nash bargaining game. As a result, the manager and the
entrepreneur receive fractions α and 1− α of the operating profit, respectively.
3.2.3. The Firm’s Problem under Open Economy
We incorporate the effect of credit constraints on exporting. We make the assumption that
entrepreneurs need to finance their fixed costs in selling abroad only. The above assumption
follows Manova (2013) which assumes that entrepreneurs finance their domestic activities
with cash flows from operations, and they face liquidity constraints in financing their foreign
sales.
Entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints in financing their domestic production and their
exporting. While variable costs can be funded internally, a fraction djst ∈ (0, 1) of the fixed
costs is borne up-front and has to be covered by outside capital for firms in sector s and they
must pledge collateral to borrow in country j. A fraction of tjst ∈ (0, 1) of the sunk entry
cost is assumed to be used as collateral. djst and tjst vary across sectors for technological
reasons innate to a sector and are exogenous from the individual firms’ perspective.
Countries differ in their level of financial contractibility. An investor can expect to be
repayed with probability λj ∈ (0, 1), which is exogenous to the model and determined by the
strength of j’s financial institutions. With probability (1 − λj) the investor is not repayed,
i.e. the entrepreneur defaults. In that case, the creditor seizes the collateral tjstcjsfej. To
continue operations and be able to borrow in the future, the entrepreneur then needs to
replace this collateral.
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Financial contracting proceeds as follows. In the beginning of each period, every en-
trepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a potential investor. This contract specifies
the amount the entrepreneur needs to borrow, the repayment F , and the collateral in case
of default. After that, the entrepreneur starts his operation and receives profits. Finally, the
creditor receives repayment or the collateral.
3.2.4. Credit-Constrained Exporters
We consider the open economy. As discussed before, firms require outside capital for a
fraction djst of the fixed costs associated with entering each market. Companies in sector s
in country j has the probability λj to enforce contracts and ts is fraction in sunk cost required
as collateral. We consider the case of a multi-country world, for generalization. The ice-berg
trade cost is τjis ≥ 1 and the fixed cost of entering market is fji. The entrepreneur’s problem
is represented as
max
p,q,F
pijis(ρ, ψ) = (1− α)
[
pjis(ρ, ψ)qjis(ρ, ψ)− τjiscjs
ρψ(ρ)
qjis(ρ, ψ)
]
−(1− djst)cjsfji − λjF (ρ, ψ)− (1− λj)tjstcjsfej (46)
s.t. (46, 1) qjis(ρ, ψ) =
(
pjis(ρ,ψ)
Pis
)−σs
µsYi
Pis
,
(46, 2) Ajs(ρ, ψ) ≡ (1− α)
[
pjis(ρ, ψ)qjis(ρ, ψ)− τjiscjsρψ(ρ) qjis(ρ, ψ)
]
− (1− djst)cjsfji ≥ F (ρ, ψ),
(46, 3) Bjis(ρ, ψ) ≡ −djstcjsfji + λjF (ρ, ψ) + (1− λj)tjstcjsfej ≥ 0.
Following Manova (2013) investors break even in expectation and producers adjust the
payment F (ρ, ψ) so that Bjis(ρ, ψ) = 0. Here, we follow Manova (2012) to assume that
tjstcjsfej ≤ djstcjsfji, so that we can get
(1− djst)cjsfji + F (ρ, φ) ≥ (1− djst)cjsfji + λjF (ρ, ψ) + (1− λj)tjstcjsfej
i.e. as long as condition (5.2) is satisfied, the entrepreneur will always get positive payoff.
The operating profit p˜ijis under this problem is
p˜ijis =
1
σs
Rjis(ρ, ψ) =
1
σs
(
σsτjiscjs
(σs−1)Pisρψ(ρ))
1−σsµsYi = τ 1−σsjis β(φ)φηjis,
where φ = ρσs−1, β = ψσs−1 and ηjis =
cjs
σs
(σs−1
σs
)σs−1µsYi
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3.2.5. Agency Problem
The manager’s problem is represented by the following:
max
ψ
αp˜ijis(ρ, ψ)− cjsγψθ0 (47)
s.t. αp˜ijis(ρ, ψ)− cjsγψθ0 ≥ cjs (48)
where cjsγψθ0 is the dis-utility of the manager and p˜ijis is the operating profit of the firm. The
setting follows Chen (2018). Similar to that paper, we assume the cost of effort θ0 > σs− 1.
In the constraint, the outside option for the manager is normalized to be cjs. Using the
transformation in the previous subsection, the manager’s problem can be re-written as
max
β
ατ 1−σsjis β(φ)φηjis − cjsγβθ (49)
st. ατ 1−σsjis β(φ)φηjis − cjsγβθ ≥ cjs
and θ = θ0
σs−1 , so that the dis-utility is convex in the effort.
If manager’s participation constraint is satisfied, the solution to the optimization problem
is
β(φ) = β∗x(φ) = (
αφηjisτ
1−σs
jis
θγcjs
)
1
θ−1 (50)
The above is "first-best" effort.
3.2.6. Self-select into Exporting
It is worth noting here that when the initial quality φ is sufficiently small, the profit the
entrepreneur gets from manager’s first-best effort is not enough to cover the repayment, i.e.
the condition (3.2.4) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, there exist a cutoff φ∗jis below which the
manager cannot compensate the entrepreneur by the first-best effort in market i. Formally,
the cutoff is defined as
(1− α)τ 1−σsjis φ∗jisβ(φ∗jis)ηjis = (1− ds)cjsfji + F (ρ, ψ)
Furthermore, an uninteresting case will occur if the manager choose to be a worker in a
firm with φ∗jis, so, we make the assumption that
ατ 1−σsjis β(φ
∗
jis)φ
∗
jisηjis − cjsγβ(φ∗jis)θ ≥ cjs
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or formally, the assumption is
α ≥ cjis[
Djis(1− 1θ ) + cjis
] (51)
and the cutoff is
φ∗jis = (
Djis
1− α)
θ−1
θ (
τ
θ(σ−1)
jis cjsθγ
αηθ
)
1
θ (52)
where Djis = (1− djst)cjsfji + F (ρ, φ).
It is argued by Chen (2018) that for managers working with firms with initial productivity
lower than φ∗jis, she can exert higher effort to induce the entrepreneur to enter market i and
she still get payoff higher than the outside option. Her optimal effort level in this case should
be β(φ∗jis)
φ∗jis
φ
, which decreases with the firm’s initial productivity.
Finally, if the initial idea quality is too low, exerting effort β(φ∗jis)
φ∗jis
φ
gives the manager
the payoff lower than her outside option. In this case, the manager does not have the
incentive to induce the entrepreneur to enter market i. Formally, this cutoff φx is defined as
ατ 1−σsjis β(φ
∗
x)φ
∗
xηjis − cjsγ(β(φ∗x)φ
∗
x
φx
)θ = cjs
Solving the constraints, we can have the lower cutoff as
φjis =
(αDjis)
1
θ
(θ [αDjis − (1− α)]) 1θ
φ∗jis < φ
∗
jis (53)
Figure 1 shows the relation between effort levels and firm’s initial productivity, conditional
on the entrepreneur entering market i. It plots the effort level β(φ) against φ.
3.2.7. Comparative Statistics
The two cutoffs are related to financial frictions both at sectoral and country levels. The
cutoffs φ∗jis and φjis are higher when external financial dependence (djst) is higher and when
asset tangibility (tjst) and country financial development λj are lower. In addition, country
level financial development lowers the cutoffs more in financially more vulnerable sectors.
The reasoning is that, since the financing cost is
Djis = (1− djst)cjsfji + F (ρ, φ)
and the banker’s constraints always binds. Then, the financing cost Djis can be re-written
as:
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Djis = cjs
[
fji +
1−λj
λj
(djstfji − tjstfej)
]
These arguments is formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The productivity cutoff for profitable exporting is higher in financially more
vulnerable sectors and lower in financially more developed countries (∂φ
∗
jis
∂djst
> 0, ∂φ
∗
jis
∂tjst
< 0,and
∂φ∗jis
∂λj
< 0). Financial developments lowers this cutoff relatively more in financially more
vulnerable sectors ( ∂
2φ∗jis
∂djst∂λj
< 0 and ∂
2φ∗jis
∂tjst∂λj
> 0).
Proof. The cutoff φ∗jis increases with the fixed cost Djis:
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
= θ−1
θ
τ
θ(σs−1)
jis cjsθγ
α(1−α)θ−1ηθD
− 1
θ
jis > 0
, with θ > 1 With the functional form of Djis, the following relations hold:
∂Djis
∂djst
= cjsfji
1− λj
λj
> 0 (54)
∂Djis
∂tjst
= −cjsfej 1− λj
λj
< 0 (55)
∂Djis
∂λj
= −cjs
λ2j
(djstfji − tjstfej) < 0 (56)
∂2Djis
∂djst∂λj
= −cjsfji 1
λ2
< 0 (57)
∂2Djis
∂tjst∂λj
= cjsfej
1
λ2j
> 0 (58)
With equations (13)-(17), we can then arrive at the following implications:
∂φ∗jis
∂djst
=
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
∂Djis
∂djst
> 0
∂φ∗jis
∂djst
=
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
∂Djis
∂tjst
< 0
∂φ∗jis
∂djst
=
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
∂Djis
∂λj
< 0
∂2φ∗jis
∂tjst∂λj
= ∂
∂tjst
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
∂Djis
∂λj
= θ−1
θ
fejD
−1
θ
τ
θ(σs−1)
jis cjsθγ
α(1−α)θ−1ηθ
cjs
λ2j
> 0
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∂2φ∗jis
∂djst∂λj
= ∂
∂djst
∂φ∗jis
∂Djis
∂Djis
∂∂λj
= − θ−1
θ
fjiD
−1
θ
τ
θ(σs−1)
jis cjsθγ
α(1−α)θ−1ηθ
cjs
λ2j
cjs
λ2j
< 0
QED
At this stage, it can be implied that final productivity and financial development are
substitutes. In other word, when financial development is low, firms with the lower produc-
tivity need to be more productive to produce and export, since the probability of exporting
of a firm f in country j to country i in sector s is
Mfjis =
φH − φjis
φH − φL (59)
where it’s assumed that φ ∈ [φL, φH ], then we can derive the following:
∂Mfjis
∂djst
< 0, ∂Mfjis
∂tjst
> 0,and ∂Mfjis
∂λj
> 0,
∂2Mfjis
∂djst∂λj
> 0 and ∂
2Mfjis
∂tjst∂λj
< 0
For a firm with initial productivity φ ∈ [φjis, φ∗jis], the final productivity is
β(φ)φ =
β(φ∗jis)φ
∗
jis
φ
φ = (
αηjisτ
1−σs
jis
θγcjs
)
1
θ−1φ
∗ θ
θ−1
jis
Additionally, for an exporting firm from j to i, manager’s effort levels increases with
financial frictions, if firms’ initial productivity is between the two thresholds. We apply
similar rationale here. For such a firm with φ ∈ [φjis, φ∗jis], manager’s effort is
β(φ) = β∗jis(φ
∗
jis)(
φ∗jis
φ
) = (
αηjisτ
1−σs
jis
θγcjs
)
1
θ−1
φ
∗ θ
θ−1
jis
φ
(60)
Since φjis increases with djst and decrease with λj, the following relations hold:
∂β(φ)
∂djst
> 0, ∂β(φ)
∂tjst
< 0 and ∂β(φ)
∂λj
< 0
∂2βjis(φ)
∂djst∂λj
< 0 and ∂
2β(φ)
∂tjst∂λj
> 0
Thus, we can conclude that to some extent, the optimal effort and financial development
are substitutes for the firms in the margin of surviving. When the firm face less financial
frictions, managers working with that firm can exert less effort so that the firm can export.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 compare the effort levels of two firms selling in market i with different
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λj. Note that 2 cases exist here. In Figure 2, when financial frictions (or trade costs) the
two firms face does not differ too much , the higher cutoff of the less constrained firm is
still higher than the lower cutoff of the more constrained firm. In Figure 3, when financial
frictions (or trade costs) the two firms face differ to a large extent, the higher cutoff of the
less constrained firm is even lower than the lower cutoff of the more constrained. In both
cases, it’s evident that financial constraints lead to higher efforts for marginal exporting firms
in the destination market.
3.2.8. The Role of Agency Problem
In this subsection, we explore how the agency problem affects changes in firm productivity
in the multi-country model, since some firms still are not subject to the agency problem in
reality. In order do this, we consider a world without the agency problem. As there is no
separation of ownership and control for firms in this alternative world, the manager (i.e., the
owner) chooses the effort to maximize the total profit.
In this case, the manager (owner) has the objective function of
max
β
φβ(φ)ηjis − cjsγβθ (61)
st.φβ(φ)ηjis − cjsγβθ ≥ (1− djst)cjsfji + F (ρ, ψ)
Therefore, the "first-best" effort is
β(φ) =
(
ηjisφ
cjisγθ
) 1
θ−1
(62)
In a world without the agency problem, the introduction of the manager’s effort choice into
Melitz (2003) does not change the property of the Melitz model. Namely, the ratio of the
payoff for two owners with differential initial draws is still proportional to the ratio of the
initial quality draws. Therefore, all the results obtained in Melitz (2003) also work here.
3.3. Empirical Specification and Data
To provide evidence for the theories above, we run a reduced form regression of management
scores on various credit constraints variables, firm productivity, and interactions of them.
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The empirical specification takes the following form
ManagementScorefsit = α0 + α1FinDevit + α2Ext.Depit × Ext.Depist
+α3FinDev × Productivityfst +Xfst + ψt + ψs + ψmne + ψi + fst
(63)
where ManagementScorefsit denotes the management score of firm f in sector s at year
t in country i, FinDevit denotes the financial development level of country i at year t,
FinV ulist denotes the financial vulnerability of sector s at year t in country i, Productivityfst
is the initial productivity of firm f at sector s at year t, and Xfst is the vector of firm-level
characteristics such as the proportion of exports and its ownership, etc. ψt, ψs, ψmne and
ψi are year, sector, MNE, and country fixed effects. fsit is the idiosyncratic error. The
data are further split to observations with firm size above 7 and those below 7. Under the
theoretical framework, estimated coefficients are expected to be significant if samples with
firm size below 7 and insignificant using firms with firm size above 747.
Following Chen (2018) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), the major dataset we use
here is World Management Survey (WMS) which is the major project by WMS team. Here,
we only focus on exporting firms.
The dataset is intended to measure the quality of management practices in establishments
in various countries. The data is at firm-year level from 20 countries48 in all manufacturing
sectors (at 3-digit SIC levels). The advantage of the dataset is that it provides measures
of managerial efforts by 18 management practice questions. For instance, good monitoring
and good system of rewarding are related to more hard-working managers. So, the average
score of the 18 management questions serves as the proxy for efforts. In addition, the log of
employment serves as the proxy for initial productivity. Another advantage of the dataset is
that it provides other firm-level characteristics such as the proportion of outputs exported
(export intensity)49, the proportion of managers (and non-managers) with a college degree,
number of competitors, and multi-national corporation (MNC) (local and foreign) identity.
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. As Table 1 suggests, the average of
management score is slightly less than 3, with a relatively small standard deviation. The
(log) firm size has an average of around 6.2 with a standard deviation of 1.481. Firms differ
to a large extent in terms of exports, with the mean proportion of exporting 31.96%. Notice
47other threshold values such as 6.5 and 7.5 are also used and we get similar results as here
48These 20 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
49For missing values, we let them equal to the last observation for a given firm
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that the employment rigidity index and PPP-to-GDP ratio are at country-year level.
Secondly, the financial constraint data are from two sources. The national level financial
development data is obtained from World Bank, which provides the database of indicators
of financial developments across more than 120 countries and over 1960 to 2011. Of the
31 indicators, the variable "Private Credit by Banks and Other Financial Institutions as to
GDP" is selected to proxy λj, following J. M. Chan and Manova (2015). Table 2 summarizes
financial development across countries and years. Additionally, sectoral financial vulnerabil-
ity is calculated following Braun (2005), which are based on global publicly listed companies
from Compustat’s annual industry files. The industry level financial vulnerability is proxied
by external financial dependence (EFDjst), which is defined as the share of capital expen-
ditures not financed with cash flows from operations (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Different
from previous work, we construct EFDjst at country-industry-year basis, to capture pos-
sible changes in industrial developments. Thus, we firstly calculate the EFD at firm level
and then choose the median value firm each country-year-industry group (Bilir et al. 2016).
As Table 38 shows, the external dependence has a larger variation across years than across
country-industry pairs.
From the Table 37, it’s inferred that financial development differs both across countries
and years. The gaps in credits among countries are much larger than that over years. Also,
industry-specific external dependence are reported in Table 38 for 27 SIC 3- digit industries
across countries and years in the Compustat firm sample. External finance dependence has a
higher standard deviation. Further, they have a weak correlation of -0.0408, i.e. an industry
can have a high asset tangibility while rely heavily on external financial resources.
In this study, we match country-level financial development and vulnerability data with
WMS data. In the WMS data, the industrial classification is SIC (3-digits), which is then
transferred to ISIC Rev.3 according to Haveman’s Industrial Concordance. The ISIC Rev.
3 codes are further transferred to ISIC Rev. 2, which is used as industrial classification in
Braun (2003) financial vulnerability.
3.4. Results
In this section, we discuss the results in the above empirical studies and rationale for them
are discussed. Samples are separated into two parts: those with (log) firm size below or equal
to 7 and those above 7 and other thresholds around 7 are also used. Firstly, we examine
the theoretical predictions by using different aspects of managerial efforts as the dependent
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variable. The productivity threshold selected here is (log) employment of 7: Table 39 uses
the sub-sample of firms with (log) employment less than or equal to 7.
In general, point estimates are in line with theoretical predictions. The coefficients on
credit-to-GDP ratio are negative and significant when dependent variable is "management";
the interaction term of credit-GDP ratio with (the dummy of) higher external dependence
(FinDev*Ext.Dep) is negative and significant. They are robust when adding additional
controls (comparing Column 1 and 2; Column 3 and 4, with the exception of using dependent
variable "people"). Thus, if a firm is in an industry with low external financial dependence,
1% increase in loan-to-GDP ratio decreases the managerial score by 0.0017; if a firm is
in an industry with higher external financial dependence, corresponding managerial score
decreases by 0.0018, other conditions held constant.
To completely examine our theoretical models, we use the same empirical specification
but focus on firms with higher productivity. Thus, in Table 40, we use firms with (log)
employment higher than 7. As Table 40 shows, non of the corresponding point estimates are
significant for larger firms. It is then implied that our model prediction that the management
efforts in the most productive firms are not affected by financial constraints in the exporting
market.
We further add robustness to the above results by altering the productivity cutoff. Table
41 shows results using firms with (log) employment lower than 7.5 and Table 42 reports
results using those with (log) employment lower than 6.5. As is shown by Table 41 and
Table 42, point estimates remain stable over different sub-samples.
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3.5. Conclusion
The paper presents a model which captures the coexistence of financial constraints outside
a firm and agency problem inside a firm. The main prediction in the model is that for some
exporting firms entering foreign market, agency problems can arise from credit frictions, since
managers are incentivized to exert more effort to induce their owners to export to a market.
That substitution effect does not apply to firms with large enough initial productivity since
they are not subject to financial constraints. Finally, smallest firms does not export since
revenues from manager’s second-best efforts are not high enough to cover financing costs.
Using WMS data, we provide evidence to support the model predictions on relationship
between managerial effort and financial constraints. In the data, only managerial efforts
in small-and-medium size exporting firms are affected by financial constraints. The biggest
firms’ managerial efforts are invariant to credit frictions at industry and country levels.
From the above analysis, we identify a new mechanism through which financial con-
straints affect trade. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. From the theoretical point, a
more comprehensive work can be done in exploring the effect of trade costs in managerial
incentives/efforts. Welfare analysis can be taken in a counter-factual practice such as raising
loan ratio by 10% in the economy.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1. Multi-Product Extension
The theoretical model is based on single product. The setup in the model assumes that each
firm produces one product only. However, it can be generalized to assume that each firm
produces multiple products and sells to multiple countries. The utility function in (1) and
the production cost in (4) remain unchanged. I follow Mayer et al. (2014) by assuming that
there exist "product ladder" with increasing customization cost for products further from
the core product. Specifically, I assume that each product m produced by a firm with core
marginal cost c incurs the marginal cost of
v(m, c) = λ−mc (64)
with λ ∈ (0, 1).
In the above setup, more peripheral products require higher customization costs. In (64),
m is positive and represents the distance from the core product of firm c: m = 0 indicates
that product m is the core product and higher m implies that product m requires higher
adjustment cost. Higher m reflects decreasing product appeal. Thus, if a firm in country i
decides to sell product m to country j, its total cost becomes
TCij(c,m) = q(c,m)(c+ µjz(c,m)) + δz(c,m)
2 (65)
and its problem becomes:
piij(c,m) = max
qj(c,m),zj(c,m)
pij(c,m)qij(c,m)− TCij(c,m) (66)
Similar to the case of single-product model, one can derive the optimal quality of product
m as
zij(c,m) = ρij(c
j
D − τijλ−mc) (67)
where ρij = Lj(κj − µi)/ (4δγ − Lj(κj − µi)2). Therefore, within a firm, more peripheral
products are sold with lower quality. More productive firms provide higher-quality core
products. Additionally, products are affected differently within a firm. A simple algebra
in (67) implies that competitiveness of market j (revealed in trade costs and market size)
imposes heterogeneous effects on products of different hierarchies. To see this, the first-order
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derivative of zij(c,m) with respect to τij is
∂zij(c,m)
∂τij
= ρij
(
∂cjD
∂τij
− λ−mc
)
That derivative with respect to m is then
∂2zij(c,m)
∂τij∂m
= ρijcλ
−m lnλ ≤ 0 (68)
since 0 < λ < 1. From (68), second order derivative implies that products closer to the core
(lower m) are affected by market competition more significantly.
The number of products a firm can offer to the destination market depends on the firm-
level marginal cost c. Firms with lower marginal cost c generally produce more products to
a destination market. If the cost cutoff to export from i to j is cijx , the number of products
the firm c ≤ cijx offers is
Mij(c) = max {m | c ≤ cijx λm}+ 1
the total profit of firm c in exporting to country j is the sum of profits from all products:
Πij(c) =
Mij(c)∑
m=0
piij(c,m) (69)
A.1.1. Equilibrium
Similar to single product setting, a firm draws its marginal cost c prior to entry to the market
with sunk cost fe. The expected profit from selling to all markets equal to the sunk cost
in equilibrium. The total expected profit can then be decomposed into profits from each
product sold to each destination. This can then be expressed as
∑
j∈J
∫ cijx
0
Πij(c)dG(c) =
∑
j∈J
∞∑
m=0
[∫ λmcijx
0
piij(c,m)dG(c)
]
= fe (70)
Again, I assume Pareto distribution of c. Thus the expected profit of a firm in country i can
be expressed as
2c−kM
(k + 1)(k + 2)
(
1− λk)−1∑
j∈J
Lj
4γ
[1 + (κj − µi) ρij] τ−kij
(
cjD
)k+2
= fe (71)
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The above form can be re-written for J countries. Thus, one can write the condition (71) in
the matrix form in a similar manner as in single product setting. The cutoff cjD satisfies the
following: (
cjD
)k+2
=
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)(1− λk)fe
| B |
∑
iCij (c
i
M)
k
Lj
(72)
where | B | is the determinant of matrix B and Cij is the cofactor of Bij. Other parameters
in (72) are defined in the similar manner as in single product setting. It is implied from the
above condition that endogenous competitiveness can also depend on product flexibility λ:
if (1− λk)−1 is large, the cutoff is small and the market is more competitive.
Other aggregate variables are derived in the similar approach as in single product setup.
It is important to notice that the product flexibility can vary across countries and sectors.
The aggregate bilateral trade value from i to j also depends on the product flexibility and
larger flexibility implies higher bilateral trade value. The expected number of entrants are
also determined by the product flexibility.
rij =
kNEi (c
i
m)
−k
2(1− λk)γ L
j(τij)
−(k+1) (cjD)k+2 [1 + (κj − µi)ρij]( 1k(k + 2) + (κj + µi)ρijk(k + 1)(k + 2)
)
(73)
For computing the number of entrants, the matrix F becomes
2γ(k+1)(1−λk)(α−ciD)
ηci,k+1D
A.2. Proofs of Propositions
A.2.1. Proof of Proposition 1
By the free entry condition in 15, we can obtain J conditions in the following form:
[1 + (κ1 − µi)ρi1]L1τ−ki1 (c1D)k+2 +...+[1 + (κJ − µi)ρiJ ]LJτ−kiJ (cJD)k+2 = 2γ(k+1)(k+2)feckM
(74)
When τij = τji and when there is a bilateral trade liberalization, the first-order condition
with respect to τij(τji) implies the following:
∑
d∈J
Bdd′Ld′
∂(cd
′
D)
k+2
∂τ−kij
= 0 (75)
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if d 6= i, j
and
∑
d′∈J
Bid′Ld′
∂(cd
′
D)
k+2
∂τ−kij
+
Bij
τ−kij
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2 = 0 (76a)
∑
d′∈J
Bjd′Ld′
∂(cd
′
D)
k+2
∂τ−kji
+
Bji
τ−kji
Li(c
i
D)
k+2 = 0 (76b)
for countries i and j respectively.
Since Bji
τ−kji
Lic
i
D > 0 and
Bij
τ−kij
Ljc
j
D > 0, from (76), at least one of
∂(cd
′
D )
k+2
∂τ−kji
(or ∂(c
d′
D )
k+2
∂τ−kji
,
d′ ∈ {1, ..., J}) is negative. However, if all of them are negative, the condition in (75) cannot
be satisfied. The conditions in (75) and (76) can be written in the matrix form:
BLc′ = F (77)
where B and L is defined the same as in Section 1.3. c′ is the vector with the d th ele-
ment being ∂(cdD)k+2/∂τ
−k
ij . On the right hand side, F is the vector with ith element being
− Bij
τ−kij
Ljc
j
D, j th element being − Bijτ−kij Ljc
j
D and other elements being 0. Thus, the sign of
∂(cdD)
k+2/∂τ−kij depend on those two non-zero elements, determinant and the cofactors of
matrix B:
∂(cdD)
k+2/∂τ−kij = −
1
| B |
(
Cdi
Bij
τ−kij
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2 + Cdj
Bij
τ−kij
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2
)
(78)
where Cdi is the di th element in the cofactor matrix of B.
A.2.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1. Taking the derivative of Equation
(74) with respect to κj, one can obtain J equations in the following form:
∑
h∈J
BihLh
∂(chD)
k+2
∂κj
+
∂Bij
∂κj
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2 = 0 (79)
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In the matrix form, (79) can be written as
BL
∂ck+2D
∂κj
= G (80)
where G is the vector with with ith element being ∂Bij
∂κj
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2 > 0.
Thus, the vector of partial derivatives can be computed as:
∂(ciD)
k+2
∂κj
= −Lj(c
j
D)
k+2
Li | B |
∑
h∈J
| Cih | ∂Bhj
∂κj
(81)
The sign of ∂(c
i
D)
k+2
∂κj
depends on the determinant ofB as well as its cofactors. By the definition
of B, ∂Bhj
∂κj
> 0, ∀ h. Therefore, ∃ B such that ∂(ciD)k+2
∂κj
> 0, ∀ i, j.
A.2.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Taking the derivative of (79) with respect to τij (τji), one can obtain two sets of equations,
if the origin country is i or j, the following holds:
∑
h∈j
Bi(j)hLh
∂2(chD)
k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
+ Lj
∂Bi(j)j
∂τ−kij
∂(cjD)
k+2
∂κj
+
∂2Bi(j)j
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
Lj(c
j
D)
k+2 + Lj
∂Bi(j)j
∂κj
∂(cjD)
k+2
∂τ−kij
= 0
(82)
where ∂Bij
∂τ−kij
> 0. If the origin country is not i or j, the following shall hold:
∑
h∈J
BdhLh
∂2(chD)
k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
+ Lj
∂Bdj
∂κj
∂(cjD)
k+2
∂τ−kij
= 0 (83)
If ∂(c
j
D)
k+2
∂τ−kij
, ∂(c
j
D)
k+2
∂κj
< 0, ∃ B such that ∂2(chD)k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
< 0.
From the above polynomial equations, the higher Bdh, the lower
∂2(chD)
k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
, i.e. more like
that ∂
2(chD)
k+2
∂κj∂τ
−k
ij
< 0.
A.3. Productivity Estimation
I construct the firm-level measures based on the ORBIS enterprise database of Bureau van
Dijk (BvD). This dataset provides comprehensive information on listed and de-listed private
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companies around the world. I use the financial module of the database. It provides firm-
level financial report items including total revenues, employment, total assets, and research
and development (R&D) expenses.50
I follow long-established methods of estimating firm productivity as a residual of Cobb-
Douglas production function. In this regard, both methodologies proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996b) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) are possible candidates given
the current dataset. I choose to estimate firm productivity based on LP, because the LP
approach relies on intermediate inputs as a proxy rather than on investment, whose level
may be non-positive and depends on the assumption of the depreciation rate. On the other
hand, it is common that firms record positive use of materials/energy so that I preserve as
many observations as possible.51
I choose to download recent 10 years of financial data for each firm. The missing values
exist. Thus, this is an unbalanced panel. The procedure to estimate productivity is as
follow. First, gross output, capital and total inputs are proxied by total revenues, total
assets, and Costs of Goods Sold (COGS), respectively. The cost of material/energy (in short,
material, henceforth) is calculated by COGS minus total wage payable, by the accounting
definition of COGS, if material cost is unavailable. Second, these values are deflated to
obtain the quantity counterpart.52 The number of employees are directly observable from
the data. Given the observations on gross output, labor, material, and capital, I estimate
the production function based on the Stata program levpet using as instruments current
capital, lagged material, lagged labor, lagged two year material and lagged capital. Because
industries can vary in their production technologies, the estimation is done separately for
each 3-digit NAICS sector. inputencodinglatin1
50Data are downloaded in US dollars.
51I also use OP as a robustness check and estimated productivities are similar.
52The total sales revenues are deflated by Consumer Price Index (CPI), the total assets deflated by
the index of fixed asset investment deflator, and the material normalized by Producer Price Index (PPI).
Currently, I use the US CPI (Total All Items) and PPI (for All Commodities), and construct the index of
fixed asset investment deflator from gross fixed investment flows. They are retrieved from the US Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis website, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1. Location-Specific Institution Investments
In this alternative setup, we extend the benchmark framework and allow multinational
firms to build local informal institutions at home Ih and in the host country Id, sepa-
rately. Nonetheless, the level of informal institution that a firm builds at home still af-
fects, to some extents, its operation fixed cost in the host country. In particular, firms
choose ID,∗h to minimize the fixed cost of local production: F
D = fD(rh, Ih) + kh(Ih),
and IFDI,∗h and I
FDI,∗
d to minimize the fixed cost of multinational production: F
FDI =
fD(rh, Ih) + f
FDI(rd, Ih, Id) + kh(Ih) + kd(Id).
The first order conditions for IFDI,∗h and I
FDI,∗
d are, respectively:
∂fD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )
∂Ih
+
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Ih
+ k′h(I
FDI,∗
h ) = 0, (84)
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
+ k′d(I
FDI,∗
d ) = 0. (85)
Define FD,∗(rh) and F FDI,∗(rh, rd) as the respective minimal fixed cost of local production
and FDI. We make similar assumptions on fD(rh, Ih) as in the benchmark, i.e., fD(rh, Ih)
strictly increases in rh; strictly decreases in Ih; and (28). Furthermore, assume that fFDI(rd, Ih, Id)
strictly increases in rd; strictly decreases in Ih and Id; and
∂
∂rd
(
∂fFDI(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Ih
)
< 0;
∂
∂rd
(
∂fFDI(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Id
)
< 0. (86)
We also simplify the following analysis by assuming the neutral scenario that
∂2fFDI(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Ih∂Id
= 0, (87)
such that there are no reinforcing effects of rh on the choice of Id through Ih. We discuss the
possibility of reinforcing effects at the end of this section. Basically, the proposed mechanism
is further strengthened.
(i) The investment in informal institution at home will be higher for firms engaging in
multinational production than for firms engaging only in local production: IFDI,∗h (rh, rd) >
ID,∗h (rh); (ii) The total fixed cost of production will be higher for multinational production
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than for local production: F FDI,∗(rh, rd) > FD,∗(rh); (iii) The total fixed cost of multina-
tional production will be higher in FDI destination of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drd > 0;
(iv) For a given FDI destination, the total fixed cost of multinational production will be
higher for MNEs based in countries of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drh > 0.
Proof. (i) Using similar rationales as in the benchmark, we have
∂F FDI
∂Ih
|Ih=ID,∗h =
∂fD(rh, I
D,∗
h )
∂Ih
+
∂fFDI(rd, I
D,∗
h , Id)
∂Ih
+ k′h(I
D,∗
h )
=
∂fFDI(rd, I
D,∗
h , Id)
∂Ih
< 0,
where the second equality follows by the FOC condition for ID,∗h :
∂fD(rh,I
D,∗
h )
∂Ih
+ k′h(I
D,∗
h ) = 0,
and the inequality follows by the assumption that fFDI(rd, Ih, Id) strictly decreases in Ih.
The sign implies that IFDI,∗h > I
D,∗
h .
(ii) Similarly as in the benchmark model, we can write the difference in the fixed costs
as:
F FDI,∗ − FD,∗ =
{
F FDI,∗ − FD(rh, IFDI,∗h )
}
+
{
FD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )− FD,∗
}
=
{
fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d ) + kd(I
FDI,∗
d )
}
+
{
FD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )− FD,∗
}
> 0,
where the second equality follows by the definition of FD and F FDI , and
{
FD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )− FD,∗
}
>
0 follows by the definition of FD,∗ and the fact that IFDI,∗h 6= ID,∗h .
(iii) Taking the derivative of F FDI,∗ with respect to rd, we have:
dF FDI,∗
drd
=
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Ih
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rd
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rd
,
=
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd
> 0, (88)
where the second equality follows by the FOCs for IFDI,∗h and I
FDI,∗
d in (84) and (85) and
the sign follows by the assumption that fFDI(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd.
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(iv) Similarly, we have
dF FDI,∗
drh
=
∂fD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )
∂rh
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Ih
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
,
=
∂fD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )
∂rh
> 0, (89)
by the FOC for IFDI,∗h in (84) and by the assumption that f
D(rh, Ih) strictly increases in
rh. QED
Multinational firms headquartered in countries of poorer institutions will invest more in
informal institution at home: ∂I
FDI,∗
h (rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0. As a corollary, multinational firms head-
quartered in countries of poorer institutions will be more effective at reducing its overhead
fixed cost at a given FDI destination: df
FDI(rd,I
FDI,∗
h ,I
FDI,∗
d )
drh
< 0.
Proof. Take total differentiation of (84) with respect to rh and IFDI,∗h , we have
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
= −
∂2fD(rh,I
FDI,∗
h )
∂Ih∂rh
∂2FFDI
∂I2h
> 0.
The inequality follows because the numerator is negative by (28) and because ∂2FFDI
∂I2h
> 0 by
the SOC for IFDI,∗h . As a corollary,
dfFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
drh
=
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Ih
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
< 0
by the assumption that fFDI(rd, Ih, Id) decreases in Ih and the previous result
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
>
0. QED
A firm’s net profit of local production given the optimal choice of ID,∗h and net profit of
FDI given the optimal choice of IFDI,∗h and I
FDI,∗
d are, respectively:
ΠD,∗ ≡ piD − FD,∗(rh) = Bφ˜ (wh)1−σ − FD,∗(rh), (90)
ΠFDI,∗ ≡ piFDI − F FDI,∗(rh, rd) = Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − F FDI,∗(rh, rd). (91)
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Among possible destinations of FDI, firms trade off lower wages with higher fixed costs
associated with poorer institutions, and choose rd that maximizes (91). The FOC for the
optimal choice r∗d requires that at r∗d:
∂piFDI
∂wd
ω′(rd)− ∂f
FDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd
= 0, (92)
where ∂F FDI,∗(rh, rd)/∂rd = ∂fFDI(rd, IFDI,∗h , I
FDI,∗
d )/∂rd by the envelope theorem.
(i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities at Firm-level FDI) All else being
equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the
poorer the institutional quality at home: ∂r
∗
d
∂rh
> 0; (ii) All else being equal, a firm will choose
to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the more productive the firm
is: ∂r
∗
d
∂φ˜
> 0; (iii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of
poorer institutional qualities, the larger the world demand for the sector is: ∂r
∗
d
∂B
> 0; (iv)
All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional
qualities, the less headquarter-intensive the sector is: ∂r
∗
d
∂η
< 0.
Proof. (i) Totally differentiate (92) with respect to r∗d and rh, we obtain
∂r∗d
∂rh
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
ω′(rd)ω′(rh)− ∂2fFDI∂Ih∂rd
∂IFDI,∗h (rh,rd)
∂rh
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0. (93)
The inequality holds by similar arguments as in the benchmark: ∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
> 0 by the Cobb-
Douglas functional form of piFDI ; ∂
2fFDI
∂Ih∂rd
< 0 by the assumption in (86); and ∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
< 0 by
the SOC for r∗d. (ii)–(iv) The proofs remain the same as in the benchmark. QED
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss the implications if Ih and Id are com-
plementary in lowering fixed cost of FDI at the destination. In other words, suppose that
∂2fFDI(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Ih∂Id
< 0. (94)
In this case, IFDI,∗d is not determined by (85) alone, but is jointly determined with I
FDI,∗
h
by (84) and (85). Take total differentiation of (84) and (85) with respect to rh, IFDI,∗h , and
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IFDI,∗d , we have:
∂2fD
∂rh∂Ih
drh +
∂2F FDI
∂I2h
dIFDI,∗h +
∂2fFDI
∂Id∂Ih
dIFDI,∗d = 0, (95)
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
dIFDI,∗h +
∂2F FDI
∂I2d
dIFDI,∗d = 0. (96)
Substituting (96) in (95) and collecting terms, we obtain
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
= −
∂2fD
∂rh∂Ih
∂2FFDI
∂I2h
−
(
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
)2
/∂
2FFDI
∂I2d
> 0, (97)
which holds if the denominator is positive. In other words, it requires that(
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
)2
<
∂2F FDI
∂I2h
∂2F FDI
∂I2d
. (98)
This is basically a stability condition on the system that the complementarity effect between
Ih and Id on fFDI is sufficiently weak to ensure that the solutions to Ih and Id are not
explosive. As a corollary, we have:
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rh
=
{
−∂
2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
/
∂2F FDI
∂I2d
}
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
> 0. (99)
It follows that:
dfFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
drh
=
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Ih
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rh
+
∂fFDI(rd, I
FDI,∗
h , I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rh
< 0.
Thus, Proposition B.1 continues to hold and with the effects reinforced under the scenario
(94).
In parallel to the analysis above, if we take total differentiation of (84) and (85) with
respect to rd, IFDI,∗h , and I
FDI,∗
d , we have:
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Ih
drd +
∂2F FDI
∂I2h
dIFDI,∗h +
∂2fFDI
∂Id∂Ih
dIFDI,∗d = 0, (100)
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Id
drd +
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
dIFDI,∗h +
∂2F FDI
∂I2d
dIFDI,∗d = 0. (101)
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Substituting (101) in (100) and collecting terms, we obtain
∂IFDI,∗h
∂rd
= −
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Ih
−
(
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Id
/∂
2FFDI
∂I2d
)
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
∂2FFDI
∂I2h
−
(
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
/∂
2FFDI
∂I2d
)
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
> 0, (102)
and
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rd
= −
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Ih
−
(
∂2fFDI
∂rd∂Id
/∂
2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
)
∂2FFDI
∂I2h
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
−
(
∂2FFDI
∂I2d
/∂
2fFDI
∂Ih∂Id
)
∂2FFDI
∂I2h
> 0, (103)
where the signs hold under conditions (86), (94), and (98).
Proposition B.1 remains to hold, with modifications to the proof for part (i) such that
∂r∗d
∂rh
= −
∂2piFDI
∂wd∂wh
ω′(rd)ω′(rh)−
{
∂2fFDI
∂Ih∂rd
∂IFDI,∗h (rh,rd)
∂rh
+ ∂
2fFDI
∂Id∂rd
∂IFDI,∗d (rh,rd)
∂rh
}
∂2ΠFDI
∂r2d
> 0. (104)
In sum, we see that the overall mechanism is reinforced under scenario (94). Thus, the basic
setup in (87) is a neutral assumption.
B.2. Horizontal FDI
This section extends the benchmark model to the case of horizontal FDI. Contrary to the
vertical FDI scenario in the benchmark, where a firm chooses a country to produce the
manufactured component and to serve the world market, a firm now chooses whether or not
to enter a foreign market (in addition to the home market) and whether to enter the foreign
market via exporting or horizontal FDI. Thus, the fixed costs of exporting or FDI specified
below are paid on top of the fixed cost of serving the home market.
It is assumed that firms make location-specific investment in informal institution: Ih at
home and Id abroad in the destination of foreign sales. Investment in informal institution is
assumed to be sequential: firms first choose the optimal level of investment I∗h to minimize
the fixed cost of producing for the home market: FD = fD(rh, Ih) + kh(Ih). Given this,
firms then choose between export and horizontal FDI to serve a foreign market. If a firm
chooses to enter a foreign market by exporting, its fixed cost of serving the foreign market
is: FE = fE(rd, I∗h, Id) + kd(Id). If it chooses to enter via FDI, the fixed cost of serving the
foreign market is instead: F FDI = fE(rd, I∗h, Id) + fP (rd, I∗h, Id) + kd(Id). We could interpret
fE as the fixed cost of maintaining the distribution network in the destination (which needs
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to be incurred in either case of exporting and FDI), while fP as the fixed cost of setting up an
additional production plant in foreign countries. Firms choose IE,∗d and I
FDI,∗
d to minimize
the fixed cost of foreign market entry in the case of exporting and FDI, respectively.
The first order conditions for I∗h, I
E,∗
d and I
FDI,∗
d are, respectively:
∂fD(rh, I
∗
h)
∂Ih
+ k′h(I
∗
h) = 0, (105)
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
+ k′d(I
E,∗
d ) = 0, (106)
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
+
∂fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
+ k′d(I
FDI,∗
d ) = 0. (107)
Define FD,∗(rh) ≡ FD(rh, I∗h), FE,∗(rh, rd) ≡ FE(rd, I∗h, IE,∗d ), F FDI,∗(rh, rd) ≡ F FDI(rd, I∗h, IFDI,∗d );
i.e., they are the respective minimal fixed cost of serving the home market, exporting
and horizontal FDI. We make similar assumptions on fD(rh, Ih) as in the benchmark, i.e.,
fD(rh, Ih) strictly increases in rh; strictly decreases in Ih; and (28). Furthermore, assume
that fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd; strictly decreases in Ih and Id; and
∂
∂rd
(
∂fS(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Ih
)
< 0;
∂
∂rd
(
∂fS(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Id
)
< 0, for S ∈ {E,P}. (108)
Given the discussions at the end of Section B.1, we make analogous neutral assumption that
∂2fS(rd, Ih, Id)
∂Ih∂Id
= 0, for S ∈ {E,P}, (109)
such that there are no reinforcing effects of rh on the choice of Id through Ih. A firm incurs
an iceberg trade cost τhd to export from home country h to the destination market d. In
sum, the net profits of home market, export and FDI are, respectively:
ΠD ≡ piD − FD,∗(rh) = Bhφ˜(wh)1−σ − FD,∗(rh), (110)
ΠE ≡ piE − FE,∗(rh, rd) = Bdφ˜(τhdwh)1−σ − FE,∗(rh, rd), (111)
ΠFDI ≡ piFDI − F FDI,∗(rh, rd) = Bdφ˜
(
(τhdwh)
ηw1−ηd
)1−σ − F FDI,∗(rh, rd), (112)
where in the FDI mode, we allow the use of headquarter input that needs to be shipped to
the foreign market (incurring trade cost) and combined with the manufactured component
produced in the destination market. With trade cost, the market size B now refers to that
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of a national market indexed by h or d.
(i) The investment in informal institution will be higher for firms engaging in horizontal
FDI than for firms entering the same market by exporting: IFDI,∗(rh, rd) > IE,∗(rh, rd);
(ii) The total fixed cost of production will be higher for horizontal FDI than for exporting:
F FDI,∗(rh, rd) > FE,∗(rh, rd); (iii) The total fixed cost of horizontal FDI will be higher in FDI
destination of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drd > 0; (iv) The total fixed cost of exporting
will be higher in destination of poorer institutions: dFE,∗/drd > 0.
Proof. (i) Note that
∂F FDI(rd, I
∗
h, Id)
∂Id
|Id=IE,∗d =
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
+
∂fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
+ k′d(I
E,∗
d )
=
∂fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
< 0,
where the second equality follows by the FOC condition for IE,∗d :
∂fE(rd,I
∗
h,I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
+k′d(I
E,∗
d ) = 0,
and the inequality follows by the assumption that fP (rd, Ih, Id) strictly decreases in Id. The
sign implies that IE,∗d < I
FDI,∗
d .
(ii) Using similar method as in the benchmark, we can write
F FDI,∗ − FE,∗ =
{
F FDI,∗ − FE(rd, I∗h, IFDI,∗d )
}
+
{
FE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )− FE,∗
}
= fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d ) +
{
FE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )− FE,∗
}
> 0,
where the second equality follows by the definition of FE and F FDI , and FE(rd, I∗h, I
FDI,∗
d )−
FE,∗ > 0 follows by the definition of FE,∗ and the fact that IFDI,∗d 6= IE,∗d .
(iii) Note that
dF FDI,∗
drd
=
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd
+
∂fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd
+
∂F FDI(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂Id
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rd
> 0,
(113)
where the sign follows by the assumption that fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd for S ∈
{E,P}, and by the FOC for IFDI,∗d such that ∂F FDI(rd, I∗h, IFDI,∗d )/∂Id = 0.
(iv) The proof is similar to (iii). We have
dFE,∗
drd
=
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂rd
+
∂FE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂Id
∂IE,∗d
∂rd
> 0, (114)
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where the sign follows by the assumption that fE(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd and by
the FOC for IE,∗d such that ∂F
E(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )/∂Id = 0. QED
(i) Firms based in countries of poorer institutions will invest more in home informal
institution: ∂I
h,∗(rh)
∂rh
> 0. (ii) Firms exporting to countries of poorer institutions will invest
more in destination informal institution: ∂I
E,∗
d (rh,rd)
∂rd
> 0. (iii) Multinational firms doing
horizontal FDI in countries of poorer institutions will invest more in destination informal
institution: ∂I
FDI,∗
d (rh,rd)
∂rd
> 0. (iv) As a corollary of (i), firms based in countries of poorer
institutions and entering foreign markets will be more effective at reducing its overhead fixed
cost in a given foreign market: dF
E(rd,I
∗
h,I
E,∗
d )
drh
< 0 and dF
FDI(rd,I
∗
h,I
FDI,∗
d )
drh
< 0.
Proof. (i) Take total differentiation of (105) with respect to rh and I∗h, we have
∂I∗h
∂rh
= −
∂2fD(rh,I
∗
h)
∂rh∂Ih
∂2FD
∂I2h
> 0,
since the numerator is negative by (28) and since ∂2FD
∂I2h
> 0 by the SOC for I∗h.
(ii) Take total differentiation of (106) with respect to rd and IE,∗d , we have
∂IE,∗d
∂rd
= −
∂2fE(rd,I
∗
h,I
E,∗
d )
∂rd∂Id
∂2FE
∂I2d
> 0,
at IE,∗d by the SOC for I
E,∗
d and the assumption in (108).
(iii) Take total differentiation of (107) with respect to rd and IFDI,∗d , we have
∂IFDI,∗d
∂rd
= −
∂2fE(rd,I
∗
h,I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd∂Id
+
∂2fP (rd,I
∗
h,I
FDI,∗
d )
∂rd∂Id
∂2FFDI
∂I2d
> 0,
at IFDI,∗d by the SOC for I
FDI,∗
d and the assumption in (108).
(iv) As a corollary,
dFE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
drh
=
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂I∗h
∂I∗h
∂rh
< 0,
dF FDI(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
drh
=
∂fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂I∗h
∂I∗h
∂rh
+
∂fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂I∗h
∂I∗h
∂rh
< 0,
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by the assumption fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly decreases in Ih for S ∈ {E,P}, and by (i) ∂I
∗
h
∂rh
>
0. QED
For each foreign market, firms choose the entry mode by comparing the difference in
profits from horizontal FDI and exporting. Let Π∆ denote the difference:
Π∆ = Bdφ˜
[
(τhdwh)
η(1−σ)(wd)(1−η)(1−σ) − (τhdwh)1−σ
]− (F FDI,∗ − FE,∗). (115)
The difference varies with rd according to:
∂Π∆
∂rd
= (1− η)(1− σ)Bdφ˜(τhdwh)η(1−σ)w(1−η)(1−σ)−1d ω′(rd)−
[
dF FDI,∗
drd
− dF
E,∗
drd
]
, (116)
where the first term is positive because in destinations of higher rd, wages are lower, which
reduces the marginal cost of manufactured components in FDI mode but does not affect
the exporting variable profits. Thus, the difference in variable profits increase with rd. The
sign of the second term depends on functional form assumptions about the importance of
plant-level fixed cost fP (incurred only under FDI) relative to distribution fixed cost fE
(incurred in both entry modes). We will discuss this further below. The cross derivative of
the profit differential with respect to rh is then:
∂2Π∆
∂rh∂rd
= η(1−η)(1−σ)2Bdφ˜(τhd)η(1−σ)(wh)η(1−σ)−1w(1−η)(1−σ)−1d ω′(rh)ω′(rd)−
[
∂2F FDI,∗
∂rh∂rd
− ∂
2FE,∗
∂rh∂rd
]
,
(117)
where the first term is positive. Thus, the variable profit differential between FDI and
exporting in destinations of higher rd is larger for firms based in countries of higher rh. This
is mainly due to the complementarity between headquarter and manufactured components
implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function. Assume the scenario in (109); we obtain
∂2F FDI,∗
∂rh∂rd
− ∂
2FE,∗
∂rh∂rd
=
∂2fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂I∗h ∂rd
∂I∗h
∂rh
+
∂2fP (rd, I
∗
h, I
FDI,∗
d )
∂I∗h ∂rd
∂I∗h
∂rh
−∂
2fE(rd, I
∗
h, I
E,∗
d )
∂I∗h ∂rd
∂I∗h
∂rh
< 0, (118)
where the first and the third terms are independent of Id and cancel each other (since there
is no interaction between Ih and Id in fixed cost function). This leaves the second term,
which is negative because of the assumption in (108) and Proposition B.2(i). The result in
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(118) reinforces the complementarity of rh and rd in variable profit difference of FDI and
exporting in (117). Thus, we reach a similar proposition as in the benchmark vertical FDI
model.
(i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities at Firm-level horizontal FDI)
All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose to undertake horizontal FDI instead of
exporting to serve a foreign market of poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institu-
tional quality at home: ∂2Π∆
∂rh∂rd
> 0; (ii) All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose
to undertake horizontal FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign market of poorer in-
stitutional qualities, the more productive the firm is: ∂2Π∆
∂φ˜∂rd
> 0; (iii) All else being equal,
a firm will more likely choose to undertake horizontal FDI instead of exporting to serve a
foreign market of poorer institutional qualities, the larger the destination market demand is:
∂2Π∆
∂Bd∂rd
> 0; (iv) All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose to undertake horizontal
FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign market of poorer institutional qualities, the less
headquarter-intensive the sector is: ∂2Π∆
∂η∂rd
< 0.
Proof. (i) This follows from the derivations above, where in (117) the first term is positive
and the second term is negative by (118).
(ii) Taking total differentiation of (116) with respect to φ˜, we have
∂2Π∆
∂φ˜∂rd
= (1− η)(1− σ)Bd(τhdwh)η(1−σ)w(1−σ)(1−η)−1d ω′(rd) > 0, (119)
because ω′(r) < 0.
(iii) It is straightforward to see that Bd has an analogous (positive) effect as φ˜ on ∂Π
∆
∂rd
,
because Bd and φ˜ enter the profit function multiplicatively.
(iv) Finally, we have
∂2Π∆
∂η∂rd
= (1− σ)
[
(1− η)(1− σ) ln τhdwh
wd
− 1
]
(piFDI/wd)ω
′(rd) < 0, (120)
for
(
τhdwh
wd
)(1−η)(1−σ)
< 1, which is necessary if FDI is the chosen entry mode instead of
exporting (because the FDI variable profit must be larger than exporting to compensate for
the higher FDI fixed costs as shown in Proposition B.2(ii)). In other words, for firms based
in a country of sufficiently high wage (relative to the FDI destination adjusted for trade
cost), the wage saving of FDI (in destinations of higher rd and thus lower wd) relative to
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exporting becomes smaller when the headquarter intensity η is higher. QED
We now propose possible functional-form assumptions about fE and fP that satisfy our
assumptions:
fE = rd exp(−ΥIh) + rd exp(−Id), Υ > 0, (121)
fP = Ξrd exp(−ΥIh) + Ξrd exp(−Id), Ξ > 0, (122)
where both fE and fP increase with rd, decrease with Ih and Id, and satisfy assumption (108).
They are also separable in the home and destination informal institutions, and thus satisfy
assumption (109). The parameter Υ denotes the transnationality of informal institution at
home in reducing destination fixed cost, while Ξ denotes the size of plant-level fixed cost
relative to distribution fixed cost. Given this,
dF FDI,∗
drd
− dF
E,∗
drd
= Ξ exp(−ΥI∗h) + (Ξ + 1) exp(−IFDI,∗d )− exp(−IE,∗d ), (123)
∂2F FDI,∗
∂rh∂rd
− ∂
2FE,∗
∂rh∂rd
= −ΥΞ exp(−ΥI∗h)
∂I∗h
∂rh
< 0, (124)
where the sign of (123) depends on the parameter Ξ, so the first-order difference in fixed costs
of FDI and exporting can increase or decrease with rd. Nonetheless, the cross derivative of
the fixed-cost difference with respect to rh and rd is negative. Thus, whatever the fixed-cost
difference of FDI and exporting, the difference is smaller for firms based in countries of higher
rh when the foreign destination is of higher rd.
B.3. Informal Institution and Variable Cost
In the benchmark model, we assume that informal institution affects only fixed costs. Here,
we extend the model by allowing it to affect both variable and fixed costs. A firm’s produc-
tivity is assumed to be determined by both an exogenous component φ and an endogenous
part that increases with investment in informal institution. That is, informal institution
helps to facilitate production process and reduces a firm’s input requirement. In particular,
the profit functions of domestic production and FDI are, respectively:
ΠD ≡ piD − FD(rh, I) = Bφ˜ θ(I) (wh)1−σ − FD(rh, I), (125)
ΠFDI ≡ piFDI − F FDI(rh, rd, I) = Bφ˜ θ(I)
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − F FDI(rh, rd, I), (126)
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where θ′(I) > 0. The fixed cost of domestic production and FDI are as in the benchmark
model: FD(rh, I) ≡ f(rh, I) + k(I) and F FDI(rh, rd, I) ≡ f(rh, I) + f(rd, I) + k(I). The
firms now choose ID,∗ that maximizes ΠD in the case of producing locally and IFDI,∗ that
maximizes ΠFDI in the case of producing abroad. Define F FDI,∗ = F FDI(rh, rd, IFDI,∗) and
FD,∗ = FD(rh, ID,∗).
(i) The investment in informal institution will be higher for firms engaging in multina-
tional production than for firms engaging only in local production: IFDI,∗(rh, rd) > ID,∗(rh);
(ii) The total fixed cost of production will be higher for multinational production than for
local production: F FDI,∗(rh, rd) > FD,∗(rh). (iii) The total fixed cost of multinational pro-
duction will be higher in FDI destination of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drd > 0; (iv) For
a given FDI destination, the total fixed cost of multinational production will be higher for
MNEs based in countries of poorer institutions: dF FDI,∗/drh > 0.
Proof. (i) The proof is similar to the benchmark, but with the net profit (instead of the total
fixed cost) as the objective function:
∂ΠFDI
∂I
|I=ID,∗ = θ′(ID,∗)Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − ∂f(rh, ID,∗)
∂I
− ∂f(rd, I
D,∗)
∂I
− k′(ID,∗)
> θ′(ID,∗)Bφ˜ (wh)
1−σ − ∂f(rh, I
D,∗)
∂I
− ∂f(rd, I
D,∗)
∂I
− k′(ID,∗)
= −∂f(rd, I
D,∗)
∂I
> 0,
where the first inequality follows because wh > wd holds if firms engage in FDI, since higher
variable profits are necessary to compensate for the higher fixed cost of FDI (as the next
part shows). The second equality follows by the FOC for ID,∗ and the last inequality follows
by the assumption that f(r, I) strictly decreases in I. The sign implies that IFDI,∗ > ID,∗.
(ii) We can write
F FDI,∗ − FD,∗ = {F FDI,∗ − FD(rh, IFDI,∗)}+ {FD(rh, IFDI,∗)− FD,∗}
= f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
+
{−ΠD(rh, IFDI,∗) + piD(rh, IFDI,∗)}− {−ΠD(rh, ID,∗) + piD(rh, ID,∗)} > 0,
where the first equality follows by the definition of the fixed cost and profit functions. In the
above expression, piD(rh, IFDI,∗) = Bφ˜θ(IFDI,∗) (wh)
1−σ > Bφ˜θ(ID,∗) (wh)
1−σ = piD(rh, ID,∗)
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holds because θ′(I) > 0. In addition, ΠD(rh, ID,∗) > ΠD(rh, IFDI,∗) holds by the optimality
of ID,∗ (in maximizing the net profit of local production) and by the fact that IFDI,∗ 6= ID,∗.
(iii) The derivative of F FDI with respect to rd is
dF FDI,∗
drd
=
∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂I
∂IFDI,∗
∂rd
> 0,
where the first term is positive by assumption, and ∂IFDI,∗
∂rd
> 0 holds as shown in Proposi-
tion B.3. Next, note at IFDI,∗,
∂ΠFDI
∂I
|I=IFDI,∗ = ∂pi
FDI
∂I
|I=IFDI,∗ − ∂F
FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂I
= 0, (127)
where ∂piFDI
∂I
= θ′(I)Bφ˜
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ
> 0 because θ′(I) > 0. This implies that ∂F
FDI(rh,rd,I
FDI,∗)
∂I
>
0. The result thus follows.
(iv) The proof is similar to (iii), with
dF FDI,∗
drh
=
∂f(rh, I
FDI,∗)
∂rh
+
∂F FDI(rh, rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂I
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
> 0,
where the first term is positive by assumption, ∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
> 0 holds by Proposition B.3, and
∂FFDI(rh,rd,I
FDI,∗)
∂I
> 0 as shown in (iii). QED
(i) Multinational firms headquartered in countries of poorer institutions will invest more
in informal institution: ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rh
> 0. As a corollary, multinational firms headquartered in
countries of poorer institutions will be more effective at reducing its overhead fixed cost at a
given FDI destination: df(rd,I
FDI,∗)
drh
< 0. (ii) Multinational firms will also invest more in infor-
mal institution when the FDI is located in countries of poorer institutions: ∂I
FDI,∗(rh,rd)
∂rd
> 0.
Proof. (i) Take total differentiation of (127) with respect to rh and IFDI,∗, we have
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
= −η(1− σ)pi
FDI(θ wh)
−1θ′(I)ω′(rh)− ∂2f(rh,I)∂I∂rh
∂2Π
∂I2
> 0.
The inequality follows because ∂2Π
∂I2
< 0 by the SOC for IFDI,∗, θ′(I) > 0 > ω′(rh) by the
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setup, and ∂
2f(rh,I)
∂I∂rh
< 0 by (28). As a corollary,
df(rd, I
FDI,∗)
drh
=
∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂I
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
< 0
by the assumption f(r, I) decreases in I and the previous result ∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
> 0.
(ii) Take total differentiation of (127) with respect to rd and IFDI,∗, we have
∂IFDI,∗
∂rd
= −(1− η)(1− σ)pi
FDI(θ wd)
−1θ′(I)ω′(rd)− ∂2f(rd,I)∂I∂rd
∂2Π
∂I2
> 0,
by similar arguments as in (i). QED
We now characterize firms’ optimal choice of FDI destination. A firm’s net profit of local
production given the optimal choice of ID,∗ and net profit of FDI given the optimal choice
of IFDI,∗ are, respectively:
ΠD,∗ ≡ piD,∗ − FD,∗(rh) = Bφ˜ θ(ID,∗) (wh)1−σ − FD,∗(rh), (128)
ΠFDI,∗ ≡ piFDI,∗ − F FDI,∗(rh, rd) = Bφ˜ θ(IFDI,∗)
(
wηhw
1−η
d
)1−σ − F FDI,∗(rh, rd).(129)
Among possible destinations of FDI, firms trade off lower wages with higher fixed costs
associated with poorer institutions, and choose rd that maximizes (129). The FOC for the
optimal choice r∗d requires that at r∗d:
∂piFDI,∗
∂wd
ω′(rd)− ∂f(rd, I
FDI,∗)
∂rd
= 0, (130)
where we have used the fact that
{
∂piFDI,∗
∂I
− ∂FFDI
∂I
}
∂IFDI,∗
∂rd
= 0 by the FOC for IFDI,∗.
(i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities at Firm-level FDI) All else being
equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the
poorer the institutional quality at home: ∂r
∗
d
∂rh
> 0; (ii) All else being equal, a firm will choose
to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional qualities, the more productive the firm
is: ∂r
∗
d
∂φ˜
> 0; (iii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of
poorer institutional qualities, the larger the world demand for the sector is: ∂r
∗
d
∂B
> 0; (iv)
All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in countries of poorer institutional
qualities, the less headquarter-intensive the sector is: ∂r
∗
d
∂η
< 0.
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Proof. (i) Totally differentiate (130) with respect to r∗d and rh, we have
∂r∗d
∂rh
= −
∂2piFDI,∗
∂wd∂wh
ω′(rd)ω′(rh) + ∂
2piFDI,∗
∂wd∂θ
θ′(IFDI,∗)ω′(rd)∂I
FDI,∗
∂rh
− ∂2f
∂I∂rd
∂IFDI,∗
∂rh
∂2ΠFDI,∗
∂r2d
> 0. (131)
The inequality holds because ∂2ΠFDI,∗
∂r2d
< 0 by the SOC for r∗d, and the numerator is positive
by the facts that: (a) ∂2piFDI,∗
∂wd∂wh
= η(1 − η)(1 − σ)2piFDI,∗/(whwd) > 0; (b)∂2piFDI,∗∂wd∂θ = (1 −
η)(1− σ)piFDI,∗/(θwd) < 0 and θ′(I) > 0 > ω′(r); (c) ∂2f∂I∂rd < 0 by (28); and (d) ∂I
FDI,∗
∂rh
> 0
by Proposition B.3.
(ii)–(iv) The proofs are exactly the same as in the benchmark, except that the definition
of piFDI,∗ now takes the alternative form in (129), i.e., piFDI,∗ ≡ Bφ˜ θ(IFDI,∗) (wηhw1−ηd )1−σ.
QED
B.4. Country/Sector Compositions
We use a merged data of fDi Market and Orbis. It should be acknowledged that sample
selection bias can exist in these two datasets. For example, fDi Market data focus only on
FDI transaction that appear in news sources. Orbis also have bias towards more developed
countries. Therefore, it is important to check the post-merge composition of countries and
industries.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the country composition patterns before and after match-
ing. The country composition is computed as the ratio of parent firms a country has to the
total number of firms in the sample across years. The comparison shows that the represen-
tation of parent firms from US in the whole sample drop significantly after merging. The
representation of US parent firms decreased so that the distribution of firms across countries
becomes more even after merging with Orbis. So, as a robust check, we drop parent firms
from US and conduct the same regression as the baseline model. Table 22 shows that the
coefficients on Go ∗Gd are still positive and significant.
Figure 13 shows the comparison of sectoral composition before (blue) and after (orange)
merge. The vertical axis of Figure 13 is the percentage of a sector in the sample. The
comparison shows that sector composition changes slightly after merging, with the largest
decrease being less than 2%. Thus, the merging preserves the original sectoral comparison
in the Greenfield FDI data.
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B.5. Sector-Level Variables
The above studies focus on country-level analysis. However, according to Nunn (2007),
countries with better institutional quality can have a comparative advantage in sectors that
rely on formal institutions. In order to check whether the results differ across sectors, we
add sectoral level variables in the specification. So we run the following specification:
ln(FDIftshdt) = β1(Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1) + β1,1(CIs ∗Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1)
+β2 ln(prodf,t−) + β3(ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1)
+β4RDf,t−1 + β5(RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1)
+β6 | ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | +γ′Xhd,t−1
+χht + ζdt + κds + hdsft (132)
we add the sector-level contractual intesity, following Nunn (2007). Summary statistics
are shown in Table 23. Country-level contractual environment is proxied by two variables:
contract enforcement degree, from World Bank Doing Business Survey and legal system &
property rights protection, from Economics Freedom Insex. Summary Statistics on country-
level contractual enforcement and judical system is in Table (24). As is with institutional
quality measures, FDI home countries generally have better countractual environments and
better property rights protection. So, if β1,1 > 0, highly contractual intensive industries
display stronger patterns of institutional complementarity. The results are shown as in
Table 25, where CIs = 1 if the firm falls into the industry of high contractual intensity (its
intensity is above the median). The findings implies that the institutional complementarity
is stronger in sectors of high CI.
B.6. Informal Institution
The mechanism through which complementarity in institutional quality works is the informal
institution. We empirically check the higher informal institution investment leads to firms
undertaking FDI in countries of poorer formal institutional quality. A problem is that infor-
mal institution investment for firms are not readily available, since this investment cannot
be observed from firm-level financial data. So, we use country-level informal institution in-
vestment level. This data is compiled by Faccio (2006) by measuring the percentage of firms
in the Worldscope that are closely connected to ministers and/or members in the parliament
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(MP).53
The results support the hypothesis in the theory. In order to be robust, we use all 4
measures of connectiveness: (1) percentage of firms in a country that is connected with
ministers; (2) percentage of firms in a country connected with ministers in a close relation;
(3) percentage of top 50 firms connected; (4) percentage of market capitalization of those
connected firms. From Table 26 to Table 29, the coefficients on average informal institution
at home and governance at the destination country is negative. This result also supports
the finding in Faccio (2006) that higher level regulations reduces average firms’ connections
with officials.
B.7. Other robustness Checks
To provide a more direct prediction, we include the firms that only have one destination
country. The negative coefficient on productivity and destination institutional quality sug-
gests that more productive firms are more likely to enter countries of poorer institutional
quality. Additionally, more productive firms can enter more countries. So, the benchmark
results can be counfounded by the choices of productive firms from countries of poorer insti-
tutional quality. We drop those set of firms that enter more than one destination countries
so that the optimal choice of FDI destinations by the firms can be taken. Table 30 shows
the results and the baseline results still hold.
We also add more bilateral variables to rule out other possibilities that leads to institu-
tional complementarity. Specifically, we add cultural similarity (see Footnote 18), industrial
structure similarity (see Footnote 17) and endowment similarity. Endowment similarity is
measured as the (absolute) difference in capital-labor ratio between the home and host coun-
tries.54 Table 31 displays the results. The coefficents of interest are robust to controlling
more variables that reflects bilateral differences. In addition, coefficients on those three new
variables are positive and significant. This implies that firms are more likely to invests in
countries of different culture environments and different economic/resource conditions. So,
the firms tend to be market and resource-seeking.
Another issue with the baseline result lies in the measure of firm-level productivity.
Firstly, the revenue-based estimation can reflect the markup. Secondly, LP method also
53Formally, in Faccio (2006), if a company is connected with a politician, if: the company’s large share-
holders or top officer is: (a) a member of parliament (MP), (b) a minister or the head of state, or (c) closely
related to a top official.
54We take the cross-country endowment in capital and labor endowment from Penn World Table.
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received criticism since the imperfect competition in the output market can invalidate the
invertibility condition so that its consistency is like to break down (Beveren, 2012). In order
to deal with those issues, we apply more recent alternative methods to estimate firm-level
TFP. Specifically, we use ACF, Wooldridge and Mollisi-Rovigatti. Those are based on value-
added. 55 The results are robust to alternative productivity estimation methods, as shown
in Table 32, 33 and 34.
Although the above six measures can reflect institutional quality, these measures do not
shed light on the type of institution that matters in FDI decisions and exhibits comple-
mentarity across countries. The result that R&D intensity negatively affects FDI seems to
suggest that contract and property right institutions are also important. We extend our
results by adding more institutional related variables: contractual enforcement and judical
system quality. 56 Table shows the summary statistics of these two variables, both for home
and host countries. Table 35 shows such results. It’s implied that institutional complemen-
tarity also exists in terms of contractual environment and property rights protection. This
results to some extent is consistent with the negative effect of R&D intensity on FDI.
55It is available by Stata command prodest.
56Following Nunn (2007), contractual enforcement is obtained from World Bank Doing Business Survey.
Judical quality and property rights protection data is from Index of Economic Freedowm, retrieved from
https://www.heritage.org/index/.
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Table 1: Price and Destination Country Population
Dependent Variable: ln(price)
ln(pfhc) ln(phc)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(log) Population 0.035*** 0.051*** 0.208*** 0.245***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Country-level Controls No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,224,467 11,038,879 449,135 440,783
R-Squred 0.697 0.698 0.763 0.780
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
dependent variable in specifications (1)-(2) is the (log) price at the firm-HS8-country level,
and in specifications (3)-(4) is the (log) price at the HS8-country level. Country-level other
controls include GDP per capita and distance. All regressions include a constant term.
Table 2: Price and Revenue
Dependent Variable: ln(price)
ln(pfhc) ln(pfh)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Revenue) 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.206*** 0.210***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Revenue) ∗RD_Intensity 0.048*** 0.009
(0.005) (0.009)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,476,096 11,070,256 4,146,176 3,660,845
R-Squred 0.696 0.695 0.722 0.725
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
dependent variable in specifications (1)-(2) is the (log) price at the firm-HS8-country level, and in
specifications (3)-(4) is the (log) price at the firm-HS8 level. RD_Intensity is compiled by Kroszner
et al. (2007) at ISIC level, which can be converted to HS 6 codes. All regressions include a constant
term.
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Table 3: Price and Entry
Dependent Variable: ln(price)
ln(pfh) std.(ln(pfh))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Num_Destinations 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num _Destinations*RD_Intensity 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,622,117 10,314,550 9,069,247 8,065,339
R-Squred 0.681 0.680 0.459 0.463
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in
specifications (1)-(2) is the (log) price at the firm-HS8 level, and in specifications (3)-(4) is the standard deviation
of (log) prices at the firm-HS8 level. RD_Intensity is compiled by Kroszner et al. (2007) at ISIC level, which can
be converted to HS 6 codes. All regressions include a constant term.
Table 4: Description of HS 2-digit Industries and Number of Observations
HS 2 Obs HS 2 Obs HS 2 Obs HS 2 Obs
2 30,707 24 6,503 51 1,780 73 27,812
3 58,406 30 28,032 52 3,047 74 6,489
4 27,854 32 3,420 54 900 76 3,604
6 2,998 33 58,712 55 1,928 82 31,914
7 53,205 34 30,956 57 29,694 83 6,406
8 53,451 35 3,713 58 500 84 47,596
9 36,534 36 1,750 59 1,035 85 91,988
10 3,848 37 902 61 234,282 87 21,361
11 4,079 38 15,284 62 265,844 88 1,515
15 13,055 39 31,740 63 74,382 89 8,254
16 29,784 40 16,135 64 66,311 90 31,572
17 11,371 42 59,404 65 14,244 91 29,964
18 12,387 43 3,802 66 6,506 92 16,893
19 39,318 44 12,643 67 4,578 93 3,776
20 76,252 46 6,690 68 1,477 94 61,268
21 34,332 48 46,325 69 16,443 95 52,143
22 47,661 49 31,867 70 19,589 96 46,185
23 2,307 50 395 71 22,075 97 11,678
Note: This table summarizes the number of bilateral trade transaction observa-
tions within each HS 2 sector. Raw Data source is from CEPII
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Table 5: Summary of Importing Countries’ Products
Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs
AFG 902 CCK 86 GUY 935 MAR 1,194 STP 687
ALB 1,063 COL 1,103 HTI 780 MOZ 1,123 SAU 1,152
DZA 1,094 COM 797 HND 966 OMN 1,136 SEN 1,045
ASM 250 COG 1,064 HKG 1,195 NRU 364 SYC 868
AND 1,030 ZAR 998 HUN 1,171 NPL 1,010 SLE 701
AGO 1,127 COK 692 ISL 1,119 NLD 1,201 IND 1,107
ATG 992 CRI 1,108 IDN 1,148 ABW 1,085 SGP 1,184
AZE 1,096 HRV 1,157 IRN 945 NCL 1,094 SVK 1,177
ARG 1,036 CUB 863 IRQ 1,041 VUT 720 VNM 1,145
AUS 1,172 CYP 1,156 IRL 1,182 NZL 1,142 SVN 1,160
AUT 1,186 CZE 1,181 ISR 1,139 NIC 1,015 SOM 611
BHS 1,123 BEN 882 ITA 1,203 NER 821 ZAF 1,164
BHR 1,155 DNK 1,192 CIV 1,093 NGA 1,130 ZWE 1,054
BGD 931 DMA 488 JAM 1,082 NIU 299 ESP 1,209
ARM 1,019 DOM 1,132 JPN 1,214 NFK 289 SUR 958
BRB 1,141 ECU 1,016 KAZ 1,157 NOR 1,171 SWE 1,187
BEL 1,207 SLV 1,062 JOR 1,125 MNP 294 CHE 1,187
BMU 1,104 GNQ 827 KEN 1,085 FSM 596 SYR 823
BTN 246 ETH 1,020 PRK 747 MHL 306 TJK 743
BOL 969 ERI 302 KOR 1,180 PLW 707 THA 1,180
BIH 1,092 EST 1,163 KWT 1,149 PAK 1,014 TGO 896
BRA 1,128 FLK 382 KGZ 983 PAN 1,143 TKL 95
BLZ 897 FJI 1,038 LAO 733 PNG 948 TON 732
IOT 32 FIN 1,171 LBN 1,143 PRY 992 TTO 989
SLB 531 FRA 1,223 LVA 1,164 PER 1,071 ARE 1,187
VGB 630 PYF 1,066 LBR 741 PHL 1,213 TUN 1,076
BRN 1,076 ATF 164 LBY 1,021 PCN 21 TUR 1,143
BGR 1,165 DJI 796 LTU 1,160 POL 1,181 TKM 888
MMR 936 GAB 939 MAC 1,047 PRT 1,192 TCA 519
BDI 698 GEO 1,093 MDG 898 GNB 462 TUV 231
BLR 1,132 GMB 720 MWI 952 TMP 802 UGA 984
KHM 968 PAL 804 MYS 1,184 QAT 1,159 UKR 1,158
CMR 894 DEU 1,208 MDV 1,046 ROM 1,178 EGY 1,112
CAN 1,198 GHA 1,112 MLI 762 RUS 1,187 GBR 1,205
CPV 919 GIB 970 MLT 1,161 RWA 884 TZA 1,035
CYM 751 KIR 549 MRT 843 SHN 354 USA 1,238
CAF 343 GRC 1,184 MUS 1,120 KNA 501 BFA 854
LKA 1,047 GRL 1,000 MEX 1,168 AIA 314 URY 1,065
TCD 589 GRD 538 TWN 1,167 LCA 679 UZB 874
CHL 1,113 GUM 583 MNG 1,007 SPM 538 VEN 1,100
CHN 1,182 GTM 1,103 MDA 1,078 VCT 499 WLF 451
CXR 261 GIN 869 MSR 164 SMR 389 WSM 806
YEM 950 ZMB 1,063
Note: This table summarizes the number of import transaction observations for each country. Raw Data source is from CEPII
105
Table 6: Summary of Exporting Countries’ Products
Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs Country Obs
AFG 277 CCK 34 GUY 280 MAR 1,024 STP 53
ALB 622 COL 973 HTI 239 MOZ 360 SAU 888
DZA 296 COM 118 HND 635 OMN 706 SEN 588
ASM 128 COG 178 HKG 1,163 NRU 80 SYC 208
AND 387 ZAR 240 HUN 1,124 NPL 571 SLE 241
AGO 158 COK 67 ISL 626 NLD 1,212 IND 1,167
ATG 219 CRI 881 IDN 1,135 ABW 201 SGP 1,180
AZE 414 HRV 1,029 IRN 737 NCL 377 SVK 1,095
ARG 1,027 CUB 186 IRQ 198 VUT 106 VNM 1,105
AUS 1,190 CYP 923 IRL 1,150 NZL 1,145 SVN 1,092
AUT 1,168 CZE 1,173 ISR 1,004 NIC 497 SOM 75
BHS 301 BEN 230 ITA 1,231 NER 242 ZAF 1,186
BHR 839 DNK 1,185 CIV 564 NGA 608 ZWE 466
BGD 755 DMA 152 JAM 537 NIU 25 ESP 1,242
ARM 509 DOM 854 JPN 1,172 NFK 7 SUR 331
BRB 505 ECU 786 KAZ 743 NOR 1,090 SWE 1,167
BEL 1,204 SLV 765 JOR 804 MNP 110 CHE 1,120
BMU 130 GNQ 25 KEN 937 FSM 44 SYR 683
BTN 44 ETH 508 PRK 432 MHL 62 TJK 230
BOL 443 ERI 50 KOR 1,152 PLW 18 THA 1,179
BIH 801 EST 1,095 KWT 814 PAK 1,014 TGO 478
BRA 1,078 FLK 34 KGZ 492 PAN 960 TKL 146
BLZ 241 FJI 804 LAO 317 PNG 148 TON 84
IOT 33 FIN 1,086 LBN 1,002 PRY 417 TTO 507
SLB 47 FRA 1,254 LVA 1,119 PER 968 ARE 1,173
VGB 198 PYF 297 LBR 71 PHL 1,076 TUN 903
BRN 427 ATF 16 LBY 142 PCN 26 TUR 1,152
BGR 1,109 DJI 72 LTU 1,138 POL 1,177 TKM 141
MMR 508 GAB 213 MAC 633 PRT 1,195 TCA 129
BDI 115 GEO 670 MDG 613 GNB 33 TUV 27
BLR 949 GMB 163 MWI 274 TMP 69 UGA 627
KHM 616 PAL 428 MYS 1,156 QAT 484 UKR 998
CMR 421 DEU 1,226 MDV 153 ROM 1,096 EGY 1,015
CAN 1,186 GHA 645 MLI 252 RUS 1,147 GBR 1,218
CPV 141 GIB 85 MLT 660 RWA 303 TZA 640
CYM 76 KIR 34 MRT 167 SHN 40 USA 1,265
CAF 46 GRC 1,153 MUS 801 KNA 46 BFA 306
LKA 971 GRL 95 MEX 1,131 AIA 36 URY 656
TCD 33 GRD 80 TWN 1,106 LCA 88 UZB 371
CHL 1,036 GUM 353 MNG 292 SPM 81 VEN 573
CHN 1,267 GTM 933 MDA 650 VCT 69 WLF 10
CXR 43 GIN 216 MSR 17 SMR 184 WSM 176
YEM 323 ZMB 487
Note: This table summarizes the number of export transaction observations for each country. Raw Data source is from CEPII
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Table 7: Summary of Coefficients on Trade Cost Variables
(a) HS 2 - HS 49
HS Contig Comlang Colony Comcol Curcol Smctry LnDist RTA Comcur
2 0.137*** 0.050*** 0.073*** 0.113*** 0.057 0.080** -0.143*** 0.121*** 0.075***
3 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.003 0.009 -0.173*** 0.063*** 0.008
4 0.125*** 0.075*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.226*** 0.045 -0.173*** 0.142*** 0.083***
6 0.287*** 0.079** 0.223*** -0.038 0.340 -0.145 -0.205*** 0.198*** 0.002
7 0.068*** 0.061*** 0.179*** 0.124*** 0.090 -0.011 -0.207*** 0.180*** 0.028
8 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.008 -0.022 -0.190*** 0.121*** -0.006
9 0.091*** 0.116*** 0.189*** 0.055** 0.289* 0.094** -0.186*** 0.114*** 0.024
10 0.204*** -0.006 0.111** 0.133*** 0.257 0.034 -0.175*** 0.187*** 0.201***
11 0.202*** 0.067* 0.181*** 0.304*** 0.154 -0.063 -0.217*** 0.131*** 0.000
15 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.165*** 0.098*** 0.083 0.044 -0.207*** 0.139*** 0.097***
16 0.105*** 0.093*** 0.185*** 0.165*** 0.368*** 0.027 -0.148*** 0.119*** 0.009
17 -0.010 0.065*** 0.186*** 0.142*** 0.070 -0.047 -0.247*** 0.133*** 0.131***
18 0.002 0.076*** 0.247*** 0.163*** -0.126 -0.015 -0.264*** 0.136*** 0.049
19 0.027 0.145*** 0.176*** 0.162*** 0.078 0.027 -0.249*** 0.109*** -0.016
20 0.056*** 0.120*** 0.191*** 0.194*** -0.044 0.033 -0.181*** 0.125*** -0.068***
21 0.019 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.118*** 0.219 0.043 -0.216*** 0.118*** -0.009
22 0.077*** 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.228*** 0.152* 0.082*** -0.177*** 0.160*** -0.067***
23 0.076** 0.100*** 0.078** 0.056 0.288 -0.070 -0.206*** 0.107*** -0.066**
24 0.001 0.036 0.073** 0.093*** 0.039 -0.001 -0.196*** 0.190*** 0.130***
30 -0.037** 0.160*** 0.097*** 0.175*** -0.022 -0.007 -0.161*** 0.095*** -0.011
32 0.235*** 0.058* 0.197*** 0.201*** 0.269 -0.043 -0.199*** 0.056** -0.014
33 -0.006 0.138*** 0.129*** 0.139*** 0.035 0.027 -0.230*** 0.128*** -0.006
34 0.007 0.141*** 0.178*** 0.119*** 0.037 0.052 -0.283*** 0.143*** 0.050*
35 0.044 0.084*** 0.225*** 0.274*** 0.363** -0.075 -0.248*** 0.112*** 0.052
36 0.199*** 0.031 -0.040 0.210*** 0.235 0.197*** -0.051** 0.085** 0.156**
37 0.051 0.035 0.144** -0.091 0.513 0.213** -0.054* 0.195*** 0.013
38 0.036 0.054*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.317** -0.019 -0.193*** 0.093*** 0.061**
39 0.045** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.119 0.068* -0.224*** 0.131*** -0.036
40 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.210*** 0.067** 0.386** -0.025 -0.197*** 0.048 -0.023
42 0.037 0.095*** 0.178*** 0.017 0.173 0.065 -0.206*** 0.077*** -0.064***
43 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.099** 0.073 0.671*** -0.159* -0.161*** -0.004 -0.031
44 0.110*** 0.143*** 0.216*** 0.061 0.315* -0.002 -0.203*** 0.060*** -0.008
46 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.025 0.538** 0.007 -0.230*** 0.036 0.072*
48 0.016 0.146*** 0.106*** 0.175*** -0.029 -0.021 -0.270*** 0.131*** -0.014
49 -0.010 0.317*** 0.215*** 0.151*** 0.085 0.071* -0.247*** 0.115*** -0.025
.5
Note: This table summarizes the estimated coefficients on proxy variables of trade costs, for sectors HS 2 to HS 49. Contig =
1 of the both are contiguous; Comlang =1 if both share the same language; Colony =1 if ever had colonial relation; Comcol
=1 if having common colonizer; Curcol =1 if currently in colonial relation; Smctry =1 if were/are the same country; RTA =1
if having regional trade agreement; Comcur =1 if using the same currency. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
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(b) HS 50 - HS 97
HS Contig Comlang Colony Comcol Curcol Smctry LnDist RTA Comcur
50 0.020 0.120 0.074 -0.026 -0.053 0.188 -0.163*** -0.032 0.171
51 0.134* 0.082 0.128** 0.392** -0.298 -0.047 -0.155*** 0.125*** 0.080
52 0.133*** 0.001 0.082 -0.048 -0.184 -0.037 -0.214*** 0.075** 0.112*
54 0.160** 0.056 0.114 0.188 -0.202 -0.173 -0.052*** -0.007
55 0.132*** 0.154*** -0.032 0.026 -0.498* 0.107 -0.181*** 0.113** 0.009
57 0.050* 0.097*** 0.155*** 0.123*** -0.053 -0.061 -0.216*** 0.108*** -0.013
58 0.104 0.157 0.164 -0.248 -0.227 0.089 -0.131*** -0.028 -0.002
59 0.059 0.146** 0.050 0.004 -0.622* -0.017 -0.143*** 0.071 0.087
61 0.046** 0.119*** 0.144*** 0.059*** 0.120 0.016 -0.197*** 0.098*** -0.003
62 0.043* 0.136*** 0.160*** 0.041** 0.135 0.010 -0.200*** 0.081*** -0.029
63 0.063*** 0.135*** 0.177*** 0.084*** 0.056 0.022 -0.219*** 0.128*** -0.002
64 0.088*** 0.110*** 0.150*** 0.102*** 0.125 -0.014 -0.217*** 0.087*** 0.022
65 0.077*** 0.111*** 0.232*** 0.110*** 0.405** -0.048 -0.205*** 0.096*** 0.027
66 0.129*** 0.097*** 0.185*** 0.078 0.451** 0.001 -0.228*** 0.109*** 0.063*
68 0.132** 0.077 -0.052 -0.100 1.140** -0.076 -0.178*** 0.017 0.129*
69 0.110*** 0.122*** 0.186*** 0.124*** 0.531** -0.006 -0.184*** 0.107*** -0.079***
70 0.090*** 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.153*** 0.346 -0.049 -0.193*** 0.098*** 0.012
71 0.011 0.140*** 0.242*** 0.108*** 0.070 0.084 -0.176*** 0.109*** 0.001
74 0.066** 0.101*** 0.208*** 0.273*** -0.168 0.047 -0.223*** 0.130*** -0.084**
76 0.149*** 0.074*** 0.232*** 0.182*** 0.242 -0.016 -0.235*** 0.144*** 0.047
82 0.051* 0.122*** 0.166*** 0.060* 0.104 0.034 -0.196*** 0.094*** 0.011
83 0.139*** 0.120*** 0.269*** -0.038 0.155 -0.081 -0.187*** 0.079*** -0.044
84 0.044** 0.094*** 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.359* 0.055 -0.193*** 0.104*** -0.017
85 0.019 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.094 0.013 -0.185*** 0.109*** 0.016
87 0.161*** 0.070*** 0.143*** 0.159*** 0.457*** 0.005 -0.142*** 0.126*** 0.026
88 0.051 0.079* -0.147*** -0.106 -1.882*** 0.124* -0.046** 0.057 -0.049
89 0.091*** 0.025 0.116*** 0.203*** -0.330** 0.029 -0.133*** 0.067*** -0.052*
90 0.058** 0.065*** 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.223 -0.009 -0.135*** 0.075*** -0.044*
91 0.036 0.086*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.330*** 0.038 -0.170*** 0.029 0.089 ***
92 0.089*** 0.068*** 0.091*** 0.206*** 0.721*** 0.064 -0.137*** 0.049** 0.016
93 0.060* 0.099*** 0.063* 0.342*** -0.180 0.127* -0.077*** 0.045 0.031
94 0.034 0.167*** 0.127*** 0.078*** 0.139 0.062 -0.231*** 0.098*** -0.074***
95 0.074*** 0.110*** 0.193*** 0.059** 0.480*** -0.025 -0.176*** 0.065*** -0.013
96 0.064** 0.101*** 0.186*** 0.092*** 0.660*** 0.032 -0.206*** 0.104*** -0.027
97 0.040 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.026 0.358** 0.127** -0.102*** 0.056*** -0.102***
.5
Note: This table summarizes the estimated coefficients on proxy variables of trade costs, for sectors HS 50 to HS 97. Contig
= 1 of the both are contiguous; Comlang =1 if both share the same language; Colony =1 if ever had colonial relation; Comcol
=1 if having common colonizer; Curcol =1 if currently in colonial relation; Smctry =1 if were/are the same country; RTA =1
if having regional trade agreement; Comcur =1 if using the same currency. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
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Table 8: Estimated Preference for Quality
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 165 22.246 19.613 0.467 120.217 54 165 11.385 13.524 1.000 89.390
3 165 16.230 12.954 0.642 99.572 55 165 11.407 12.325 1.000 70.688
4 165 21.944 19.275 0.023 95.676 58 165 5.814 7.687 1.000 39.734
6 165 15.513 16.725 1.000 102.454 59 165 13.130 14.915 1.000 87.704
7 165 16.686 13.018 1.000 91.702 61 165 19.649 18.534 1.000 98.075
8 165 19.338 17.456 1.000 93.673 62 165 20.201 19.074 1.000 100.413
9 165 21.288 19.457 1.000 96.457 63 165 21.464 18.519 1.000 90.493
10 165 21.508 20.186 1.000 132.176 64 165 17.749 13.834 1.000 77.016
11 165 20.349 20.691 1.000 148.433 65 165 17.903 15.941 1.000 79.300
15 165 21.821 21.960 1.000 170.171 66 165 19.995 20.808 1.000 136.851
16 165 20.542 18.605 1.000 91.212 67 165 15.871 14.654 1.000 79.738
17 165 21.330 20.083 1.000 120.062 68 165 13.762 13.674 1.000 69.466
18 165 23.452 24.309 1.000 154.248 69 165 19.893 21.115 1.000 174.533
19 165 19.730 17.928 1.000 87.576 70 165 26.733 31.433 1.000 166.876
20 165 13.773 9.373 1.000 42.538 71 165 17.061 16.126 0.876 97.138
21 165 21.046 18.647 1.000 89.231 73 165 20.877 18.926 1.000 115.750
23 165 22.211 39.912 1.000 417.558 74 165 17.933 16.758 1.000 87.612
24 165 19.376 17.441 1.000 93.222 77 165 19.266 16.757 1.000 81.233
30 165 17.782 15.580 1.000 88.500 82 165 21.521 21.301 1.000 153.153
32 165 16.370 15.530 1.000 78.624 85 165 9.549 56.190 0.978 590.516
34 165 15.013 11.013 0.000 54.480 87 165 21.242 19.659 1.000 121.543
35 165 16.151 23.239 1.000 252.413 88 165 8.442 8.623 0.000 47.360
36 165 18.633 21.963 1.000 143.656 89 165 21.767 25.082 1.000 164.926
37 165 7.529 9.940 1.000 73.404 90 165 19.339 17.718 1.000 87.486
38 165 25.404 29.797 1.000 178.241 91 165 19.110 18.261 1.000 98.730
39 165 21.551 19.905 1.000 149.762 92 165 20.431 22.115 1.000 154.758
40 165 19.242 17.163 0.609 79.498 93 165 14.949 13.256 0.000 71.716
42 165 19.754 17.691 1.000 87.856 94 165 20.294 18.134 1.000 87.038
49 165 20.422 18.574 1.000 90.914 95 165 19.526 17.907 1.000 84.246
50 165 4.876 6.636 1.000 38.863 96 165 23.772 26.979 1.000 191.981
51 165 8.913 9.538 0.000 44.815 97 165 18.996 20.996 1.000 174.981
52 165 15.120 15.745 1.000 89.140
Note: This table summarizes estimated preference for quality (κi,s) across all countries i within each sector
s.
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Table 9: Estimated Marginal Cost of Quality
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 165 5.098 3.600 0.000 18.030 54 165 1.948 1.847 0.000 13.054
3 165 3.650 2.453 0.000 24.217 55 165 1.637 2.557 0.000 31.159
4 165 5.912 6.072 0.000 67.456 58 165 1.385 1.097 0.000 9.063
6 165 3.938 8.218 0.000 102.771 59 165 2.252 2.422 0.000 12.221
7 165 3.871 1.716 0.000 8.806 61 165 2.742 1.486 0.000 10.675
8 165 4.242 2.156 0.000 16.841 62 165 3.051 1.714 0.000 14.742
9 165 4.271 3.949 0.000 47.431 63 165 5.839 3.079 0.000 21.517
10 165 4.413 3.849 0.000 31.479 64 165 4.525 3.065 0.000 30.028
11 165 3.126 3.263 0.000 27.200 65 165 2.413 1.688 0.000 9.500
15 165 3.524 2.351 0.000 13.085 66 165 2.196 2.542 0.000 24.453
16 165 3.553 2.603 0.000 21.460 67 165 1.988 1.576 0.000 10.410
17 165 3.284 2.201 0.000 16.038 68 165 1.816 1.683 0.000 9.698
18 165 3.512 2.380 0.000 12.900 69 165 2.756 1.681 0.000 10.819
19 165 2.469 1.931 0.000 15.552 70 165 3.908 2.803 0.000 14.830
20 165 3.956 1.884 0.000 12.288 71 165 3.625 2.377 0.000 17.847
21 165 4.053 2.107 0.000 17.662 73 165 3.714 2.075 0.000 11.556
23 165 1.843 3.430 0.000 38.749 74 165 2.301 1.510 0.000 7.564
24 165 4.121 2.994 0.000 18.264 77 165 2.951 2.109 0.000 16.693
30 165 3.648 1.906 0.000 9.800 82 165 3.261 1.908 0.000 9.653
32 165 1.966 1.857 0.000 11.108 85 165 5.292 45.482 0.247 585.700
34 165 4.615 2.607 0.000 16.672 87 165 3.965 2.265 0.000 10.860
35 165 3.204 3.066 0.000 21.819 88 165 1.664 1.817 0.000 20.027
36 165 1.765 1.771 0.000 10.764 89 165 3.404 2.598 0.000 18.004
37 165 1.275 0.879 0.000 6.082 90 165 3.089 2.180 0.000 16.907
38 165 3.278 4.996 0.000 52.698 91 165 2.967 2.330 0.000 14.631
39 165 5.994 2.513 0.000 12.972 92 165 2.533 1.790 0.000 10.225
40 165 2.759 2.512 0.000 24.370 93 165 2.431 2.326 0.000 12.901
42 165 3.930 1.835 0.000 13.093 94 165 3.932 1.809 0.000 11.029
49 165 3.972 2.692 0.000 24.601 95 165 3.248 2.012 0.000 20.826
50 165 1.134 0.630 0.000 4.231 96 165 3.588 2.238 0.000 17.202
51 165 2.859 2.968 0.000 18.538 97 165 3.853 1.848 0.000 11.709
52 165 1.764 1.545 0.000 9.746
Note: This table summarizes estimated cost for quality (µi,s) across all countries i within each sector s.
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Table 10: Preference for Quality and GDP Per Capita
HS Coefficients HS Coefficients HS Coefficients HS Coefficients
2 1.879∗ 23 1.438 54 3.506∗∗∗ 74 2.561∗∗∗
3 1.238∗ 24 1.613∗ 55 2.989∗∗∗ 76 2.044∗∗
4 2.067∗∗ 30 0.867 58 2.163∗∗∗ 82 1.692
6 4.128∗∗∗ 32 2.431∗∗∗ 59 3.903∗∗∗ 85 1.231
7 0.062 34 0.040 61 2.009∗∗ 87 1.319
8 1.518∗ 35 -0.207 62 1.960∗∗ 88 1.852∗∗∗
9 0.985 36 2.228∗ 63 1.314 89 3.152∗∗
10 1.451 37 3.016∗∗∗ 64 0.240 90 2.128∗∗
11 3.033∗∗∗ 38 2.144 65 1.917∗∗ 91 2.698∗∗∗
15 2.623∗∗ 39 0.328 66 2.082∗ 92 2.889∗∗
16 2.029∗∗ 40 1.568∗ 67 1.955∗∗ 93 2.025∗∗∗
17 1.656 42 2.062∗∗ 68 2.993∗∗∗ 94 1.649∗
18 2.106 49 1.891∗ 69 2.422∗∗ 95 1.800∗
19 1.733∗ 50 2.032∗∗∗ 70 2.857∗ 96 2.146
20 0.186 51 2.090∗∗∗ 71 2.679∗∗∗ 97 3.422∗∗∗
21 1.692∗ 52 2.829∗∗∗ 73 1.580
Note: This table the estimated coefficients on (log) GDP per capita with dependent variable
being the κi for each sector s. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively
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Table 11: Cost of Quality and GDP Per Capita
HS Coefficients HS Coefficients HS Coefficients HS Coefficients
2 0.494∗∗∗ 23 0.264 54 0.395∗∗∗ 74 0.246∗∗∗
3 0.219∗ 24 0.210 55 0.278∗∗ 77 0.115
4 0.521 30 -0.028 58 0.186∗∗∗ 82 0.209∗∗
6 0.338 32 0.169∗ 59 0.715∗∗∗ 85 1.208
7 0.044 34 0.151 61 -0.205∗∗∗ 87 -0.247∗∗
8 -0.146 35 0.404∗∗∗ 62 -0.076 88 0.425∗∗∗
9 -0.055 36 -0.076 63 0.279∗ 89 0.166
10 0.192 37 0.163∗∗∗ 64 -0.199 90 0.060
11 0.337∗ 38 -0.184 65 -0.063 91 -0.139
15 0.312∗∗ 39 0.453∗∗∗ 66 0.157 92 0.120
16 0.185 40 0.187 67 0.070 93 0.584∗∗∗
17 0.053 42 0.121 68 0.427∗∗∗ 94 0.046
18 0.328∗∗∗ 49 0.147 69 -0.150 95 0.077
19 -0.176∗ 50 0.053 70 0.156 96 0.208∗
20 0.110 51 0.767∗∗∗ 71 -0.105 97 -0.128
21 -0.113 52 0.191∗∗ 73 0.155
Note: This table the estimated coefficients on (log) GDP per capita with dependent variable
being the µi for each sector s. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively
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Table 12: Summary of Exogenous Competitiveness
(a) HS 2 - HS 51
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 150 24.900 30.751 10.451 308.543
3 138 1.609 4.517 0.674 49.741
4 148 0.577 1.377 0.221 16.706
6 129 5.67E+03 5.83E+03 1.55E+03 3.96E+04
7 155 1.989 1.036 1.290 8.073
8 148 136.358 64.449 71.293 398.349
9 150 0.529 0.369 0.336 3.782
10 152 1.442 1.383 0.395 4.362
11 157 0.197 0.057 0.121 0.581
15 154 0.824 0.822 0.251 3.487
16 151 0.685 0.463 0.367 3.840
17 156 0.361 0.272 0.197 2.481
18 158 0.050 0.021 0.028 0.117
19 163 0.060 0.025 0.037 0.226
20 142 0.429 0.242 0.297 2.184
21 155 0.057 0.034 0.038 0.337
23 160 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.023
24 147 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.008
30 158 0.325 0.625 0.168 7.216
32 159 9.104 2.486 7.390 33.174
34 145 6251.746 3636.260 4089.427 40193.020
35 152 0.060 0.024 0.029 0.183
36 153 436.416 30.690 404.460 637.010
37 143 3.28E+07 2.19E+06 3.10E+07 4.92E+07
38 159 0.060 0.063 0.029 0.437
39 147 0.015 0.061 0.004 0.662
40 158 0.361 0.475 0.161 5.763
42 158 12.000 64.131 4.345 792.150
49 164 0.117 0.159 0.048 0.682
50 107 4.01E+12 7.98E+11 3.32E+12 1.13E+13
51 95 0.442 0.305 0.151 1.777
Note: This table summarizes the estimated exogenous competitiveness from qual-
ity model for industries from HS 2 to HS 51
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(b) HS 52 - HS 96
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
52 154 0.354 0.245 0.229 3.183
54 122 9051.833 1944.386 7409.059 27034.280
55 149 0.474 0.070 0.361 0.904
58 149 1.407 0.154 1.155 2.506
59 116 0.781 0.261 0.345 1.080
61 156 3.372 1.820 2.151 19.650
62 155 1.013 0.408 0.679 3.317
63 157 1.537 1.890 0.846 21.568
64 148 0.550 0.372 0.323 2.306
65 153 4.423 5.596 2.232 38.725
66 157 80.861 25.629 50.781 334.302
67 148 6.701 9.744 2.679 75.814
68 143 10.399 3.691 6.252 41.790
69 161 107.424 1266.542 5.332 16078.190
70 158 11.084 10.113 4.999 117.903
71 146 1.06E+05 3.95E+05 2.86E+03 1.85E+06
73 159 0.384 0.244 0.240 2.430
74 154 59.894 20.527 43.466 234.731
76 158 0.077 0.029 0.042 0.223
82 159 24.072 15.373 14.861 171.604
85 162 5242.618 2099.089 4312.667 27509.740
87 158 2.802 0.958 2.006 6.494
88 133 524.241 19.825 501.511 644.742
89 150 14.529 10.022 7.053 87.736
90 161 3.463 25.910 0.802 329.955
91 159 9.40E+04 2.33E+04 7.56E+04 2.71E+05
92 150 5.985 2.880 3.919 21.810
93 135 2769.903 6592.229 1639.503 78574.520
94 164 0.218 0.081 0.153 0.619
95 154 3.116 3.515 1.331 37.424
96 157 0.197 0.083 0.127 0.558
Note: Note: This table summarizes the estimated exogenous competitiveness
from quality model for industries HS 52 to HS 96
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Table 13: Summary of Cutoffs — Quality Model
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 150 3.193 2.258 -3.773 8.843
3 138 1.097 2.869 -10.654 7.451 52 154 0.527 2.504 -6.717 10.367
4 148 1.008 1.617 -7.744 4.466 54 104 2.720 2.819 -4.052 17.634
6 128 7.627 2.840 -1.662 14.552 55 148 0.321 3.007 -7.431 7.327
7 154 2.160 2.769 -8.700 10.649 58 144 -4.662 3.801 -12.224 14.796
8 147 3.079 2.453 -9.172 13.662 59 116 1.582 1.895 -6.410 4.840
9 150 1.271 1.890 -6.190 4.611 61 154 0.670 3.494 -7.308 9.192
10 152 0.793 2.024 -5.359 5.373 62 155 -0.568 3.570 -8.134 7.563
11 157 0.293 2.377 -11.553 12.827 63 157 1.753 3.012 -8.383 10.598
15 154 1.069 1.622 -6.561 4.172 64 148 0.235 3.075 -7.296 7.520
16 151 0.788 1.743 -6.752 4.771 65 153 1.883 2.421 -3.978 9.374
17 156 1.478 1.650 -5.644 5.916 66 157 1.921 2.542 -3.859 14.613
18 158 0.264 1.434 -3.614 5.453 67 141 0.923 3.630 -9.452 7.234
19 163 -0.456 1.475 -5.850 6.520 68 141 3.829 2.277 -5.093 7.577
20 142 -0.012 2.088 -13.366 11.607 69 161 2.516 2.881 -5.794 13.437
21 155 -0.772 1.703 -7.983 10.165 70 158 2.477 2.091 -3.990 7.993
23 160 -2.093 1.907 -7.440 2.399 71 122 6.911 3.253 -0.570 15.437
24 146 -5.573 3.395 -19.292 3.481 73 159 1.360 1.467 -3.445 4.580
30 156 -0.648 2.535 -6.231 9.380 74 153 0.526 2.202 -5.759 18.850
32 158 -0.210 2.195 -7.951 12.375 76 158 0.590 1.368 -4.148 5.923
34 138 0.856 2.276 -6.754 17.849 82 159 2.959 2.190 -2.797 8.213
35 152 -0.364 2.131 -12.268 5.465 87 156 1.713 2.887 -7.842 13.780
36 141 2.766 3.501 -4.758 14.432 88 123 0.098 3.029 -6.952 15.822
37 84 7.881 2.917 1.732 25.094 89 149 2.490 2.154 -4.532 8.526
38 159 -0.886 1.577 -4.756 6.580 90 156 0.835 1.440 -2.976 4.344
39 147 -1.963 2.057 -9.644 3.091 91 98 5.958 3.803 -2.000 25.677
40 158 0.287 1.675 -5.473 9.903 92 146 1.197 3.382 -7.977 8.698
42 154 0.914 2.770 -8.523 8.218 93 105 6.577 2.748 -3.537 18.500
49 163 0.449 1.914 -4.101 9.980 94 164 0.662 2.157 -10.345 8.008
50 106 22.518 3.090 15.606 38.232 95 153 0.347 2.618 -7.854 11.375
51 94 0.590 3.265 -14.942 5.291 96 157 -0.042 2.060 -5.586 4.974
Note: This table summarizes the estimated exogenous competitiveness ciM across countries within each sector s from quality model
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Table 14: Summary of Cutoffs —Melitz and Ottaviano Model
HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max HS Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 150 3.011 2.214 -3.992 8.409
3 138 1.249 2.645 -8.513 6.687 52 154 0.495 2.501 -6.882 7.866
4 148 0.868 1.228 -2.975 4.239 54 104 1.041 2.077 -4.777 5.708
6 128 7.710 2.764 -0.780 15.091 55 148 0.065 2.562 -6.670 4.982
7 154 1.216 1.979 -4.815 7.150 58 144 1.049 2.572 -5.458 13.692
8 147 2.261 2.126 -2.952 12.880 59 116 1.700 1.351 -2.378 4.444
9 150 0.654 1.684 -4.379 3.718 61 154 0.792 3.299 -6.633 10.001
10 152 0.997 1.848 -5.317 5.391 62 155 -0.611 3.498 -8.208 8.613
11 157 0.436 1.352 -4.034 3.497 63 157 1.879 2.569 -4.476 7.188
15 154 1.047 1.439 -2.104 4.277 64 148 0.124 2.744 -6.358 8.317
16 151 0.849 1.620 -6.824 4.562 65 153 2.020 2.333 -3.684 9.270
17 156 1.341 1.236 -2.432 5.477 66 157 1.943 2.580 -4.759 14.359
18 158 0.404 1.234 -2.701 4.046 67 141 1.217 3.488 -6.993 7.586
19 163 -0.273 1.013 -2.728 2.819 68 141 3.971 1.908 -1.216 7.532
20 142 0.173 1.198 -2.071 2.534 69 161 2.326 2.653 -5.742 8.726
21 155 -0.625 1.104 -2.981 1.894 70 158 2.570 2.003 -3.190 8.366
23 160 -2.125 1.851 -7.661 1.200 71 122 6.987 3.883 -5.886 15.516
24 146 -5.581 3.025 -15.509 2.437 73 159 1.500 1.253 -2.480 4.756
30 156 -0.443 2.427 -5.975 4.664 74 153 0.488 1.452 -4.534 6.413
32 158 -0.225 1.452 -4.578 3.050 76 158 0.557 1.131 -4.030 4.030
34 138 -0.095 1.354 -5.192 3.013 82 159 1.858 2.116 -3.206 5.999
35 152 -0.751 1.718 -6.521 2.556 87 156 1.902 2.518 -5.229 7.500
36 141 2.621 3.361 -7.049 10.561 88 123 -0.144 1.899 -5.253 5.816
37 84 2.459 2.584 -4.488 7.855 89 149 2.773 2.055 -2.797 10.367
38 159 -0.736 1.397 -3.502 6.090 90 156 0.969 1.361 -2.965 4.320
39 147 -1.879 1.561 -7.064 3.002 91 98 6.833 3.035 2.149 21.273
40 158 0.401 1.295 -5.337 5.052 92 146 1.443 3.264 -6.880 8.791
42 154 0.815 2.659 -7.365 9.969 93 105 7.317 2.357 -2.368 17.926
49 163 0.303 1.433 -3.599 5.719 94 164 1.006 1.677 -4.750 5.649
50 106 1.955 2.781 -6.967 7.527 95 153 0.268 2.484 -7.657 5.498
51 94 1.768 2.238 -5.315 7.984 96 157 0.107 2.070 -4.670 5.063
Note: This table summarizes the estimated exogenous competitiveness ciM across countries within each sector s from Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) model
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Table 15: International Trade Cost Increase
HS Mean Std.Dev Min Max HS Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2 2.801 2.284 -0.003 9.085
3 1.983 3.815 -0.327 30.816 52 1.935 1.768 -0.085 6.716
4 0.944 1.178 -0.302 4.733 54 13.115 6.858 0.000 39.165
6 3.914 4.133 -0.038 24.256 55 1.217 1.876 -0.353 15.144
7 1.248 1.236 -0.383 3.983 58 5.617 3.677 -0.053 15.358
8 3.591 3.468 -0.348 15.524 59 0.752 1.322 -0.602 8.314
9 1.411 1.341 -0.200 7.070 61 3.032 4.738 -0.220 18.739
10 3.196 3.037 -0.001 24.547 62 2.988 6.235 -0.179 45.542
11 0.731 0.837 -0.244 5.103 63 1.520 2.268 -0.452 12.386
15 1.002 1.428 -0.433 8.380 64 1.173 2.023 -0.294 9.771
16 1.277 1.521 -0.255 6.770 65 1.856 1.703 -0.095 10.980
17 1.973 1.369 0.212 6.722 66 3.150 2.721 -0.032 14.317
18 1.362 1.105 -0.296 5.531 67 3.587 5.030 -0.466 23.328
19 0.986 1.816 -0.398 12.198 68 0.839 1.219 -0.439 6.521
20 1.298 1.960 -0.505 13.862 69 2.108 2.579 -0.254 13.567
21 0.583 1.015 -0.247 8.883 70 2.675 2.609 -0.302 12.418
23 0.900 1.212 -0.261 5.901 71 5.430 3.946 0.033 15.622
24 2.055 2.091 -0.006 14.665 73 2.160 1.785 -0.249 7.655
30 2.829 2.432 -0.263 12.214 74 3.756 3.876 -0.023 22.587
32 4.943 4.259 -0.022 30.004 76 0.148 0.388 -0.505 1.933
34 28.687 13.970 -0.074 71.330 82 2.988 3.571 -0.027 17.884
35 0.276 0.407 -0.184 2.016 87 1.815 1.789 -0.712 7.665
36 12.454 9.820 0.216 45.854 88 8.191 4.952 -0.054 22.213
37 14.389 5.979 -0.053 36.342 89 1.434 1.475 -0.113 8.867
38 0.662 0.893 -0.174 3.920 90 3.195 2.180 0.030 10.248
39 0.596 0.981 -0.526 4.460 91 8.818 6.094 -0.065 24.584
40 1.112 1.552 -0.368 8.873 92 2.605 3.745 -0.320 22.862
42 8.844 6.304 0.023 28.939 93 3.810 2.954 -0.278 10.813
49 0.311 0.429 -0.114 3.005 94 1.109 2.610 -0.709 17.924
50 7.222 5.252 -0.017 23.817 95 3.633 3.020 0.040 16.968
51 1.071 2.407 -0.309 16.746 96 1.074 1.305 -0.088 5.768
Note: This table summarizes the effects on cutoffs (endogenous competitiveness) of a 5% increase in inter-
national trade costs under quality model
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Table 16: International Trade Cost Increase–MO
HS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max HS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2 1.047 1.272 -0.293 7.608
3 0.586 1.051 -0.158 7.937 52 0.607 0.931 -0.010 6.390
4 0.446 0.787 -0.661 5.415 54 0.646 1.266 -0.399 9.755
6 2.593 3.507 -0.452 27.547 55 0.597 1.095 -0.370 7.856
7 0.663 1.209 -0.107 11.402 58 1.168 1.486 -0.130 7.156
8 1.616 1.636 -0.137 8.661 59 0.543 0.847 -0.399 4.301
9 0.389 0.565 -0.138 2.651 61 1.189 1.491 -0.031 7.398
10 0.497 0.697 -0.526 5.233 62 1.363 1.891 -0.061 10.884
11 0.381 0.725 -0.150 7.001 63 0.633 0.750 -0.508 3.724
15 0.449 0.662 -0.034 4.073 64 0.695 0.876 -0.075 4.262
16 0.659 1.185 -0.463 8.025 65 0.791 2.017 -0.125 22.371
17 0.364 0.561 -0.010 3.607 66 2.033 2.519 -0.131 19.504
18 0.232 0.320 -0.009 1.939 67 4.231 4.888 -0.462 19.710
19 0.327 0.420 -0.010 2.236 68 0.727 1.212 -0.159 8.095
20 0.407 0.533 -0.361 2.586 69 1.127 1.502 -0.173 8.505
21 0.412 0.670 -0.013 4.640 70 0.518 0.886 -0.394 5.239
23 0.481 0.764 -0.012 4.653 71 3.212 4.667 -0.223 24.524
24 0.923 1.302 -0.292 10.050 73 0.457 0.665 -0.036 4.666
30 0.731 0.952 -0.179 4.721 74 0.336 0.673 -0.031 4.304
32 0.400 0.613 -0.253 3.211 76 0.240 0.422 -0.104 3.735
34 0.419 0.636 -0.006 3.691 82 0.858 1.104 -0.362 5.341
35 0.525 0.824 -0.009 5.677 87 0.766 1.347 -0.749 6.729
36 7.257 6.698 0.096 36.632 88 1.041 1.260 -0.185 8.286
37 2.159 1.844 -0.065 8.031 89 4.455 3.799 -0.039 17.700
38 0.330 0.518 -0.084 3.462 90 0.339 0.426 -0.378 2.027
39 0.284 0.562 -0.013 4.220 91 9.938 5.588 -0.051 36.798
40 0.401 0.740 -0.023 5.858 92 2.672 4.312 -0.399 24.148
42 0.952 1.652 -0.084 13.658 93 8.151 4.063 1.295 18.768
49 0.300 0.418 -0.217 2.798 94 0.488 0.711 -0.368 5.283
50 0.792 1.732 -0.020 13.111 95 0.649 0.984 -0.273 6.777
51 0.840 1.897 -0.131 12.506 96 0.644 0.762 -0.107 3.713
Note: This table summarizes the effects on cutoffs (endogenous competitiveness) of a 5% increase in inter-
national trade costs under Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model
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Table 17: Summary of Cutoff Changes
(a) Summary of Cutoff Changes
Country ∆ Country ∆ Country ∆ Country ∆
ABW 0 DMA 0 BOL -92.825249 GTM -142.23793
AFG 0 DNK -114.35749 BRA -88.041534 GUM 0
AGO -5.9250102 DOM -290.53134 BRB 0 GUY 0
AIA 0 DZA -211.93385 BRN -105.61481 HKG 0
ALB 0 ECU -150.62788 BTN -30.520798 HND -71.087296
AND 0 EGY -139.12598 CAF -6.0313959 HRV -35.601143
ARE 110.83006 ERI 0 CAN -134.60129 HTI 10.083085
ARG -172.65367 ESP -3.0844131 CCK 0 HUN -71.353348
ARM -83.855202 EST -137.4808 CHE -221.01123 IDN -61.682568
ASM 0 ETH -14.915351 CHL 148.51651 IND -79.18856
ATF 0 FIN -139.43924 CHN -18.930056 IOT 0
ATG 0 FJI -1.2493064 CIV -566.53101 IRL -159.63408
AUS -85.625969 FLK 0 CMR 20.903 IRN 125.87421
AUT -35.475746 FRA -48.415028 COG 9.3548021 IRQ -94.298141
AZE -88.898872 FSM 0 COK 0 ISL -217.56667
BDI 197.47388 GAB -317.1246 COL -32.865913 ISR -117.73706
BEL 4.9142151 GBR -89.882896 COM 0 ITA -4.3799672
BEN 340.07468 GEO -77.644836 CPV 0 JAM -181.83876
BFA -499.91898 GHA 313.25208 CRI -150.97874 JOR -117.16895
BGD -52.478401 GIB 0 CUB 0 JPN -34.355942
BGR -193.67613 GIN -221.29001 CXR 0 KAZ -3.359056
BHR 0 GMB -127.25304 CYM 0 KEN 114.01509
BHS -313.15955 GNB 425.91129 CYP -286.89645 KGZ -32.405098
BIH -70.668152 GNQ 164.41464 CZE -132.38187 KHM -155.89485
BLR 9.4817276 GRC -42.363346 DEU -97.001007 KIR 0
BLZ -127.64666 GRD 0 DJI -76.750755 KNA 0
BMU 0 GRL 0
Note: This table summarizes the changes in endogenous cutoffs following an increase in preference for quality
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(b) Summary of Cutoff Changes (continue)
Country ∆ Country ∆ Country ∆ Country ∆
KOR -35.787136 QAT -219.32658 MYS -158.87752 TKM -52.555267
KWT -460.9559 ROM 0 NCL 0 TMP 0
LAO -436.81769 RUS -98.661285 NER -230.2971 TON 0
LBN 20.976509 RWA -396.1434 NFK 0 TTO -104.69793
LBR 292.86221 SAU -45.471489 NGA -42.240189 TUN -165.00168
LBY 0 SEN -349.76016 NIC 74.577103 TUR -73.441292
LCA 0 SGP 0 NIU 0 TUV 0
LKA -184.27283 SHN 0 NLD -138.3261 TWN -55.560108
LTU -159.97792 SLB 0 NOR -83.566177 TZA -234.38101
LVA -20.440449 SLE 194.28214 NPL -314.22827 UGA -58.329792
MAC 0 SLV -65.059845 NRU 0 UKR -150.4944
MAR -100.28398 SMR 0 NZL -180.14423 URY -185.035
MDA -37.104824 SOM 0 OMN -0.6131459 USA -83.864113
MDG -21.992657 SPM 0 PAK -30.568909 UZB 110.60154
MDV 0 STP 0 PAL 0 VCT 0
MEX -26.129211 SUR -325.828 PAN -197.16428 VEN -17.546169
MHL 0 SVK -167.24568 PCN 0 VGB 0
MLI 7.2255492 SVN -107.09841 PER -114.9763 VNM -68.709572
MLT 0 SWE -112.68818 PHL -77.56852 VUT 0
MMR -69.190582 SYC 0 PLW 0 WLF 0
MNG -217.73524 SYR -77.680817 PNG 0 WSM 0
MNP 0 TCA 0 POL -64.078629 YEM -515.06506
MOZ -138.54242 TCD 105.06513 PRK 0 ZAF -143.84947
MRT 179.3062 TGO 301.63589 PRT -181.69063 ZAR 0
MSR 0 THA -39.003437 PRY -254.91846 ZMB -184.53088
MUS 0 TJK -232.86932 PYF 0 ZWE 150.78076
MWI 37.507915 TKL 0
Note: This table summarizes the changes in endogenous cutoffs following an increase in preference for quality
Table 18: Gains from Preference Shock and Country Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Changes in Cost Cutoff
(1) (2) (3)
(log) Population -6.188** -8.510*** -8.929***
(3.139) (2.044) (3.299)
Initial Preference -0.795 -0.634
(0.606) (0.700)
(log) GDP per capita -13.617
(9.317)
Number of Observations 168 168 160
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications (1)-(3) is the level of
aggregate cutoff change at the country-level. Country-level control variables
are the initial preferences for quality and (log) GDP per capita.
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Table 19: Summary Statistics on Firm-Level Variables
Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
2009–2016:
FDI capital investment (in million USD) 32,403 35.9 302.19 0 18,500
Lagged:
Productivity (in log) 19,322 3.35 4.81 -17.62 17.26
R&D Intensity (= R&D expenses / Operating revenues) 13,621 0.1 3.4 0 259.34
Operating revenues (in log, thousand USD), real 26,765 12.75 3.47 -4.5 20
No of employees (in log) 24,247 7.27 3.24 0 13.78
Total assets (in log, thousand USD), real 27,458 12.71 3.69 -6.76 19.97
Material costs (in log, thousand USD), real 21,476 11.67 3.93 -6.87 20.28
Note: The GDP deflator is used to normalize the current and material costs, before they are used in the productivity estimations.
Table 20: Summary Statistics on Institutional Quality
Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Home country
VA (Voice and Accountability) 37,062 1.14 0.5 -1.83 1.77
PV (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) 37,073 0.6 0.54 -2.81 1.57
GE (Government Effectiveness) 37,073 1.4 0.53 -1.5 2.43
RQ (Regulatory Quality) 37,073 1.32 0.53 -2.14 2.26
RL (Rule of Law) 37,073 1.4 0.57 -1.99 2.12
CC (Control of Corruption) 37,073 1.38 0.73 -1.42 2.53
Destination country
VA (Voice and Accountability) 37,064 0.35 1.02 -2.24 1.77
PV (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) 37,065 0.15 0.8 -3.06 1.57
GE (Government Effectiveness) 37,053 0.78 0.86 -2.22 2.43
RQ (Regulatory Quality) 37,053 0.72 0.87 -2.45 2.26
RL (Rule of Law) 37,063 0.65 0.97 -2.45 2.12
CC (Control of Corruption) 37,054 0.58 1.04 -1.84 2.53
Note: Statistics refer to institutional quality lagged by one year before the year of FDI.
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Table 21: Firm-level FDI’s dependence on institutional quality
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t01 ∗Gd,t−1 0.592*** 1.022*** 0.753*** 0.766*** 0.801*** 0.501***
(0.0757) (0.126) (0.132) (0.145) (0.120) (0.0855)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0414 -0.0567 0.0288 0.0248 -0.0218 -0.0221
(0.0352) (0.0365) (0.0544) (0.0417) (0.0503) (0.0396)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0983*** -0.0389 -0.114** -0.148*** -0.0463 -0.1000***
(0.0259) (0.0483) (0.0476) (0.0415) (0.0443) (0.0354)
RDf,t−1 -0.482** -0.0505*** -3.105*** -1.550*** -2.568*** -0.656***
(0.209) (0.00971) (0.300) (0.104) (0.319) (0.0908)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.328** 0.0390*** 1.953*** 0.946*** 1.512*** 0.360***
(0.153) (0.0151) (0.192) (0.0652) (0.190) (0.0526)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.822*** 0.979*** 1.068*** 1.116*** 1.303*** 1.107***
(0.166) (0.153) (0.173) (0.175) (0.184) (0.184)
ln(distancehd) -0.189 -0.272** -0.219* -0.198* -0.133 -0.200*
(0.118) (0.108) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.112)
contighd 0.638*** 0.592*** 0.808*** 0.747*** 0.812*** 0.809***
(0.208) (0.219) (0.222) (0.219) (0.212) (0.218)
comlanghd 0.381** 0.481*** 0.666*** 0.701*** 0.611*** 0.621***
(0.188) (0.165) (0.174) (0.172) (0.169) (0.171)
colonyhd -0.208 -0.117 -0.467** -0.502** -0.450** -0.399**
(0.209) (0.192) (0.199) (0.204) (0.199) (0.193)
comcolhd 0.0373 0.275 0.240 0.122 0.141 0.0926
(0.528) (0.426) (0.411) (0.425) (0.459) (0.423)
smctryhd -1.356*** -1.538*** -1.015*** -0.913** -0.073*** -1.244***
(0.355) (0.356) (0.407) (0.378) (0.380) (0.369)
rtahd,t−1 -0.140 0.184 -0.0399 -0.0620 0.0955 0.0963
(0.213) (0.194) (0.217) (0.218) (0.203) (0.207)
comcurhd,t−1 0.528** 0.379 0.405* 0.490** 0.464** 0.431*
(0.246) (0.232) (0.233) (0.236) (0.232) (0.235)
bithd,t−1 -0.220 -0.385* -0.285* -0.250 -0.179 -0.225
(0.186) (0.170) (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) (0.175)
constant -8.024*** -24.83*** -37.55*** -21.39*** -18.85*** -25.22***
(1.607) (1.893) (2.440) (1.790) (1.794) (1.940)
Observations 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252
R2 0.454 0.438 0.487 0.482 0.493 0.472
Origin− yearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination− yearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector −DestinationFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (16). Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs are reported in the parenthesis.
Productivity estimates based on the LP method and operating revenues. The entry , and indicates statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 22: Firm-Level FDI Dependence on Institutional Quality without US
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.619*** 1.014*** 0.778*** 0.833*** 0.815*** 0.532***
(0.0797) (0.124) (0.135) (0.147) (0.126) (0.0882)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0314 -0.0491 0.0305 0.0252 -0.0166 -0.0165
(0.0355) (0.0374) (0.0543) (0.0418) (0.0497) (0.0396)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0870*** -0.0311 -0.105** -0.134*** -0.0351 -0.0924**
(0.0265) (0.0487) (0.0487) (0.0423) (0.0451) (0.0364)
RDf,t−1 -0.853 -1.602 -4.049** -3.885** -2.012 -1.481
(1.109) (1.047) (1.799) (1.511) (1.582) (1.450)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.500 3.212** 2.868** 3.081*** 1.263 1.034
(0.943) (1.545) (1.197) (1.117) (0.956) (1.056)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.856*** 1.019*** 1.113*** 1.202*** 1.332*** 1.171***
(0.171) (0.158) (0.179) (0.181) (0.192) (0.192)
ln(distancehd) -0.160 -0.230** -0.191* -0.146 -0.110 -0.173
(0.126) (0.110) (0.115) (0.116) (0.114) (0.113)
contighd 0.538** 0.498** 0.712*** 0.656*** 0.704*** 0.714***
(0.209) (0.220) (0.223) (0.221) (0.215) (0.220)
comlanghd 0.313 0.400** 0.580*** 0.607*** 0.537*** 0.533***
(0.202) (0.174) (0.185) (0.182) (0.181) (0.182)
colonyhd -0.142 -0.0607 -0.409** -0.444** -0.383* -0.337*
(0.216) (0.196) (0.204) (0.209) (0.206) (0.198)
comcolhd -0.0815 0.154 0.130 0.0459 0.00929 0.00210
(0.540) (0.430) (0.415) (0.422) (0.463) (0.425)
smctryhd -1.352*** -1.478*** -0.972** -0.872** -1.026*** -1.213***
(0.362) (0.360) (0.385) (0.384) (0.382) (0.370)
rtahd,t−1 -0.198 0.167 -0.0578 -0.0753 0.0657 0.0805
(0.221) (0.202) (0.224) (0.226) (0.211) (0.213)
comcurhd,t−1 0.623** 0.477** 0.479** 0.584** 0.540** 0.527**
(0.250) (0.234) (0.235) (0.238) (0.236) (0.239)
bithd,t−1 -0.481** -0.632*** -0.527*** -0.507*** -0.430** -0.472**
(0.193) (0.182) (0.183) (0.185) (0.184) (0.187)
constant -15.35*** -16.53*** -11.07*** -11.14*** -13.01*** -11.12***
(1.803) (1.740) (1.854) (1.861) (1.889) (1.863)
Observations 7132 7132 7132 7132 7132 7132
R2 0.801 0.802 0.799 0.804 0.798 0.801
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions does not include US
parent firms.
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Table 23: Sectoral Level Contractual Intensity
Sectors CI
Beverages 0.73
Food & Tobacco 0.34
Textiles 0.67
Wood Products 0.56
Paper, Printing & Packaging 0.54
Biotechnology 0.52
Alternative/Renewable energy 0.52
Chemicals 0.52
Pharmaceuticals 0.52
Rubber 0.6
Plastics 0.45
Ceramics & Glass 0.44
Building & Construction Materials 0.44
Metals 0.34
Business Machines & Equipment 0.84
Engines & Turbines 0.84
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools 0.84
Space & Defence 0.84
Communications 0.82
Consumer Electronics 0.82
Electronic Components 0.82
Medical Devices 0.82
Semiconductors 0.82
Aerospace 0.89
Automotive OEM 0.89
Automotive Components 0.89
Non-Automotive Transport OEM 0.89
The table shows the contractual intensity across sectors in greenfield
data.
Source: Desboras and Wei (2017)
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Table 24: Contractual Enforcement and Judical System of Home and Host Countries
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Home country
Contract 36,822 69.067 11.200 20.820 93.360
legal 38,472 7.301 1.096 1.349 9.138
Destination country
Contract 36,732 65.237 13.733 20.820 93.360
legal 37,550 6.351 1.352 1.349 9.138
The table shows contractual enforcement, from World Bank Doing Business Survey and legal
system & property rights protection, from Economics Freedom Index Database.
Table 25: Sectoral Variation in Complementarity Pattern
VA PV GE RQ RL CC Contract Legal
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.267** 0.334** 0.455*** -0.100 0.396*** -0.0156 0.000264 0.146***
(0.114) (0.152) (0.159) (0.198) (0.142) (0.0998) (0.000404) (0.0525)
CIs ∗Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.677*** 1.126*** 0.354** 0.905*** 0.691*** 0.450*** 0.000961*** -0.0183
(0.194) (0.282) (0.168) (0.161) (0.166) (0.128) (0.000133) (0.0230)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0362 -0.0494 0.0292 0.0219 -0.0183 -0.00831 0.118 0.0320
(0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0673) (0.0515) (0.0547) (0.0456) (0.157) (0.196)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0688* -0.113** -0.0989* -0.102** -0.0260 -0.0749* -0.00240 -0.0126
(0.0358) (0.0523) (0.0576) (0.0486) (0.0480) (0.0398) (0.00245) (0.0286)
RDf,t−1 -0.200 -0.0297*** -2.054*** -1.090*** -1.659*** -0.464*** -0.0357 -3.358***
(0.210) (0.0102) (0.323) (0.1000) (0.325) (0.0882) (0.0476) (0.626)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.125 0.00352 1.290*** 0.665*** 0.974*** 0.252*** 0.000134 0.422***
(0.153) (0.0149) (0.206) (0.0628) (0.194) (0.0509) (0.000649) (0.0794)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.319*** 0.343*** 0.382*** 0.0936 0.600*** 0.158 0.0536 0.321***
(0.115) (0.113) (0.136) (0.159) (0.156) (0.134) (0.0962) (0.116)
ln(distancehd) -0.401*** -0.364*** -0.381*** -0.344*** -0.345*** -0.348*** -0.388*** -0.349***
(0.118) (0.116) (0.114) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.119)
contighd 0.615*** 0.770*** 0.853*** 0.897*** 0.798*** 0.881*** 0.862*** 0.906***
(0.185) (0.185) (0.187) (0.192) (0.184) (0.190) (0.202) (0.198)
comlanghd 0.329* 0.372** 0.439** 0.471** 0.395** 0.443** 0.478*** 0.362**
(0.192) (0.183) (0.181) (0.184) (0.187) (0.184) (0.185) (0.183)
colonyhd -0.293 -0.259 -0.369* -0.380* -0.351* -0.347* -0.324 -0.309
(0.207) (0.204) (0.199) (0.200) (0.209) (0.202) (0.209) (0.209)
comcolhd 0.276 0.372 0.431 0.111 0.252 0.126 0.259 0.197
(0.549) (0.578) (0.591) (0.560) (0.559) (0.551) (0.571) (0.574)
smctryhd -2.303*** -1.686*** -1.624*** -1.587*** -1.865*** -1.678*** -1.837*** -1.722***
(0.386) (0.373) (0.388) (0.380) (0.375) (0.369) (0.375) (0.401)
rtahd,t−1 -0.0905 0.0794 -0.0846 -0.111 0.0844 -0.0110 0.0152 0.180
(0.200) (0.195) (0.201) (0.200) (0.197) (0.194) (0.201) (0.204)
comcurhd,t−1 0.122 0.0303 0.108 0.0227 0.0751 0.0160 0.0320 0.116
(0.249) (0.242) (0.251) (0.260) (0.248) (0.258) (0.265) (0.260)
bithd,t−1 -0.0284 -0.000320 0.0271 -0.0378 0.0335 -0.00262 -0.0446 -0.0524
(0.209) (0.198) (0.198) (0.195) (0.200) (0.193) (0.210) (0.222)
constant -12.46*** -13.13*** -12.48*** -12.34*** -13.59*** -12.51*** -12.74*** -17.81***
(1.746) (1.733) (1.733) (1.740) (1.758) (1.739) (2.021) (2.948)
Observations 5616 5616 5616 5616 5616 5616 5605 5596
R2 0.711 0.712 0.710 0.711 0.712 0.709 0.708 0.706
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. CIs = 1 if industry s has the contractual intensity above the median.
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Table 26: Informal Institution
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Ih ∗Gdt -0.0137 -0.119*** -0.129*** -0.124*** -0.105*** -0.0756***
(0.0186) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0166)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0217 -0.0224 0.0446 0.0527 -0.00426 0.00202
(0.0342) (0.0376) (0.0575) (0.0430) (0.0503) (0.0405)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0860*** -0.0313 -0.101** -0.140*** -0.0316 -0.0763**
(0.0252) (0.0503) (0.0509) (0.0411) (0.0464) (0.0354)
RDf,t−1 -0.652*** -0.0425*** -2.297*** -1.148*** -1.813*** -0.484***
(0.192) (0.00953) (0.286) (0.0948) (0.283) (0.0844)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.450*** 0.0192 1.443*** 0.698*** 1.064*** 0.261***
(0.140) (0.0145) (0.183) (0.0597) (0.169) (0.0488)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.736*** 0.739*** 0.681*** 0.699*** 0.696*** 0.697***
(0.161) (0.159) (0.153) (0.155) (0.156) (0.157)
ln(distancehd) -0.433*** -0.384*** -0.354*** -0.401*** -0.360*** -0.380***
(0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101)
contighd 0.595*** 0.608*** 0.611*** 0.545*** 0.600*** 0.637***
(0.186) (0.182) (0.178) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180)
comlanghd 0.820*** 0.804*** 0.876*** 0.909*** 0.905*** 0.881***
(0.183) (0.181) (0.184) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181)
colonyhd -0.786*** -0.729*** -0.719*** -0.749*** -0.642*** -0.726***
(0.191) (0.190) (0.174) (0.177) (0.176) (0.178)
comcolhd -0.677 -0.406 -0.313 -0.312 -0.476 -0.452
(0.527) (0.540) (0.503) (0.507) (0.507) (0.513)
smctryhd -1.231*** -1.459*** -1.301*** -1.204*** -1.424*** -1.323***
(0.345) (0.360) (0.341) (0.350) (0.362) (0.352)
rtahd,t−1 -0.224 -0.219 -0.246 -0.292 -0.177 -0.275
(0.203) (0.193) (0.191) (0.195) (0.192) (0.191)
comcurhd,t−1 0.133 0.0489 0.0742 0.0609 0.0381 0.0473
(0.247) (0.239) (0.241) (0.242) (0.242) (0.243)
bithd,t−1 -0.0678 -0.232 -0.187 -0.175 -0.254 -0.167
(0.200) (0.191) (0.190) (0.191) (0.192) (0.190)
constant 7.505*** 6.211** 14.52*** 14.61*** 16.19*** 5.516**
(2.623) (2.676) (2.451) (2.111) (2.358) (2.705)
Observations 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216
R2 0.818 0.822 0.826 0.828 0.825 0.822
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ih measures the average informal institution
investment at the country level. It is proxied by the percentage of firms connected with a minister or MP in the Worldscope
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Table 27: Informal Institution
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Ih ∗Gdt -0.0317* -0.0943*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.116*** -0.0845***
(0.0165) (0.0198) (0.0218) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0161)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0206 -0.0205 0.0432 0.0508 -0.00410 0.00162
(0.0339) (0.0376) (0.0578) (0.0433) (0.0502) (0.0405)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0873*** -0.0275 -0.102** -0.141*** -0.0335 -0.0773**
(0.0249) (0.0503) (0.0511) (0.0413) (0.0463) (0.0354)
RDf,t−1 -0.500** -0.0464*** -2.246*** -1.114*** -1.764*** -0.464***
(0.194) (0.00952) (0.284) (0.0945) (0.282) (0.0843)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.339** 0.0257* 1.410*** 0.677*** 1.034*** 0.249***
(0.142) (0.0145) (0.182) (0.0595) (0.169) (0.0488)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.672*** 0.690*** 0.698*** 0.701***
(0.164) (0.161) (0.158) (0.160) (0.159) (0.162)
ln(distancehd) -0.417*** -0.391*** -0.339*** -0.386*** -0.345*** -0.366***
(0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104) (0.102) (0.102)
contighd 0.619*** 0.609*** 0.628*** 0.555*** 0.609*** 0.649***
(0.187) (0.185) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.181)
comlanghd 0.799*** 0.785*** 0.873*** 0.918*** 0.897*** 0.870***
(0.184) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.182)
colonyhd -0.747*** -0.718*** -0.704*** -0.730*** -0.609*** -0.697***
(0.190) (0.189) (0.175) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178)
comcolhd -0.582 -0.667 -0.312 -0.307 -0.394 -0.405
(0.537) (0.543) (0.498) (0.500) (0.507) (0.511)
smctryhd -1.180*** -1.492*** -1.286*** -1.206*** -1.406*** -1.302***
(0.350) (0.366) (0.345) (0.355) (0.363) (0.354)
rtahd,t−1 -0.226 -0.209 -0.247 -0.297 -0.186 -0.282
(0.204) (0.194) (0.192) (0.195) (0.191) (0.191)
comcurhd,t−1 0.128 0.0689 0.0994 0.0829 0.0684 0.0691
(0.245) (0.239) (0.240) (0.241) (0.240) (0.242)
bithd,t−1 -0.0757 -0.180 -0.147 -0.144 -0.219 -0.142
(0.198) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.191)
constant 5.628** 4.370 -2.920 14.61*** -0.494 1.817
(2.796) (2.722) (3.034) (2.125) (2.922) (2.817)
Observations 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216
R2 0.819 0.821 0.827 0.829 0.826 0.822
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ih measures the average informal institution
investment at the country level. It is proxied by the percentage of firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationshipin the
Worldscope
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Table 28: Informal Institution
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Ih ∗Gdt -0.00185 -0.0118*** -0.0196*** -0.0168*** -0.0159*** -0.0105***
(0.00394) (0.00401) (0.00423) (0.00406) (0.00368) (0.00351)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0222 -0.0238 0.0431 0.0495 -0.00929 -0.00172
(0.0343) (0.0381) (0.0581) (0.0438) (0.0511) (0.0409)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0855*** -0.0246 -0.103** -0.141*** -0.0296 -0.0747**
(0.0254) (0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0413) (0.0469) (0.0356)
RDf,t−1 -0.716*** -0.0576*** -2.845*** -1.375*** -2.277*** -0.603***
(0.194) (0.00963) (0.289) (0.0965) (0.290) (0.0861)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.497*** 0.0450*** 1.790*** 0.839*** 1.340*** 0.330***
(0.141) (0.0147) (0.185) (0.0608) (0.173) (0.0498)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.734*** 0.721*** 0.681*** 0.697*** 0.702*** 0.697***
(0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.162) (0.162) (0.163)
ln(distancehd) -0.440*** -0.434*** -0.427*** -0.455*** -0.428*** -0.436***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103)
contighd 0.588*** 0.609*** 0.555*** 0.524*** 0.550*** 0.604***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.184) (0.187) (0.185)
comlanghd 0.825*** 0.809*** 0.895*** 0.897*** 0.895*** 0.879***
(0.183) (0.182) (0.189) (0.186) (0.187) (0.184)
colonyhd -0.783*** -0.713*** -0.611*** -0.673*** -0.548*** -0.679***
(0.194) (0.196) (0.185) (0.187) (0.188) (0.188)
comcolhd -0.658 -0.547 -0.357 -0.336 -0.488 -0.483
(0.530) (0.543) (0.524) (0.535) (0.528) (0.532)
smctryhd -1.248*** -1.585*** -1.425*** -1.279*** -1.565*** -1.433***
(0.344) (0.356) (0.341) (0.348) (0.362) (0.351)
rtahd,t−1 -0.227 -0.212 -0.277 -0.302 -0.208 -0.295
(0.203) (0.196) (0.194) (0.196) (0.196) (0.194)
comcurhd,t−1 0.135 0.0544 0.0282 0.0500 0.0190 0.0275
(0.247) (0.244) (0.246) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245)
bithd,t−1 -0.0455 -0.0733 -0.0497 -0.0152 -0.109 -0.0454
(0.200) (0.195) (0.196) (0.195) (0.198) (0.194)
constant 14.65*** 15.68*** 13.71*** 3.473 4.625* 5.590**
(1.929) (2.213) (2.561) (2.756) (2.797) (2.763)
Observations 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216
R2 0.818 0.817 0.820 0.821 0.818 0.817
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ih measures the average informal institution
investment at the country level. It is proxied by percentage of top 50 firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship
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Table 29: Informal Institution
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investmet
Ih ∗Gdt -0.00259 -0.0157*** -0.0223*** -0.0187*** -0.0181*** -0.0128***
(0.00442) (0.00466) (0.00486) (0.00464) (0.00423) (0.00402)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0219 -0.0262 0.0445 0.0478 -0.00904 -0.00197
(0.0342) (0.0376) (0.0577) (0.0435) (0.0509) (0.0407)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0859*** -0.0267 -0.109** -0.144*** -0.0341 -0.0782**
(0.0255) (0.0506) (0.0511) (0.0414) (0.0470) (0.0357)
RDf,t−1 -0.704*** -0.0560*** -2.785*** -1.363*** -2.196*** -0.586***
(0.194) (0.00964) (0.293) (0.0967) (0.291) (0.0861)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.488*** 0.0423*** 1.752*** 0.832*** 1.292*** 0.320***
(0.141) (0.0147) (0.187) (0.0609) (0.174) (0.0498)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.735*** 0.733*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 0.734*** 0.718***
(0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.163)
ln(distancehd) -0.437*** -0.430*** -0.424*** -0.446*** -0.417*** -0.434***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
contighd 0.595*** 0.609*** 0.572*** 0.557*** 0.577*** 0.615***
(0.187) (0.186) (0.185) (0.184) (0.187) (0.185)
comlanghd 0.828*** 0.810*** 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.883*** 0.878***
(0.183) (0.182) (0.188) (0.184) (0.186) (0.184)
colonyhd -0.780*** -0.702*** -0.603*** -0.673*** -0.543*** -0.669***
(0.193) (0.195) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186)
comcolhd -0.665 -0.477 -0.349 -0.335 -0.484 -0.471
(0.528) (0.553) (0.534) (0.543) (0.535) (0.539)
smctryhd -1.263*** -1.620*** -1.464*** -1.321*** -1.601*** -1.467***
(0.343) (0.353) (0.339) (0.346) (0.357) (0.348)
rtahd,t−1 -0.222 -0.187 -0.256 -0.290 -0.166 -0.272
(0.204) (0.194) (0.192) (0.196) (0.192) (0.192)
comcurhd,t−1 0.140 0.0519 0.0627 0.0799 0.0549 0.0542
(0.246) (0.242) (0.245) (0.244) (0.243) (0.243)
bithd,t−1 -0.0442 -0.0856 -0.0665 -0.0253 -0.111 -0.0545
(0.200) (0.195) (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.194)
constant 7.486*** 6.837** 4.021 13.61*** 5.417* 14.25***
(2.652) (2.701) (2.851) (2.115) (2.766) (2.227)
Observations 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216 7216
R2 0.818 0.817 0.820 0.821 0.819 0.817
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Ih measures the average informal institution
investment at the country level. It is proxied by the percentage of market capitalization of connected firms
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Table 30: Firms with One Host Countries
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.406*** 0.902*** 0.892*** 0.223 0.818*** 0.720***
(0.126) (0.204) (0.199) (0.211) (0.179) (0.127)
ln(prodf,t−1) 0.0550 0.0377 -0.0411 -0.000659 -0.00244 -0.00237
(0.0747) (0.0557) (0.0930) (0.0857) (0.0972) (0.0778)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.0468 0.351*** 0.0732 0.0380 0.0867 0.0723
(0.0501) (0.100) (0.0931) (0.0850) (0.0884) (0.0751)
RDf,t−1 -0.549 -4.027*** -5.601* -3.703 -2.704 -3.468
(1.111) (1.182) (2.995) (2.636) (3.008) (2.358)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 -0.839 4.530*** 2.789 1.729 1.327 1.735
(1.028) (1.368) (1.728) (1.624) (1.784) (1.434)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | -0.500*** -0.173 -0.169 -0.678*** -0.143 0.000827
(0.158) (0.155) (0.192) (0.208) (0.222) (0.202)
ln(distancehd) 0.302** 0.436*** 0.367*** 0.303** 0.395*** 0.522***
(0.138) (0.132) (0.136) (0.137) (0.142) (0.139)
contighd 0.677** 1.056*** 1.037*** 1.025*** 0.953*** 0.930***
(0.319) (0.320) (0.324) (0.318) (0.330) (0.319)
comlanghd 0.470 0.649** 0.566* 0.609** 0.518* 0.607**
(0.293) (0.292) (0.293) (0.283) (0.292) (0.292)
colonyhd -0.481 -0.424 -0.508 -0.541 -0.526 -0.447
(0.329) (0.329) (0.339) (0.330) (0.334) (0.339)
comcolhd -1.263** 0.201 -0.970* -1.642*** -1.290** -1.024*
(0.496) (0.522) (0.533) (0.519) (0.522) (0.533)
smctryhd 0.290 0.592* 0.758** 0.340 0.574 0.848**
(0.348) (0.355) (0.366) (0.373) (0.382) (0.383)
rtahd,t−1 0.0484 0.0121 -0.176 -0.195 0.117 0.216
(0.204) (0.202) (0.197) (0.206) (0.206) (0.211)
comcurhd,t−1 0.871* 0.645 0.845* 0.797* 0.699 0.772
(0.475) (0.479) (0.482) (0.476) (0.480) (0.479)
bithd,t−1 0.317 -0.167 -0.00931 0.0348 0.125 0.196
(0.293) (0.291) (0.283) (0.299) (0.292) (0.284)
constant -10.80*** -12.67*** -11.35*** -10.69*** -16.48*** -17.55***
(1.569) (1.339) (1.401) (1.665) (1.402) (1.607)
Observations 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313
R2 0.971 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.971
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regression sample only includes firms
with only one host country.
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Table 31: Adding Endowment, Cultural and Industrial Differences
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.949*** 1.096*** 1.321*** 1.584*** 1.429*** 0.842***
(0.102) (0.158) (0.206) (0.208) (0.208) (0.112)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.0210 -0.0463 0.0608 0.0411 -0.00950 -0.0183
(0.0383) (0.0475) (0.0679) (0.0563) (0.0635) (0.0490)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.130*** -0.0649 -0.148** -0.168*** -0.0674 -0.110***
(0.0285) (0.0547) (0.0593) (0.0576) (0.0547) (0.0418)
RDf,t−1 -0.766*** -0.0221** -2.154*** -1.088*** -2.450*** -0.399***
(0.201) (0.00927) (0.299) (0.100) (0.327) (0.0872)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.532*** -0.0150 1.349*** 0.661*** 1.442*** 0.212***
(0.147) (0.0149) (0.191) (0.0628) (0.195) (0.0506)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 1.047*** 1.677*** 2.107*** 2.091*** 2.345*** 2.391***
(0.232) (0.256) (0.294) (0.270) (0.270) (0.287)
ln(distancehd) -0.102 0.00923 0.0413 0.00256 0.126 0.0162
(0.125) (0.134) (0.143) (0.139) (0.130) (0.132)
contighd 0.777*** 1.144*** 1.342*** 1.171*** 1.134*** 1.089***
(0.259) (0.283) (0.283) (0.266) (0.252) (0.259)
comlanghd -0.167 0.101 0.270 0.270 0.141 0.325*
(0.185) (0.178) (0.177) (0.183) (0.184) (0.183)
colonyhd -0.0266 -0.220 -0.646*** -0.666*** -0.538*** -0.502***
(0.188) (0.192) (0.204) (0.211) (0.203) (0.193)
comcolhd -2.264** -0.468 0.213 0.215 -1.304 -0.642
(1.011) (0.732) (0.695) (0.725) (0.830) (0.718)
smctryhd -2.938*** -2.641*** -2.350*** -2.492*** -2.775*** -2.923***
(0.485) (0.517) (0.606) (0.590) (0.554) (0.527)
rtahd,t−1 -0.613*** -0.482** -0.812*** -0.798*** -0.529** -0.547**
(0.205) (0.218) (0.230) (0.234) (0.206) (0.219)
comcurhd,t−1 0.581* 0.245 0.367 0.478* 0.464* 0.305
(0.299) (0.281) (0.290) (0.287) (0.279) (0.280)
bithd,t−1 -0.309 -0.392* -0.279 -0.157 -0.252 -0.196
(0.241) (0.225) (0.222) (0.227) (0.218) (0.226)
| K/Lot −K/Ldt | 1.502*** 0.468 0.620* 0.819** 0.998*** 0.192
(0.363) (0.359) (0.364) (0.345) (0.368) (0.344)
| indot − inddt | 25.51*** 27.60*** 27.68*** 26.10*** 28.36*** 25.19***
(3.822) (3.813) (4.068) (4.060) (4.029) (3.996)
| religionot − religiondt | 3.414** 6.243*** 8.113*** 6.701*** 8.183*** 7.704***
(1.425) (1.410) (1.481) (1.429) (1.451) (1.423)
constant -37.13*** -44.79*** -46.79*** -44.10*** -48.25*** -44.09***
(4.515) (4.384) (4.697) (4.647) (4.549) (4.576)
Observations 5133 5133 5133 5133 5133 5133
R2 0.856 0.849 0.855 0.857 0.858 0.854
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. K/Lot and K/Ldt are capital-labor ratio
at home and host countries. indot and inddt are industrial structure at home and host countries. religionot and religiondt are
religion compositions of home and host countries.
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Table 32: Alternative TFP Measure — ACF
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.667*** 0.889*** 0.716*** 0.742*** 0.826*** 0.540***
(0.0908) (0.129) (0.140) (0.145) (0.125) (0.0893)
ln(prodf,t−1) 0.297*** 0.222*** 0.208** 0.219*** 0.257*** 0.235***
(0.0848) (0.0669) (0.0842) (0.0783) (0.0829) (0.0680)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.189** 0.00693 -0.00966 -0.0235 -0.0830 -0.0530
(0.0783) (0.0704) (0.0759) (0.0629) (0.0599) (0.0580)
RDf,t−1 -0.136 -1.500 -5.020** -3.924** -2.807* -2.194
(1.161) (1.018) (2.106) (1.712) (1.577) (1.412)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 1.378 7.461*** 5.113*** 5.155*** 3.403*** 3.466***
(1.196) (1.456) (1.453) (1.310) (1.091) (1.085)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.728*** 0.851*** 0.950*** 1.003*** 1.204*** 1.010***
(0.146) (0.142) (0.151) (0.161) (0.162) (0.164)
ln(distancehd) -0.235** -0.304*** -0.266** -0.239** -0.188* -0.236**
(0.119) (0.108) (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
contighd 0.806*** 0.685*** 0.884*** 0.856*** 0.897*** 0.855***
(0.178) (0.176) (0.182) (0.181) (0.177) (0.178)
comlanghd 0.567*** 0.630*** 0.706*** 0.784*** 0.757*** 0.714***
(0.182) (0.166) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) (0.169)
colonyhd -0.495** -0.436** -0.677*** -0.746*** -0.788*** -0.653***
(0.193) (0.179) (0.184) (0.188) (0.186) (0.181)
comcolhd 0.200 0.256 0.277 0.247 0.288 0.240
(0.584) (0.396) (0.427) (0.450) (0.493) (0.429)
smctryhd -2.087*** -1.835*** -1.497*** -1.527*** -1.302*** -1.614***
(0.380) (0.328) (0.364) (0.374) (0.361) (0.347)
rtahd,t−1 -0.319 0.0835 -0.0557 -0.0931 -0.0232 0.0602
(0.227) (0.200) (0.224) (0.221) (0.215) (0.211)
comcurhd,t−1 0.357 0.324 0.340 0.386* 0.406* 0.396*
(0.225) (0.217) (0.224) (0.222) (0.223) (0.224)
bithd,t−1 -0.0878 -0.356** -0.290* -0.252 -0.110 -0.0885
(0.180) (0.171) (0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.171)
constant 1.198 -7.751*** -0.227 -0.0585 -2.243 -2.284
(1.843) (2.058) (1.767) (1.776) (1.856) (1.823)
Observations 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795
R2 0.835 0.838 0.835 0.835 0.837 0.836
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. TFP is estimated using Ackerberg-Caves-
Frazer (ACF) .
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Table 33: Alternative TFP Measure — Wooldridge
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.650*** 0.889*** 0.733*** 0.795*** 0.849*** 0.567***
(0.0894) (0.126) (0.144) (0.146) (0.126) (0.0930)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.191 -0.201* -0.246* -0.224* -0.207 -0.211*
(0.121) (0.104) (0.140) (0.127) (0.127) (0.112)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.134 -0.131 0.0313 -0.0302 -0.0391 -0.0593
(0.105) (0.104) (0.107) (0.0989) (0.0898) (0.0846)
RDf,t−1 -0.117 -1.725* -5.103** -3.958** -2.727* -2.175
(1.224) (1.030) (2.086) (1.747) (1.643) (1.462)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 1.292 6.991*** 4.911*** 4.896*** 3.188*** 3.239***
(1.261) (1.461) (1.464) (1.345) (1.135) (1.122)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.662*** 0.846*** 0.931*** 1.016*** 1.184*** 1.023***
(0.143) (0.142) (0.152) (0.162) (0.161) (0.164)
ln(distancehd) -0.221* -0.321*** -0.287*** -0.254** -0.190* -0.241**
(0.118) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109)
contighd 0.784*** 0.684*** 0.864*** 0.835*** 0.877*** 0.879***
(0.177) (0.180) (0.182) (0.182) (0.176) (0.178)
comlanghd 0.636*** 0.708*** 0.787*** 0.865*** 0.831*** 0.778***
(0.183) (0.169) (0.174) (0.174) (0.173) (0.171)
colonyhd -0.565*** -0.508*** -0.780*** -0.848*** -0.878*** -0.736***
(0.192) (0.179) (0.183) (0.186) (0.184) (0.178)
comcolhd 0.693 0.588 0.696 0.731 0.782 0.706*
(0.541) (0.399) (0.429) (0.446) (0.490) (0.428)
smctryhd -2.008*** -1.769*** -1.432*** -1.428*** -1.223*** -1.531***
(0.364) (0.325) (0.366) (0.376) (0.354) (0.339)
rtahd,t−1 -0.418* -0.0441 -0.175 -0.230 -0.134 -0.0632
(0.220) (0.202) (0.227) (0.224) (0.212) (0.209)
comcurhd,t−1 0.348 0.276 0.291 0.353 0.380* 0.377*
(0.220) (0.215) (0.220) (0.217) (0.218) (0.219)
bithd,t−1 -0.0757 -0.324* -0.253 -0.211 -0.0678 -0.0729
(0.182) (0.172) (0.177) (0.179) (0.177) (0.172)
constant -10.66*** 0.252 -10.77*** -1.383 -3.493* -1.979
(2.247) (1.781) (2.107) (1.858) (1.845) (1.807)
Observations 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795
R2 0.828 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. TFP is estimated using Wooldridge.
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Table 34: Alternative TFP Measure — Mollisi-Rovigatti
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.651*** 0.886*** 0.731*** 0.793*** 0.847*** 0.565***
(0.0893) (0.126) (0.144) (0.146) (0.126) (0.0930)
ln(prodf,t−1) -0.191 -0.199* -0.248* -0.220* -0.209* -0.210*
(0.121) (0.105) (0.139) (0.124) (0.126) (0.112)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.143 -0.134 0.0375 -0.0328 -0.0330 -0.0556
(0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.0985) (0.0891) (0.0858)
RDf,t−1 -0.105 -1.713* -5.104** -3.970** -2.729* -2.165
(1.228) (1.025) (2.083) (1.739) (1.637) (1.460)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 1.281 6.915*** 4.914*** 4.903*** 3.188*** 3.233***
(1.265) (1.456) (1.460) (1.339) (1.131) (1.122)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.662*** 0.823*** 0.930*** 1.015*** 1.183*** 1.021***
(0.143) (0.142) (0.151) (0.162) (0.160) (0.164)
ln(distancehd) -0.217* -0.321*** -0.286*** -0.252** -0.191* -0.241**
(0.117) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109)
contighd 0.787*** 0.653*** 0.863*** 0.836*** 0.875*** 0.878***
(0.177) (0.179) (0.182) (0.182) (0.176) (0.178)
comlanghd 0.632*** 0.730*** 0.783*** 0.865*** 0.829*** 0.775***
(0.184) (0.168) (0.174) (0.173) (0.174) (0.171)
colonyhd -0.564*** -0.533*** -0.779*** -0.849*** -0.877*** -0.735***
(0.192) (0.178) (0.183) (0.186) (0.184) (0.178)
comcolhd 0.702 0.555 0.696 0.720 0.782 0.704
(0.545) (0.395) (0.430) (0.444) (0.491) (0.428)
smctryhd -2.007*** -1.766*** -1.433*** -1.432*** -1.227*** -1.535***
(0.364) (0.325) (0.366) (0.375) (0.354) (0.339)
rtahd,t−1 -0.413* -0.0420 -0.169 -0.223 -0.130 -0.0582
(0.220) (0.200) (0.227) (0.223) (0.212) (0.208)
comcurhd,t−1 0.356 0.265 0.294 0.355 0.384* 0.380*
(0.220) (0.215) (0.220) (0.218) (0.218) (0.219)
bithd,t−1 -0.0744 -0.307* -0.248 -0.209 -0.0649 -0.0699
(0.182) (0.172) (0.177) (0.179) (0.178) (0.172)
constant -19.68*** -1.219 -1.592 -1.405 -3.528* -2.016
(2.843) (1.789) (1.821) (1.878) (1.854) (1.817)
Observations 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795 7795
R2 0.828 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831
Origin-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. TFP is estimated using Mollisi-Rovigatti.
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Table 35: Other Instutution Measures
Contract Legal
FDI capital investment
Gh,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.000800** 0.237***
(0.000317) (0.0492)
ln(prodf,t−1) 0.0609 0.0724
(0.180) (0.169)
ln(prodf,t−1) ∗Gd,t−1 -0.00157 -0.0208
(0.00273) (0.0249)
RDf,t−1 -0.104** -4.674***
(0.0476) (0.635)
RDf,t−1 ∗Gd,t−1 0.000999 0.588***
(0.000653) (0.0806)
| ln(gdppch,t−1)− ln(gdppcd,t−1) | 0.621*** 0.955***
(0.156) (0.170)
ln(distancehd) -0.251** -0.120
(0.116) (0.113)
contighd 0.779*** 0.877***
(0.236) (0.231)
comlanghd 0.675*** 0.564***
(0.181) (0.177)
colonyhd -0.367* -0.339*
(0.206) (0.206)
comcolhd -0.0178 0.219
(0.463) (0.451)
smctryhd -1.467*** -1.032***
(0.372) (0.383)
rtahd,t−1 0.00527 0.210
(0.219) (0.196)
comcurhd,t−1 0.301 0.437*
(0.250) (0.239)
bithd,t−1 -0.341* -0.271
(0.178) (0.181)
constant -10.04*** -10.55***
(1.803) (2.246)
Observations 7506 7487
R2 0.798 0.796
Origin-Year FE Y Y
Destination-Year FE Y Y
Sector-Destination fe Y Y
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The institutional quality measure is contractual enforcement
and judical system.
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Table 36: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
management 3.017 0.667 8735
monitor 3.315 0.793 8734
target 2.975 0.791 8735
people 2.833 0.674 8735
(log) employment 6.003 0.969 8735
export 31.941 33.475 3427
employment rigidity 23.384 18.778 8665
PPP-adjusted-GDP 3781.658 4347.875 8735
This reports summary statistics of major variables in
the empirical study.
Table 37: Summary Statistics—Financial Development
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Credit to GDP Overall 99.758 56.909 9.774 237.5804 222
Between 52.88 15.40233 187.7943 20
Within 20.634 38.137 187.9127 11
This table reports the financial development across countries and years.
Table 38: Summary Statistics—External Financial Dependence
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Ext.Dep Overall 1.178 118.73 -2512.778 12755.67 130689
Between 33.0732 -243.7717 1046.855 1244
Within 113.576 -2267.828 11709.99 10.507
This table reports the financial vulnerability variables across countries, years and
industries.
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Table 39: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable management management target target people people
Credit-to-GDP -0.00166* -0.00277* -0.00230 -0.00390 -0.000946 -0.00162
(0.000800) (0.00151) (0.00138) (0.00223) (0.000851) (0.00131)
FinDev*Ext.Dep -0.000168** -0.000152** -0.000322** -0.000321** -0.000128 -0.000115
(6.58e-05) (6.27e-05) (0.000113) (0.000118) (8.55e-05) (0.000124)
export 0.000305 0.000128 0.000296
(0.000462) (0.000583) (0.000282)
Employment Rigidity 0.0212* 0.0295* 0.0122
(0.0110) (0.0136) (0.00742)
PPP-adjusted-GDP 2.62e-05 1.64e-05 1.03e-05
(1.65e-05) (2.53e-05) (2.79e-05)
Observations 5,365 5,325 5,365 5,325 5,365 5,325
R-squared 0.196 0.198 0.162 0.165 0.158 0.158
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This Table reports the panel OLS estimates of equation 22. The dependent variables
measure different aspects of managerial efforts: management measures the average score across all 18 managerial
survey questions; target measures the average score in questions related to "the clarity of target" and people measures
the average score in questions related to "talent retaining/rewarding". All regressions control for industry, year, MNC,
and country fixed effects. The robust standard errors (clustered at year industry and country levels) are reported in
the parenthesis.
Table 40: Baseline Results with Larger Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable management management target target people people
Credit-to-GDP -8.79e-05 -0.000223 -0.00160 -0.00203 0.00138 0.000895
(0.00155) (0.00202) (0.00213) (0.00228) (0.00134) (0.00206)
FinDev*Ext.Dep -0.000179 -7.92e-05 -3.34e-05 0.000101 3.80e-05 2.46e-05
(0.000163) (0.000203) (0.000182) (0.000235) (0.000111) (0.000162)
export -9.90e-05 -0.000794* 0.000489
(0.000470) (0.000405) (0.000673)
Employment Rigidity 0.00153 0.00280 0.00307
(0.0146) (0.0105) (0.0138)
PPP-adjusted-GDP 7.20e-05** 8.46e-05** 5.65e-06
(2.53e-05) (2.65e-05) (2.28e-05)
Observations 1,187 1,171 1,187 1,171 1,187 1,171
R-squared 0.296 0.303 0.235 0.244 0.263 0.268
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This Table reports the panel OLS estimates of equation 22. It uses samples
of firms with (log) employment larger than 7. The dependent variables measure different aspects of managerial
efforts: management measures the average score across all 18 managerial survey questions; target measures the
average score in questions related to "the clarity of target" and people measures the average score in questions
related to "talent retaining/rewarding". All regressions control for industry, year, MNC, and country fixed effects.
The robust standard errors (clustered at year industry and country levels) are reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 41: Robustness Check: Alternative Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable management management target target people people
Credit-to-GDP -0.00159** -0.00252* -0.00228* -0.00374* -0.000856 -0.00139
(0.000620) (0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00196) (0.000663) (0.00108)
FinDev*Ext.Dep -0.000161** -0.000136** -0.000273** -0.000265** -0.000103*** -8.29e-05
(5.83e-05) (5.92e-05) (0.000109) (0.000108) (1.51e-05) (4.63e-05)
export 0.000451 0.000113 0.000390
(0.000451) (0.000551) (0.000374)
Employment Rigidity 0.0207* 0.0287* 0.0110
(0.00979) (0.0132) (0.00676)
PPP-adjusted-GDP 3.57e-05** 2.43e-05 1.78e-05
(1.24e-05) (2.04e-05) (1.98e-05)
Observations 5,927 5,885 5,927 5,885 5,927 5,885
R-squared 0.196 0.199 0.162 0.165 0.158 0.158
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This Table reports the panel OLS estimates of equation 22. The dependent variables
measure different aspects of managerial efforts: management measures the average score across all 18 managerial survey
questions; target measures the average score in questions related to "the clarity of target" and people measures the
average score in questions related to "talent retaining/rewarding". All regressions control for industry, year, MNC, and
country fixed effects. The robust standard errors (clustered at year industry and country levels) are reported in the
parenthesis.
Table 42: Robustness Check: Alternative Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable management management target target people people
Credit-to-GDP -0.00237*** -0.00386*** -0.00314** -0.00504** -0.00145* -0.00221*
(0.000533) (0.00116) (0.00113) (0.00192) (0.000736) (0.00114)
FinDev*Ext.Dep -0.000224* -0.000207 -0.000297* -0.000282* -0.000187 -0.000182
(0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000152) (0.000153) (0.000124) (0.000192)
export 0.000485 0.000275 0.000223
(0.000384) (0.000565) (0.000260)
Employment Rigidity 0.0256** 0.0334** 0.0138*
(0.0104) (0.0142) (0.00625)
PPP-adjusted-GDP 1.75e-05 1.32e-05 1.12e-05
(2.64e-05) (5.44e-05) (2.03e-05)
Observations 4,617 4,586 4,617 4,586 4,617 4,586
R-squared 0.195 0.199 0.167 0.170 0.155 0.156
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This Table reports the panel OLS estimates of equation 22. The dependent
variables measure different aspects of managerial efforts: management measures the average score across all 18
managerial survey questions; target measures the average score in questions related to "the clarity of target" and
people measures the average score in questions related to "talent retaining/rewarding". All regressions control
for industry, year, MNC, and country fixed effects. The robust standard errors (clustered at year industry and
country levels) are reported in the parenthesis.
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Figure 1: Price, Revenue and Destination Market Characteristics HS 24
(a) Price and Market Size: HS 24 (b) Price and Revenue: HS 24
(c) Price and Market Entry: HS 24
Note: The three figures show the correlation between average (log) price across firms exporting to a destina-
tion and destination market size (Panel a), average (log) price and average (log) revenue across destinations
of each firm (Panel b), and average (log) price of a firm across destinations and average number of markets
a firm enters (Panel c), of firms in sector HS 24 (Tobacco). Market size is proxied by population size and
the data is from Penn World Table.
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Figure 2: Price and Destination Market Size
(a) Price and Market Size: HS 30 (b) Price and Revenue: HS 30
(c) Price and Market Entry: HS 30
Note: The three figures show the correlation between average (log) price across firms exporting to a destina-
tion and destination market size (Panel a), average (log) price and average (log) revenue across destinations
of each firm (Panel b), and average (log) price of a firm across destinations and average number of markets
a firm enters (Panel c), of firms in sector HS 30 (Pharmaceutical). Market size is proxied by population size
and the data is from Penn World Table.
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Figure 3: The Correlation between Price and Destination Income
(a) Unit Value and GDP Per Capita: HS 20422
(b) Unit Value and GDP Per Capita: HS 940169
Note: The two figures show the correlation between price and destination GDP per capita for two sectors:
(a) HS 20422 (Meat sheep or goats; (b) fresh, chilled or frozen) and HS 940169 (Seats)
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Figure 4: Preference for Quality and Income, HS 2 - HS 51
Note: The figures show positive correlations between income and quality preferences for sectors: HS 2, HS 3, HS 4, HS 6,
HS 8, HS 11, HS 15, HS 16, HS 19, HS 21, HS 24, HS 32, HS 36, HS 37, HS 40, HS 42, HS 49, HS 50, HS 51
142
Figure 4: Preference for Quality and Income, HS 52 - HS 97
Note: The figures show positive correlations between income and quality preferences for sectors: HS 54, HS 55, HS 58,
HS 59, HS 61, HS 62, HS 65, HS 66, HS 68, HS 69, HS 70, HS 71, HS 74, HS 76, HS 87, HS 88, HS 89, HS 90, HS 91,
HS 92, HS 93, HS 94, HS 96
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Figure 5: Distribution of Cutoffs, HS 2 - HS 51
Note: The figures show differences in distribution of cutoffs between the model in this paper (right) and
Melitz and Ottaviano (left): HS 2, HS 3, HS 4, HS 6, HS 7, HS 8, HS 9, HS 10, HS 11, HS 15, HS 16, HS
17, HS 18, HS 19, HS 20, HS 21, HS 23, HS 24, HS 30, HS 32, HS 34, HS 35, HS 36, HS 37, HS 38, HS 39,
HS 40, HS 42, HS 49, HS 50, HS 51
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Figure 5: Distribution of Cutoffs, HS 52 - HS 97
Note: The figures show differences in distribution of cutoffs between the model in this paper (right) and
Melitz and Ottaviano (left): HS 52, HS 54, HS 55, HS 58, HS 59, HS 61, HS 62, HS 63, HS 64, HS 65, HS
66, HS 67, HS 68, HS 69, HS 70, HS 71, HS 73, HS 74, HS 76, HS 82, HS 87, HS 88, HS 89, HS 90, HS 91,
HS 92, HS 93, HS 94, HS 95, HS 96
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Figure 6: Distribution of Differences Cutoffs, HS 2 - HS 51
Note: The figures show distribution of differences in cutoffs predicted by model in this paper and Melitz
and Ottaviano for sectors: HS 2, HS 3, HS 4, HS 6, HS 7, HS 8, HS 9, HS 10, HS 11, HS 15, HS 16, HS 17,
HS 18, HS 19, HS 20, HS 21, HS 23, HS 24, HS 30, HS 32, HS 34, HS 35, HS 36, HS 37, HS 38, HS 39, HS
40, HS 42, HS 49, HS 50, HS 51
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Figure 6: Distribution of Differences in Cutoffs, HS 52 - HS 97
Note: The figures show distribution of differences in cutoffs predicted by model in this paper and Melitz and
Ottaviano for sectors: HS 52, HS 54, HS 55, HS 58, HS 59, HS 61, HS 62, HS 63, HS 64, HS 65, HS 66, HS
67, HS 68, HS 69, HS 70, HS 71, HS 73, HS 74, HS 76, HS 81, HS 86, HS 87, HS 88, HS 89, HS 90, HS 91,
HS 92, HS 93, HS 94, HS 95
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Figure 7: Change in Cutoffs and Quality Preferences, HS 2 - HS 51
Note: The figures show positive correlations between quality preferences and difference in loss from trade
barrier between the model in this paper and Melitz and Ottaviano for sectors: HS 2, HS 3, HS 4, HS 7, HS
8, HS 9, HS 11, HS 15, HS 16, HS 17, HS 23, HS 24, HS 30, HS 35, HS 36, HS 37, HS 38, HS 39, HS 40, HS
42, HS 51
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Figure 7: Change in Cutoffs and Quality Preferences, HS 52 - HS 97
Note: The figures show positive correlations between quality preferences and difference in loss from trade
barrier between the model in this paper and Melitz and Ottaviano: HS 52, HS 54, HS 58, HS 61, HS 62,
HS 63, HS 64, HS 65, HS 66, HS 68, HS 69, HS 70, HS 71, HS 73, HS 74, HS 76, HS 82, HS 87, HS 88, HS
90, HS 91, HS 92, HS 93, HS 95, HS 96
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Figure 9: Profit Functions of FDI
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Figure 10: Sorting of Firms
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Figure 14: Initial Quality and Optimal Effort Choice
Figure 1 plots effort against firm initial quality levels. The vertical axis is effort level and the horizontal
axis is the firm initial productivity. The above figure is plotted by setting the parameters as: α = 0.5,
fe = 3, fji = 5, fjj = 0, σ = 4, θ = 1.8, τjis = 2, γ = 1, cjs = 1, η = 1, djst = 0.5, λj = 0.85, and tjst = 0.5
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Figure 15: Initial Quality and Optimal Effort Choice: Small Difference
Figure 2 plots effort against firm initial quality levels. The vertical axis is effort level and the horizontal
axis is the firm initial productivity. The above figure is plotted by setting the parameters the same as the
last figure except that λj = 0.85, and 0.4
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Figure 16: Initial Quality and Optimal Effort Choice: Large Difference
Figure 3 plots effort against firm initial quality levels. The vertical axis is effort level and the horizontal
axis is the firm initial productivity. The above figure is plotted by setting the parameters the same as the
last figure, with the exception λj = 0.95 and 0.15
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